The U.S. nuclear modernization program, currently estimated to cost approximately $1 trillion over the next decade, is facing escalating technical and management challenges that have resulted in repeated cost and schedule overruns. The Nunn-McCurdy Act, which requires the U.S. Congress to be informed when defense programs exceed specific cost thresholds, has been violated due to the severity of these issues. The first Nunn-McCurdy notification was issued in January 2024 for the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, and the second was issued in April 2025 for the modernization of the radar for the most recent configuration of the B-52 bomber. It is important to note that these notifications are recent. Additionally, the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report in September 2024 cautioning that the Navy’s initial estimates could be exceeded by nearly five times due to the challenges associated with the construction of the lead Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine.
These cost issues have been the subject of extensive research by John Wolfsthal, the Director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists and a nuclear expert, for more than a decade. He contends that the current economic and political environment in the United States should necessitate a more rigorous examination of the nuclear budget. Wolfsthal emphasizes that the persistent pattern of significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and uncertain future prospects is detrimental to both national security and fiscal responsibility, irrespective of one’s stance on the necessity of a substantial nuclear arsenal. Wolfsthal posits that these budget demands are progressively consuming other components of the defense budget, potentially resulting in a reduction in overall nuclear capabilities. This reduction is not a strategic choice but rather the result of mismanagement and default.
Wolfsthal attributes the current cost escalation to the Obama administration’s response to the Bush administration’s neglect of investments in nuclear stockpile surveillance. Although Obama and Biden prioritized reinvestment to guarantee the arsenal’s security, subsequent modernization commitments—which were initially estimated to be $88 billion over 10 years—expanded rapidly. In 2014, Wolfsthal and colleagues ran an independent analysis that estimated a $1 trillion cost for modernization over 30 years. Nevertheless, the most recent projections suggest that this sum will be expended within a decade, primarily as a result of increasing complexity and political decisions, such as the Trump administration’s decision to award single-source contracts before the programs were fully developed.
These challenges are exemplified by the Sentinel ICBM program. Its cost has now surpassed $140 billion, exceeding the initial estimate of $60–70 billion. In contrast, the B-21 bomber program is classified at the request of the late Senator John McCain, which complicates public oversight. Although Wolfsthal attributes these delays to deficiencies in the defense-industrial base rather than direct mismanagement, the Columbia-class submarine program is also experiencing delays. After violating Nunn-McCurdy guidelines, the radar modernization of the B-52 bomber was recently declared “at-risk.”
In response to inquiries regarding the Nunn-McCurdy Act’s efficacy, Wolfsthal observes that the Defense Department is obligated to recertify the necessity of a program and delineate corrective measures following a violation, but the process frequently lacks transparency. For example, the certification for the Sentinel ICBM program was classified, which prevented public scrutiny. Wolfsthal emphasizes that the current system fails to assure accountability or prompt meaningful reform, necessitating that Congress assert its oversight role.
Additionally, Wolfsthal explores alternatives to the present methodology. During the Obama administration, there were proposals to extend the service life of the most reliable Minuteman III ICBMs and equip them with additional warheads, which could have reduced costs and reliability risks. He recalls this. Wolfsthal contends that it is imperative to reconsider these alternatives, although the Air Force rejected this option. He suggests that the United States could consider developing mobile ICBMs, constructing a new ICBM in smaller quantities, or transitioning to a nuclear dyad that relies exclusively on submarines and bombers, as proposed in a 2018 Global Zero analysis.
Wolfsthal suggests that the most effective approach to improving the oversight and management of nuclear modernization programs is to prioritize and sequence projects rather than endeavoring to modernize all components of the arsenal simultaneously. He is in favor of prioritizing the stabilization of the submarine program, delaying the bomber if necessary, and reevaluating the urgency of the ICBM modernization. Wolfsthal emphasizes that the Pentagon is not prioritizing strategic matters and that neither the Defense Department nor the White House is conducting sufficient oversight. He believes that the only entity capable of implementing the requisite reforms to establish these programs on a more solid foundation is Congress, with the assistance of expert communities and civil society.
Wolfsthal argues that the U.S. nuclear arsenal already includes more than the conventional triad of submarines, ICBMs, and bombers, which is necessary to counter China’s increasing nuclear ambitions and the likely termination of strategic arms control with Russia. It consists of tactical nuclear weapons and long-range cruise missiles. He argues that the genuine risk is not the inability to sustain nuclear deterrence but the inability to maintain effective deterrence as a result of mismanagement and overreach. According to Wolfsthal, the United States must establish a unique strategy, execute it with discipline, and align its capabilities and resources to guarantee national security in the changing global landscape, rather than relying solely on an ever-larger arsenal.