The question of Ukraine’s relationship with NATO is one of the most politically charged, profoundly misunderstood, and frequently weaponized geopolitical debates. The aspiration of Ukraine to become a member of NATO has been viewed in a significantly different perspective since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and particularly since the full-scale war of 2022. Detractors portray it as irresponsible expansionism, while supporters frame it as a sovereign nation’s right to choose its alliances.
One assertion that is particularly noteworthy—and is echoed in political circles, media, and debates—is that Ukraine desired to become a member of NATO “contrary to NATO’s wishes.” This formulation prompts significant questions:Was Ukraine pushing for membership contrary to NATO’s policy? Did NATO ever truly want Ukraine inside the Alliance? Or is the reality more complicated?
To address these questions, it is necessary to examine NATO’s legal framework, Ukraine’s aspirations, internal divisions within NATO, and the broader historical debate regarding NATO’s eastward expansion.
1. NATO’s Open Door Policy: The Legal Framework
The starting point is the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, NATO’s founding document. Article 10 states:
“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”
Two points are crucial here:
- “May,” not “shall” – NATO is not obligated to admit anyone.
- Unanimous agreement—every existing NATO member must consent to admit a new one.
This implies that while NATO remains open in principle, no country possesses a legally binding right to join. Membership is always conditional, political, and dependent on consensus.
2. Ukraine’s Path Toward NATO
Ukraine has had an uneven history with NATO.
- Early 2000s—Kyiv expressed interest in membership, but domestic politics were divided.
- 2010—Under President Yanukovych, Ukraine declared “non-aligned” status, shelving NATO ambitions.
- 2014—After Russia annexed Crimea and war began in the Donbas, Ukraine reactivated its NATO aspirations.
- 2019—Ukraine amended its Constitution to enshrine NATO membership as a strategic goal.
NATO repeatedly expressed its “support for Ukraine’s aspirations” during this time. However, support was never translated into tangible actions, such as a Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is the preparatory phase that the majority of NATO entrants undergo.
3. The Bucharest Summit 2008: Promise Without Guarantee
The turning point came in April 2008, at NATO’s Bucharest Summit. The final communiqué stated:
“We agreed today that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO.”
This sentence has been the subject of interminable debate. It appeared to be a commitment to Ukraine. Russia perceived it as an act of provocation. It was a compromise formula for NATO leaders: the United States and Eastern European allies advocated for Ukraine and Georgia to receive a MAP, while Germany and France opposed it, citing concerns about Ukraine’s readiness and dread of Russia’s reaction. The outcome was equivocal; NATO affirmed its commitment to eventual membership but did not specify a timeline or mechanism.
Consequently, NATO established political expectations in the absence of legal obligations. NATO remained divided; Ukraine experienced encouragement; Russia perceived a threat.
4. Did Ukraine Seek Membership Against NATO Members’ Wishes?
The claim that Ukraine sought membership “against NATO’s wishes” must be understood in light of these divisions.
- Supportive members: The U.S., U.K., Poland, Baltic states, Romania, and others consistently backed Ukraine’s ambitions.
- Opposed or cautious members: Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, and others resisted, citing corruption in Ukraine, lack of reforms, or fear of escalating tensions with Russia.
The resistance of even one member state blocks accession to NATO, as it necessitates unanimity. In that regard, Ukraine was indeed opposing the desires of NATO members—albeit not against all members, but only enough to obstruct consensus.
Framing it as “against NATO” obscures the nuance. NATO was not a monolithic organization. Ukraine’s proposal was in accordance with the desires of certain members and in opposition to those of others.
5. Against NATO Policy?
Did Ukraine’s ambition contradict NATO’s policy? The answer is no.
The “open door” principle has been consistently reaffirmed by NATO, which has always maintained an official policy of enlargement. Nevertheless, enlargement is never automatic and is always conditional. NATO has maintained a deliberate ambiguity regarding Ukraine, expressing support in theory but exhibiting reluctance in practice.
Consequently, Ukraine’s advocacy for NATO membership was not in opposition to NATO’s policy; rather, it was in advance of the organization’s political consensus.
6. The Russian Argument: NATO’s Broken Promise
The broader historical debate regarding NATO’s eastward expansion is inextricably linked to this debate.
- The Russian claim: In 1990–91, Western leaders reassured Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand eastward during negotiations over German reunification. NATO’s admission of Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, and other nations, according to Russia, violated this commitment.
- The NATO response: No legally binding commitment was made. The United States Secretary of State, James Baker, made the statement “not one inch” in reference to NATO forces in East Germany, not Eastern Europe. NATO maintains that the door has always been left open in accordance with Article 10.
- The historical record: Declassified documents show that informal verbal assurances were given, but Gorbachev himself later admitted NATO enlargement was never formally discussed in relation to Eastern Europe.
For Russia, NATO broke the spirit of an understanding. For NATO, it acted within its legal rights.
7. The Ukrainian Argument: NATO’s Unfulfilled Promise
Interestingly, Ukraine mirrors Russia’s complaint.
- Ukraine points to the 2008 Bucharest Summit: NATO said Ukraine “will become a member.”
- Yet, 15 years later, Ukraine is still not inside. From Kyiv’s perspective, NATO has given a promise but failed to deliver.
- NATO replies: The statement was political, not legal. No treaty obligates NATO to admit Ukraine.
Just as Russia accuses NATO of breaking an unwritten promise, Ukraine accuses NATO of withholding a written promise.
8. The Symmetry of Broken Expectations
When placed side by side, the disputes look strikingly symmetrical:
| Russia’s Claim | Ukraine’s Claim | NATO’s Position |
| NATO promised not to expand (1990). | NATO promised Ukraine membership (2008). | No legal commitments were made in either case. |
| NATO betrayed its word. | NATO failed to deliver. | NATO only acts by treaty and consensus. |
| Expansion is illegitimate. | Delay unfair. | Enlargement conditional and political. |
9. Was Ukraine Really Going “Against NATO”?
The assertion that Ukraine pursued NATO membership “against the wishes of NATO” is partially correct but incomplete.
- True in one sense: Because unanimity is required, pushing for membership when powerful powers such as Germany, France, or Hungary rejected it meant Ukraine was going against NATO’s actual decision-making balance.
- False in another sense: NATO’s official policy remained supportive of enlargement, and many members actively championed Ukraine’s case.
A more accurate framing would be that Ukraine pursued NATO membership despite divisions within NATO and resistance from key member states, and in the absence of consensus, its ambition clashed with the organization’s practical readiness to admit it.
10. Conclusion: Ambition, Division, and Ambiguity
The story of Ukraine and NATO is less about legal commitments and more about political expectations.
- NATO never legally promised to admit Ukraine, just as it never legally promised not to expand eastward.
- Ukraine pushed for membership, but NATO was divided, with some members supportive and others resistant.
- Russia used NATO’s openness to Ukraine as proof of betrayal; Ukraine used NATO’s hesitation as proof of abandonment.
- NATO itself maintained an ambiguous stance—encouraging aspirations but never crossing the line of binding obligation.
So, was Ukraine acting against NATO’s wishes? Not exactly. However, it was clearly moving against the wishes of several NATO members and the lack of an agreement was essential for membership.
Nuance is important. Simplifying the debate into a binary of promises kept or broken obscures the reality: NATO’s enlargement story is one of strategic ambiguity, with legal obligations scarce, political assurances abundant, and disappointment unavoidable—for Russia, Ukraine, and possibly even NATO itself.