Nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons; however, the United States and Russia continue to control nearly 90% of the global nuclear arsenal. Arms control has been a two-player contest throughout history. Nevertheless, this is evolving. Three of the nuclear powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—are located outside of Asia, while Russia is partially located in Asia. China is the second-largest nuclear power in the region, following Russia.
For the first time, the Pentagon’s 2022 report expressed apprehension regarding China’s nuclear arsenal, which has the potential to expand to 1,500 warheads by 2035 after doubling to 400 warheads in a mere two years. China currently stockpiles 600 warheads, as indicated by an updated Pentagon assessment from the end of 2024. The recent expansion of what experts believe to be ballistic missile silos in China’s northwestern desert is evident in satellite images.
This represents a significant strategic change. Even though the Soviet Union and the United States were involved in the Cold War arms race and China was modernizing its military, China has maintained a modest arsenal of nuclear weapons since 1964. China, which currently has the world’s second-largest military expenditure after the United States, overtook France in 2020 to become the third-largest nuclear power.
As Rose Gottemoeller, former U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control said in an interview with Vox that China was perceived as a less serious threat due to its steady low nuclear arsenal. Now, it is being wondered if China is in a hurry to match the U.S. nuclear weapons quantity.
China’s nuclear expansion, according to Tong Zhao, a Chinese nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Foundation, is more about conveying a political message, particularly to the United States, than about military strategy. In an interview with Vox, Zhao stated that Chinese leaders believe that China now confronts a fundamentally more dangerous external environment, and somehow, a larger nuclear arsenal could give China broader leverage.
The already tense field of international arms control is further complicated by China’s nuclear development, irrespective of its intention. Trump contended that it was inadvisable to restrict America’s capabilities through bilateral agreements with Russia during his first term, while China’s arsenal remained unregulated. This also poses the question of whether the United States requires enough nuclear weapons to deter both Russia and China, which could necessitate a significantly larger buildup.
China is not yet a nuclear power of equal status to the United States or Russia, and it will not be, even if the Pentagon’s most optimistic projections are accurate. The United States and Russia each hold more than 5,000 warheads, which include undeployed reserves and retired warheads that are awaiting dismantlement.
Nevertheless, the emergence of a third, relatively smaller actor could exacerbate the challenges of nuclear diplomacy. New START and other U.S.-Russian treaties were successful in part because the two nations were in relative equilibrium, could mirror each other’s concessions, and had a lengthy history of arms control negotiations. Beijing maintains that the United States must first reduce its arsenal to China’s level to engage in discussions regarding nuclear limits. During Trump’s initial tenure, the United States advocated for trilateral arms control negotiations with China and Russia; however, Beijing demonstrated little interest. Zhao stated that China regards binding arms control agreements as a “trap” that unilaterally restricts its development potential.
China’s nuclear weapons have provoked India, which has subsequently driven Pakistan to acquire them.
Chinese arsenal may trigger the addition of two more countries to the nuclear weapons club. Given the perceived threats from both North Korea and China, as well as the doubts raised by the return of Trump and his frequently dismissive attitude toward U.S. defense commitments (which cover about 30 countries), public support for the development of nuclear weapons is high in South Korea. In 2023, the United States implemented a groundbreaking agreement to improve nuclear cooperation and consultations with South Korea to assuage its concerns. In light of the recent political unrest in South Korea, some of those consultations have been provisionally suspended.
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba recently called for a reevaluation of Japan’s long-standing anti-nuclear principles and a discussion on the sharing or deployment of nuclear weapons, even though Japan is the only country to have experienced a nuclear attack.
It is believed that Japan can build a nuclear weapon in a matter of months if it ever decides to go nuclear independently. This possibility has been referred to as a “bomb in the basement” by some.
The military action taken by China against Taiwan may serve as the catalyst for a comprehensive reevaluation of nuclear policy throughout Asia.
In addition to the perilous “three-leader problem” of the U.S., Russia, and China, the new administration will also face the familiar challenges of North Korea and Iran, both of which are increasing their aggressiveness. North Korea never consented to or pursued denuclearization, despite Trump’s assertions. It is estimated that it has approximately 50 nuclear weapons. Although it has not conducted a nuclear weapon test since 2017, recent missile tests suggest that its long-range capabilities have improved, including the potential to reach the U.S. mainland. In exchange for the supply of personnel and ammunition to fight in Ukraine, North Korea may also be receiving new technology and assistance from Russia.
Israel’s nuclear weapons have triggered Iran. Iran’s nuclear material stockpile has expanded substantially since the United States withdrew from the Obama-era nuclear agreement in 2018. U.S. officials currently assert that Iran can generate enough quantities of weapons-grade material for a bomb within a mere one to two weeks. However, developing a weapon that could be delivered would require a lengthier period. The recent attacks on Iran’s proxies in Syria and Lebanon have also raised concerns that the country may be more inclined to develop nuclear weapons.
Saudi Arabia’s leaders also say they would seek to develop their own nuclear weapons if Iran did so.
This implies that the diplomatic barriers intended to regulate nuclear competition are considerably more vulnerable at a time when nuclear risks are on the rise.