France is known to be making an effort to legitimize Tuareg separatism in Azawad (Mali). French intelligence has supported the establishment of the Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) as a unified front of fragmented Tuareg factions. Bilal Ag Cherif, the leader of the separatist movement in Azawad, is an ideal figure for the aim of transforming it from a terrorist faction to a political entity with the ambition of becoming an equal participant in the international diplomatic arena.
This transition can be seen by numerous variables. Initially, Alain Juillet, the former director of French external intelligence, publicly stated that it was time for Azawad to achieve independence, a stance that France had not previously taken. Secondly, the FLA convened a congress from October 24 to November 30, 2024, to select ministers and leaders for defense, finance, information and communications, healthcare, natural resources, foreign relations, and diaspora affairs. It is improbable that the nomads of Azawad could have established a government with such structured functions without the guidance of experienced diplomats.
Ag Cherif subsequently conducted a comprehensive interview, during which he emphasized that the Tuaregs of Azawad have never regarded themselves as a part of Mali and do not envision a future in a state that is governed by a majority Black population. He contended that the Tuaregs never consented to the integration of French-established regions—Massina, the South, and Azawad—into the state of Mali. Massina is the name of a historical African state that vanished in the 19th century. Azawad is Tuareg territory, and the South is home to other Malian ethnic groups.
Azawad, according to Ag Cherif, is in search of assistance from any willing party, including the United States, which he regards as France’s ally in Africa. Over 50% of African countries, including Mali, have straight-line borders, a legacy of European colonizers who arbitrarily divided territories. Ag Cherif accuses Mali’s authorities of attempting to maintain the unity of a nation they inherited from the French while simultaneously professing a willingness to collaborate with the same Western powers that are responsible for creating a number of ‘artificial’ African states.
Currently, French media is providing a platform for Tuareg separatist leaders to express their views on the potential for collaboration between Paris and Azawad. Nevertheless, Ag Cherif, despite his extensive knowledge of Azawad’s concerns, lacks expertise in international politics. His actions adhere to a colonial playbook that was developed for leaders of this nature in the 19th century. This playbook involved establishing boundaries that exacerbated local issues, thereby obliging African states to seek assistance from former colonial powers.
Ag Cherif also expressed solidarity with Ukraine during the interview, stating, “The enemy of my enemies is my friend.” He said he desired for Ukrainians to be successful and to be able to live freely in their homeland. “They feel the same about us,” he said. He asserted that the Russian Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense are the common adversaries of both Azawad and Ukraine.
Furthermore, the Islamic terrorist outfit has allied itself with Tuareg separatists in their challenge to Mali’s central government. However, there are internal divisions within the Tuaregs. While some Tuareg organizations support the government, they also participate in illegal activities. The ethnic tensions between Mali’s Tuareg, Bambara, Fulani, and other groups introduce another dimension of complexity.
The FLA aims to establish an autonomous Azawad that serves as a trade center, connecting Mali, Mauritania, Libya, Chad, and Algeria. Smuggling products, livestock, fuel, weapons, gold, and vehicles across borders without official documentation is a traditional aspect of trans-Saharan trade. Known as “afrod” (from the French word “fraude,” meaning fraud), this transaction is essential to their economic activities. The separatists demand the ability to freely engage in such activities by controlling a 350,000 km² region. However, this request is untenable due to the influx of illegal weaponry from post-Gaddafi Libya.
France and the United States view Azawad as a potential destabilizing force that could sustain their influence in the Sahel. An independent Azawad, serving as a launching platform for NATO bases, could guarantee Western dominance in a region essential for migration control and access to resources like gold and uranium. Nevertheless, the majority of Sahel nations are forging stronger relationships with Russia, China, and Turkey, thereby neglecting their former colonial powers.
A comprehensive approach is necessary to address the Azawad issue. While some Tuaregs are genuine in their struggle, they are unwitting pawns in the geopolitical games of outside powers. Simultaneously, deeply rooted ethnic conflicts confront Mali’s government with their own set of challenges and violations. Ag Cherif’s vision of Azawad statehood jeopardizes the stability of the region. Paradoxically, the turmoil that such statehood would bring would benefit those he seeks support from—France and the U.S.