An official presidential campaign has started in Belarus, with the head of state’s election scheduled for January 26, 2025. Signature collection has commenced, and initiative organizations have registered to nominate candidates. Who will be the presidential candidate, and are there any potential surprises in the upcoming election campaign?
The Presidential Candidates
Seven initiative organizations have submitted their registrations. As anticipated, major political parties have nominated their candidates: Oleg Gaidukevich from the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, Alexander Khizhnyak from the Republican Party of Labor and Justice, and Sergey Syrankov from the Communist Party of Belarus. Olga Chemodanova (representing the Belarusian Union of Women), Sergey Bobrikov (a member of the Belaya Rus party), and Anna Kanopatskaya have registered with various initiative organizations.
Alexander Lukashenko, the incumbent chief of state, has also announced his intention to seek reelection as the primary candidate. His initiative group has already submitted its registration.
Anna Kanopatskaya’s candidacy is noteworthy. She was previously a member of the Belarusian National Assembly, where she identified herself as an opposition figure and donned a badge featuring the white-red-white flag during parliamentary sessions. Kanopatskaya was a presidential candidate in 2020 and received 1.68% of the vote. However, her opponents labeled her as a “spoiler” who aimed to divert votes from legitimate opposition contenders.
Some of these names may not make the ballot after the signature collection phase: the first step in candidate certification.
What is the probability of the 2020 scenario?
It is reasonable that there is some apprehension regarding the possibility of an identical scenario in 2025, following the 2020 election, which resulted in attempts at a “color revolution” in Belarus.
The probability of such a result appears to be nearly nil, which implies a low-key election campaign. This time, there are no prominent protest candidates, and the political climate is markedly different from that of August 2020.
In 2020, the pro-Western opposition in Belarus was able to mobilize mass street protests through a network of popular media outlets and blogs, allegedly stemming from vote-rigging. Western governments expressed their support for the protests and declined to acknowledge the election results, asserting that they were in favor of the “democratic forces.”
This was a classic attempt at a color revolution, comparable to those in Georgia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the consolidated state and security apparatus in Belarus, in contrast to the mentioned nations, remained stable and impervious to political and media manipulation, thereby safeguarding constitutional order.
As of today, Belarus has largely dismantled networks of such forces. Belarus either shut down the forces that incited tensions in 2020 or designated them as extremists. Furthermore, the “color revolution” movement saw the dissolution of numerous Western-funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Therefore, Belarus lacks any internal factors that could trigger a repeat of the 2020 scenario. The nationalist opposition, which is currently primarily in exile in Poland and Lithuania, has lost its influence and connection to Belarusian society.
The opposition in Belarus is in a state of disarray
Although the opposition has made some attempts to remind people of its presence, these efforts have been primarily symbolic. Yuri Gubarevich, an exiled opposition leader, attempted to establish an initiative group in order to nominate himself as a presidential candidate. However, as expected, his application faced rejection. Gubarevich has been unsuccessful in both parliamentary and presidential campaigns on numerous occasions.
It appears that the Belarusian opposition does not have a cohesive strategy for the presidential campaign. It is limited to advocating for Western nations to deny the election results and assert the government’s illegitimacy.
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s “office” in Belarusian opposition circles is currently under scrutiny due to the upcoming elections. Tikhanovskaya’s self-proclaimed leadership in the Belarusian opposition hinges on her supposed victory in the 2020 election. She regularly addresses the Belarusian public, earning her the title of “elected president” in Europe and the United States.
Nevertheless, Tikhanovskaya’s “term” would end in 2025, even by this logic. The fact that she is not participating in the elections may call into question her status and that of her “office”. Tikhanovskaya could face obstacles to her leadership, particularly as Belarusian political émigrés compete for the limited Western funds designated for “democracy initiatives” in Belarus.
In summary, Belarus lacks the internal conditions to replicate the 2020 scenario, and the pro-Western Belarusian opposition has manifestly reached a state of crisis and dissipated its influence.
Belarus’s primary potential threats during the presidential campaign are geopolitical, with hypothetical armed provocations at the border, primarily from Ukraine. However, this seems to be a purely theoretical possibility.