The audacious killings of Indian civilians at Pahalgam tore through the moral fabric of South Asia’s supposed ceasefire stability, as tourists were murdered in cold blood in front of their families. The attack wasn’t just another terror strike. The attack was a targeted, sectarian psychological warfare that aimed to humiliate a nation and its people. The message reportedly left behind, “Go tell Modi,” was not simply a taunt. It was a provocation aimed at coercing silence through shame.
India, however, has changed.
The turning-the-other-cheek era has ended in a country that once bore 26/11 with strategic restraint. With the launch of Operation Sindoor, India has demonstrated that any future attack on its citizens will invoke a punitive response. The name of the operation itself is symbolic. “Sindoor”—the vermilion worn by married Hindu women as a mark of their husband’s life and identity—was what the terrorists sought to defile in Pahalgam. In response, India used that very symbol to name a mission of retribution and precision.
The results were precise: nine terror-linked sites targeted with twenty-four precision-guided munitions across the Line of Control (LOC) and the International Border (IB). The strikes were not random nor indiscriminate. They were deliberate, based on real-time intelligence, and executed jointly by the tri-services command structure under complete political oversight.
And yet, what did India achieve? Casualty figures remain unknown. Imagery from the strike zones lacks visible confirmation of enemy deaths. Pakistan had already vacated many of these sites, thanks to India’s rhetoric. While operationally sound, the operation may have been more of a domestic political signal — a calculated step to pacify a grieving and angry nation, not necessarily to neutralize enemy combatants.
This reading is uncomfortable but not unfounded. Pakistan has played a clever game — absorbing the strike, issuing a calming statement through Defense Minister Khwaja Asif, and indicating its unwillingness to escalate. An innovative exit ramp, leaving India to claim retribution while avoiding the costs of a prolonged confrontation. Meanwhile, India cancelled CAPF leaves, not for combat, but to ensure smooth elections and an incident-free Amarnath Yatra. It was also a way to flood J&K with boots for internal control rather than a border war. The reality is nuanced: we demonstrated capability, not consequence.
The significance of the press briefing, however, was symbolic in a different way. Two women officers, Colonel Sofiya Qureshi and Wing Commander Vyomika Singh, stood beside Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri. Their presence sent a message beyond just retaliation. It showcased India’s inclusive strength and its multidimensional approach to security. But behind the optics lies a persistent strategic tension.
The historical context is critical to understanding this cycle. From 1948’s tribal invasion by Pakistan-backed forces to the tank battles of 1965 and the 93,000 prisoners of war in 1971, India has consistently thwarted Pakistani military adventurism. Each time Pakistan lost conventionally, it turned to asymmetric tools: jihadis in Kashmir, support for Khalistani terror, and proxy militias for deniability. The Kargil incursion, the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai carnage, Pathankot, Uri, Pulwama — all chapters in Pakistan’s deep state playbook.
This playbook was refined during the Afghan Jihad. With US support, Pakistan trained and armed Taliban fighters against the Soviets, spawning the very non-state actor model that would haunt the region. Osama bin Laden, initially backed, eventually became a liability. Yet the idea of proxy warfare endured. Pakistan leveraged it not just against India but to shape influence in Afghanistan and beyond. India, too, has had to play in this shadow space, but its doctrine remained state-centric and reactive—until now.
For all its criticisms, Operation Sindoor signals that India will no longer remain a silent spectator. Even if the actual tactical impact is debatable, the doctrinal shift is undeniable.
The Pakistan military, however, is unlikely to roll over. A retaliatory gesture — perhaps mirroring Iran’s drone strike tactics on Israel — may be imminent. With drone technology from China and Turkey, Pakistan could carry out pinprick attacks designed to provoke but not escalate. Yet this is a dangerous game. The precedent from Iran-Israel isn’t entirely in Pakistan’s favor. True Promise I & II proved that the escalation of dominance no longer sits comfortably with the technologically superior power. Pakistan knows this, and it knows India may not show restraint twice.
What complicates this calculus is Pakistan’s internal fragility. The TTP and BLA are attacking with greater coordination. The Afghan Taliban offers little help, and domestic unrest continues to simmer. Any misstep by the Pakistani military might embolden insurgents to strain an already overstretched force further.
A deeper issue is the leadership vacuum. General Asim Munir is not viewed as a strategic thinker. Described by Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa as a “strategic terrorist,” Munir relies more on ideology than doctrine. His focus on securing an extension this November makes him vulnerable to making rash decisions driven by his desire for a personal legacy. If he fails to deliver stability or a strategic win, he risks meeting the fate of Zia — and could find himself hanged on the same scaffold where Bhutto once swung.
Militarily, India must also remain clear-eyed. While the Indian Air Force has shown readiness, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is no pushover. Over the past decade, it has modernized significantly. With J-10 and JF-17 fighters, PL-15 missiles, airborne sensors, and deep interoperability with the PLA Air Force, PAF’s strategic role has evolved from defensive to offensive. Shaheen exercises, pilot cross-crewing, and combined operational strategies have enhanced Pakistan’s ability to sustain and coordinate multi-domain warfare.
While India’s advantage lies in training, readiness, and combat experience, it must not underestimate PAF’s upgraded capabilities. The Balakot operation proved India’s ability to strike but also highlighted gaps. Pakistan’s subsequent “Swift Retort” and its targeting strategy were lessons in rapid adaptation. This is not the PAF of 1965 or 1971. It has studied India’s doctrine and invested accordingly.
Indian procurement lags also remain a strategic liability. While adversaries move toward 5th and 6th generation aircraft, India’s long-delayed induction cycles are becoming critical vulnerabilities. For India to retain air dominance in the coming decade, operational tempo and deep strike capability must be bolstered.
Yet, India holds a crucial advantage — its strategic culture is evolving. From surgical strikes to Balakot to Sindoor, a doctrine of calibrated retaliation is emerging. India no longer seeks approval from global powers before acting. The restraint isn’t weakness; it’s calculus.
The Pakistani military, high on its narratives, believes it can provoke without cost. That illusion is fading. Whether Operation Sindoor was a decisive military success or not, it has reset the psychological battlefield.
The Indian response was deliberate, limited, and clear-eyed. It may not have inflicted massive casualties, but it forced Pakistan to vacate, explain, and pause. It reminded them—and the world—that South Asia has a new strategic normal.
Whether General Munir sees that clearly or not, he is walking a tightrope; the time for dangerous theatrics is over. If he fails to adjust, he may lose his extension and be remembered as the man who broke the back of a brittle empire.
From 1948 to 2025, Pakistan has tested India’s patience. That patience is over.
What replaces it is resolve — cold, calculated, and continuous.
It is pertinent that since Pakistan was created, it has been attempting to cross the Rubicon; India has shown restraint over the years. The situation has changed; the sooner Gen. Asim Munir realizes it, the better. Unlike his predecessors, I can foresee him being hanged from the same scaffold that Zia hanged Bhutto, and that will complete the circle in Pakistan and may perhaps allow a civil government elected by the people of Pakistan. They have suffered far too long under their Mullahs and Military.