India’s strategic engagement with China has been shaped over decades by contested boundaries, recurring military standoffs, and the fragile balance between cooperation and competition. From the humiliation of 1962 to the bloody hand-to-hand combat at Galwan in 2020, the shadow of China remains strong over India’s defence planning, diplomacy, and economic policy.
Yet, there are questions we must ask ourselves honestly:How important is boundary resolution? Is the Line of Actual Control (LAC) really a trigger for war? Should we view China as an adversary, challenger, or competitor? And perhaps most importantly, how does India’s goal of becoming an $8–10 trillion economy influence its strategic stance?
The Boundary Issue: Between Delimitation and Demarcation
Since independence, India has been obsessed with boundary demarcation. The 1959 maps India created, claiming Aksai Chin, directly challenged China’s road link between Xinjiang and Tibet. China’s refusal to accept these claims and Nehru’s insistence that “not an inch of land” would be ceded set the stage for the disastrous 1962 war.
Post-1962, India quietly accepted a “military reality.” The LAC became the de facto line, even though it was never mutually agreed upon. Skirmishes in 1967 at Nathu La and Cho La, where India stood its ground and inflicted heavy casualties on Chinese forces, restored some confidence but did not change the basic equation.
Since then, repeated intrusions, whether at Sumdorong Chu (1986–87), Depsang (2013), Doklam (2017), or Eastern Ladakh (2020), have been more about political signalling than territorial conquest. Beijing employs these salami-slicing tactics to test India’s resolve while keeping escalation below the threshold of war.
The reality is apparent: India does not have the power to alter maps by force. Claims and counterclaims are used as negotiation tools, not as final positions. If Beijing is not aiming for a conclusive settlement, New Delhi must consider whether pursuing an uncertain boundary resolution is worthwhile. Strategic patience, selective assertiveness, and defensive preparedness are more sustainable than striving for perfect cartographic borders.
Tripwire or Pressure Point? Is the unresolved boundary a tripwire for war? Historical evidence suggests otherwise.
1967, Nathu La & Cho La. Intense artillery duels killed hundreds on both sides, yet both governments quickly restored calm.
1986–87, Sumdorong Chu. A significant military build-up risked war, but diplomacy prevailed, resulting in the 1993 Peace and Tranquillity Agreement.
2017, Doklam. A 73-day standoff in Bhutanese territory was resolved through disengagement without shots being fired.
2020, Galwan: Twenty Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops were killed in brutal clashes, but the crisis was contained through military and diplomatic dialogue.
The pattern is clear; both sides are willing to push the envelope, but neither sees full-scale war as beneficial. Instead, Beijing treats the boundary as a pressure point, an instrument of coercion, not conquest.
Take Depsang, where India has long sought the return of nearly 950 sq km of patrolling ground. The truth is, this territory is effectively lost. Holding onto maximalist positions risks strategic self-deception. India must accept some losses as permanent while focusing on preventing fresh erosion.
China in Our Strategic Mindset: Adversary, Challenger, or Competitor?
How India labels China shapes policy. “Adversary” or “challenger” implies a purely military relationship. That narrows our options and risks hardening positions unnecessarily. A more useful lens is to treat China as a competitor.
Competition spans multiple domains: –
Economics. China’s GDP is $17.7 trillion; India’s is $4.1 trillion. Trade is heavily imbalanced. India imports $100 billion worth of goods annually from China while exporting only $15 billion.
Technology. China leads in 5G, AI patents, and EV battery manufacturing; India is catching up but remains dependent.
Military. The PLA modernises rapidly with advanced air defence, cyber, and naval assets. India retains qualitative advantages in mountain warfare but faces a widening gap in high-end capabilities.
Geopolitics. Both countries court the Global South and seek influence in multilateral forums, from BRICS to the SCO.
China may, at times, behave as an adversary, such as at Galwan, but India should avoid doctrinal rigidity. The label must be situational, not permanent. Flexibility in our strategic vocabulary keeps policy adaptive, not reactionary.
Engagement: A Layered Approach
If China is a competitor, how should India engage? The answer lies in a layered approach combining deterrence, diplomacy, and partnerships.
Tactical. Strengthen border infrastructure, surveillance, and rapid deployment forces to deny local advantages to PLA intrusions. The creation of integrated theatre commands, when implemented, should ensure faster, unified responses.
Strategic. Deepen ties with countries that share concerns about China, such as Japan, Australia, Vietnam, and the US, under the Quad framework. Simultaneously, avoid permanent alignment that reduces India’s room for manoeuvre.
Diplomatic. It is crucial to maintain dialogue with Beijing to manage crises, while cooperating selectively in areas like climate change, global trade, and counter-terrorism. Diplomatic efforts are essential in navigating the complexities of India-China relations.
This layered approach recognises that confrontation and cooperation can coexist. India’s ability to avoid over-extension and instead pursue calibrated engagement is a testament to its resilience and adaptability in the face of complex geopolitical challenges.
The Mirage of the $10 Trillion Dream
Economic growth is the foundation of strategic power. Without it, military modernisation, diplomatic influence, and domestic resilience cannot be sustained. But India must confront uncomfortable truths.
Nearly 800 million Indians depend on government food subsidies, highlighting the fragility of social safety nets.
Infrastructure gaps, power shortages, collapsing urban systems, and inadequate logistics continue to drag on productivity.
Agricultural distress and climate-related shocks undermine food security.
Despite headline growth rates of 7–8%, unemployment remains stubbornly high, particularly among youth.
The dream of an $8–10 trillion economy by 2035 is aspirational, not guaranteed. China’s rise was built on sustained double-digit growth for three decades, coupled with industrial deepening and export dominance. Domestic inequalities and governance deficits constrain India’s path.
Strategic ambition must therefore be anchored in reality. Inflated numbers and political narratives cannot substitute for the urgent need for structural reforms in land, labour, and capital markets. Only a resilient, broad-based economy can sustain India’s geopolitical aspirations.
Conclusion
India’s China strategy must be grounded in clarity, restraint, and realism. The unresolved boundary is less a tripwire for war and more a bargaining lever wielded by Beijing. India must accept certain territorial losses while investing in deterrence against fresh encroachments.
The way we define China matters. Viewing it as a competitor rather than a permanent adversary creates space for flexibility. Engagement must be layered; robust defence on the ground, strategic partnerships at the regional level, and selective cooperation on global issues.
Finally, India’s geopolitical ambitions must rest on genuine economic strength. Without reforms that lift millions out of dependency and build sustainable infrastructure, the $10 trillion milestone will remain a mirage.
China will remain a formidable competitor in our neighbourhood and beyond. The task before India is not to wish away disputes or inflate ambitions, but to navigate the contest with realism and resilience. Only then can we avoid the traps of both fatalism and overconfidence, steering our national interest with steady hands in turbulent times.
India has to rethink who governs. Lawyers govern the US. Engineers lead China, and India is led by self-serving politicians; we need to choose wisely who will lead us to greater heights.