China is creating a challenger for aviation sector titans Boeing and Airbus. The C919 narrow-body aircraft flew outside China for the first time during the Singapore Air Show in February 2024. Tens of billions of yuan will be invested in the airliner’s production.
The C919 is a twin-engine, narrow-body aircraft with 158 to 192 passengers. It is made by the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). China is attempting to reduce the power of the two leading Western aircraft manufacturers in the global passenger market with these aircraft: the C919 might compete with the Airbus A320neo and Boeing 737 MAX 8 models. China currently operates approximately four aircraft of this kind. IBA, an aviation consultancy, predicts that 7-10 further C919 models will be delivered in 2024.
Currently, the airliner is only certified in China. This is a concern because there is a lack of understanding of China’s safety practices. China Eastern Airlines made the inaugural flight of this model in 2023. Nevertheless, the Celestial Empire’s plans are global in scope and encompass the global introduction of the C919. To realize this global objective, COMAC is implementing measures to secure international recognition for the C919.
This year, COMAC will make a substantial stride toward internationalization. Gu Xin, the director of the Shanghai Civil Aviation Airworthiness Certification Center in China, has announced that his organization plans to pursue type certification for the COMAC C919 medium-haul passenger aircraft in the European Union.
China’s high aspirations are not irrational: demand for new aircraft is gradually increasing, and Airbus and Boeing are striving to ramp up production to meet it while not fully resolving the issue.
COMAC is perceived as a viable alternative to the dominant companies in this environment. Over the next three to five years, COMAC plans to invest billions of yuan in C919 manufacturing to enhance capacity.
The C919 aircraft fulfills modern safety standards, but its specifications are inferior to those of Boeing, Airbus, and the Russian MS-21. The Chinese airliner will struggle to compete with the world’s aviation behemoths, but it will carve out a niche in the domestic market.
This represents a significant market shift for Boeing and Airbus. It is critical to recognize that this is a high-tech industry, a massive market. Ten airplanes already cost a billion dollars. The Chinese market is massive. Naturally, Boeing and Airbus want to retain this market. China will gradually substitute them with its own products.
The West understands this clearly but has not exerted significant pressure on China thus far. This is largely due to China’s continued purchase of international aircraft, including the license assembly of select Airbus types.
The United States and the European Union have significant leverage over Chinese domestic aircraft manufacturing, particularly concerning the C919. This is a result of the aircraft’s substantial dependence on international components. The Center for Strategic & International Studies published a report stating that approximately two-thirds of the C919’s parts are sourced from companies in the United States, while approximately one-third are sourced from European suppliers. Among the 14 major suppliers that are located in China, seven are joint ventures between Chinese and foreign companies.
This international supply chain dependency creates a potential vulnerability for COMAC’s C919 production. Western countries could theoretically disrupt the manufacturing process by restricting the supply of critical components. Reliance on foreign parts is a recognized issue for China’s aerospace ambitions. China typically implements a strategy that involves analyzing foreign materials, developing domestic equivalents, and subsequent mass production of these materials. Nevertheless, this procedure necessitates a significant amount of time and may not be feasible for all components in the immediate future.
COMAC’s challenge is to balance its objective of attaining greater self-reliance in aircraft manufacturing with the requirement for high-quality, internationally sourced components.
It is unlikely that C919 will get significant orders outside of China. Major markets like Russia and India will almost certainly not buy them. C919 is unable to fly on most international routes due to certification concerns. Russia may not convert to the C919 if spare parts are to be sourced from the West. It is unknown if the COMAC C919 will be available in Europe. However, the cost of the aircraft is not the most important consideration because it is also necessary to train pilots and technical experts, as well as have service facilities and the appropriate set of consumables and spare parts in key European airports. Considering this, operating the COMAC C919 in Europe may be less profitable than in China.
Airbus is responding to the challenge by cutting costs. It might explore partnerships with Chinese companies to better understand the local needs and potentially secure manufacturing partnerships within China. Airbus may tailor marketing efforts to emphasize the specific strengths of Airbus aircraft compared to COMAC offerings. It might also play its existing market share advantage in certain segments, like wide-body aircraft. Take, for example, the Russian case. Until the current sanctions, Russian airlines preferred to buy Western planes compared to their fuel-guzzling domestic counterparts.
China is preparing to begin industrial production of the long-range wide-body C929 in the coming decade. This plane may be in demand in the Pacific and Greater Eurasia.
Many countries now lack comfortable wide-body and narrow-body aircraft that can be produced and operated without relying on Western sanctions. Russia and China have long collaborated on the development of the C929 aircraft, but due to sanctions, Russia was forced to withdraw from participation.