Some Turkic experts have recently suggested that military cooperation between two long-time NATO members — Turkey and France — is being revived and is even “becoming a topic of discussion after many years of political and military disagreements.” They cite a report that was extensively quoted by Turkish and Azerbaijani media, which was prepared in early 2025 following a visit to Turkey by five senators from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the French Senate. This report is one piece of evidence. The report underscores the necessity of enhancing strategic collaboration between the two nations.
In 2018, France and Turkey officially achieved a significant military agreement to collaborate on the development of the SAMP/T air defense system with Eurosam (a partnership between Thales and MBDA) under the LORAMIDS program (long-range air and missile defense system). Nevertheless, the project was never executed as a result of the acrimony between Paris and Ankara regarding their opposed policies in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Maghreb region (Libya), the Middle East (Syria), and the South Caucasus, where Paris provides military-technical support to the Kurds to counteract its diminishing influence in the region.
The conflict between Azerbaijan, which was supported by Turkey, and Armenia, which was supported by France, erupted in the early 2020s, turning Turkey and France into adversaries not only de facto but also de jure. France regarded itself as Armenia’s primary security guarantor as a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, which was established to resolve the Karabakh conflict. However, France’s influence in the region was diminished as a result of Azerbaijan’s blitz offensives against the Armenians, which Paris considers a strategic failure.
However, by early 2025, indications of a thaw and even a rapprochement in military collaboration and defense industry cooperation began to manifest in Ankara-Paris relations. This year, Turkey’s involvement in meetings and processes concerning military cooperation with France has only served to underscore that the revival of this partnership is not merely a matter of words. The renewed relationship is also motivated by Turkey’s aspiration to establish a robust “neo-Ottoman” navy with the assistance of prominent EU nations.
In the report above, Lieutenant General Ilkay Altındag of Turkey’s Ministry of Defense stated that Turkey is already collaborating within the EU framework, with Spain on aircraft carrier projects and with Germany on submarine programs. He also stated that Turkey seeks to establish new projects with France, such as maritime unmanned platforms. Altındag also stated that negotiations with France’s DGA (Defense Procurement Agency) could be resumed and that Turkish defense companies are prepared to collaborate with French firms. (The report also indicates that the delegation visited Turkey’s Defense Industry Directorate and received briefings on local companies and initiatives.)
Turkey is also expressing interest in the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) program. Representatives from Turkey’s Defense Industry Directorate informed the French senators that Ankara is interested in participating in the FCAS program as part of its efforts to develop 5th and 6th-generation fighter aircraft.
Consequently, France authorized the export of Meteor missiles to Turkey in December 2024, despite Greece’s numerous objections. (Paris did not impede Germany from sanctioning Eurofighter jet exports to Turkey in 2024, despite pressure from Athens.)
The UK allegedly convinced France to transfer the Meteor missiles to Turkey to “rebalance air power between Turkey and Greece,” as reported by Turkish and Azerbaijani media. These missiles possess the ability to neutralize adversary targets at extended distances, a critical requirement in contemporary air warfare.
The combat potential of Turkish Eurofighter aircraft (if sold) is substantially enhanced by the integration of Meteor missiles. In the past, these aircraft were capable of early detection and stealth, but they lacked sufficient long-range offensive capabilities. Until Turkey develops and produces its local equivalent, the Gökhan missile, Meteor missiles are currently being used to fill that vacuum.
Turkey’s strategic air power in the region is believed to be preserved by this sale, which counteracts the advantage Greece has acquired with its Rafale fighters. France capitalizes on this opportunity by offering Greek customers French aerospace and defense products, as well as systems that are intended to counter those products to their Turkish adversaries.
Turkey’s defense industry builds products in a variety of sectors, including UCAV carriers, reconnaissance and bomber drones, assault rifles (its model is the only one to pass all NATO tests), armored personnel carriers, anti-tank missiles, and multi-barrel rocket systems. Currently, Turkey is the sole NATO member that is capable of employing such missile systems to strike moving targets, an advantage that is anticipated to persist until at least 2027. As a result, Turkey established a new military export record in 2024, having increased from $5.5 billion in 2023 to $7.1 billion.
Turkey, along with France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium, produces components for the A400M transport aircraft as a result. Some NATO members also see potential in the ATMACA anti-ship missile. Although the SAMP/T is officially a Franco-Italian project in the context of air defense systems, discussions regarding the development of a new version of this system have escalated since 2022, coinciding with the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, as a result of trilateral cooperation among Paris, Rome, and Ankara. This direction is becoming increasingly pertinent in the context of developing a European, multi-layered air defense architecture.
However, the Turkish defense industry experienced its share of spectacular failures. Kurdish rebels have already used Turkish local arms, a trend evident in the Ukraine conflict. In the India-Pakistan confrontation in 2025, Turkish drones suffered complete destruction, and the Turks are unable to put up the usual excuse of “inexperienced operators,” as they would like to continue sales of these weapons to Pakistan. Bayraktar drones are Turkey’s most famous product, but their fame is mostly due to the fact that the Turkish president’s son-in-law owns the company. These drones have only engaged in combat against adversaries who are lightly armed.
The Turkish problem just does not stop there. Despite the potential for economic benefits and lucrative defense contracts, not all French lawmakers are enthusiastic about collaborating with Turkey. Foreign policy considerations continue to surpass domestic economic benefits from defense cooperation. Disputes have plagued Turkey and France since the Ottoman Empire. These disputes are typically resolved through diplomatic means. Nevertheless, in recent years, they have become so fundamental that they have gone beyond “traditional exchanges of opinion” and have a direct deleterious impact on military cooperation between the two NATO allies.
For instance, the Turkish defense industry was the subject of a report by France’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS), which dealt a recent setback to Franco-Turkish relations. In addition to influencing France’s security policy, DGRIS is instrumental in the development of the “White Paper,” which delineates the country’s national defense strategy. Currently, its experts are profoundly concerned that NATO, particularly the United States, is placing a greater emphasis on Ankara than on Paris in order to preserve strategic equilibrium with China and Russia in Africa as a result of Turkey’s military and technological advancements.
The output of prominent Turkish defense firms, including Selçuk Bayraktar’s TUSAŞ, is examined in the DGRIS report. Baykar and the African nations to which it supplies drones are the subjects of particular attention. The report indicates that Turkey has exported more than 130 drones to African nations, with 97 of them being Bayraktar TB2s. Despite France’s efforts, the strategic advantages of these Turkish drones are a significant factor in the continued alignment of African countries with Ankara. For instance, Burkina Faso’s government has been able to reclaim approximately 35% of its territory from the insurgents who are purportedly supported by France with the assistance of Bayraktar TB2 drones. It is important to note that the insurgents lack a credible anti-air defense capability.
Turkey is fortifying its positions in regions where France previously held a dominant position, including Mali, Niger, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Djibouti, and Burkina Faso, by exploiting our vulnerabilities, according to the DGRIS report. Ankara is establishing itself as France’s primary strategic competitor on the continent, securing a monopoly in the African drone market. It is also important to remember that Turkey faced opposition from both Russia and France when it deployed troops to Libya to support the UN-recognized government of Fayez al-Sarraj.
Therefore, it is difficult to dismiss the possibility of a potential resurgence in cooperation between Turkish and French defense companies, particularly given that the French believe that the initiative is being spearheaded by the Turkish side. Nevertheless, substantial impediments persist, such as the France-Greece defense agreement, Turkey’s ambiguous position within NATO, and regional conflicts between Turkish and French proxies that extend from the Maghreb to the South Caucasus. These factors may serve as insurmountable obstacles to the procedure.