In an era where wars begin long before the first shot is fired, intelligence superiority has shifted decisively from secrecy alone to sense-making at speed. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) today shape the battlespace invisibly through data exhaust, digital footprints, satellite imagery, cyber signatures, and narrative warfare. For India, a rising power facing persistent strategic pressure from both state and non-state adversaries, the integration of AI-enabled OSINT into military decision-making is no longer optional; it is existential.
Yet, despite technological advances and episodic successes, India continues to be surprised by Kargil (1999), Pulwama (2019), and Galwan (2020), and repeated terror strikes in Jammu & Kashmir are reminders that intelligence failure is not always about the absence of information, but about the failure of fusion, imagination, and institutional design.
OSINT in the Indian Context: Present but Peripheral
India’s Armed Forces utilise OSINT for social media monitoring, satellite analysis, and narrative tracking, but its limited integration hampers strategic advantage. Highlighting its current peripheral role underscores the need for institutional prioritisation.
This mindset is dated. Modern conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza demonstrate that OSINT, when fused with AI, can provide early warning, intent assessment, and escalation indicators well before traditional channels respond. Embracing this approach can inspire confidence in India’s strategic resilience by showing that institutional ownership and doctrinal centrality are within reach.
Strategic Surprise: Patterns That Refuse to Disappear
A retrospective look at India’s major intelligence failures reveals a disturbing continuity.
- 1962: Political idealism (“Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai”) substituted for ground truth.
- 1999: Lahore Bus Yatra optimism coexisted with Pakistani intrusions in Kargil.
- 2019: Pulwama exposed CI grid dilution and narrative blindness.
- 2020: Galwan occurred amid misplaced assumptions of “bonhomie” and stability.
In each case, data existed in signals, indicators, and behavioural cues, but they were either ignored, misinterpreted, or suppressed by bureaucratic inertia and cognitive bias. The problem was not intelligence collection; it was intelligence fusion and credibility hierarchy.
Field intelligence, local indicators, and unconventional warnings were often overridden by centrally assessed “A1” intelligence, reflecting a systemic bias toward pedigree rather than plausibility.
Galwan: A Case Study in Missed Technological Opportunity
Galwan stands out as a particularly troubling episode. In an age of ubiquitous UAVs, drones, and commercial satellite imagery, confirming PLA presence and mobilisation should not have been difficult. Yet, persistent ISR was absent, and the confrontation unfolded tactically blind.
This was not a technological failure; it was an organisational and doctrinal failure, the absence of a continuously operating, AI-enabled OSINT and TECHINT grid capable of flagging anomalies in real time. Galwan should be studied not merely as a border clash, but as a warning about India’s gaps in persistent sensing.
AI-Enabled OSINT: From Information to Anticipation
AI transforms OSINT from passive observation into anticipatory intelligence. Its true value lies in scale, speed, and pattern recognition: –
- Detecting mobilisation patterns across logistics, transport, and communications.
- Tracking narrative preparation and psychological conditioning before kinetic action.
- Identifying force posture changes through imagery, shipping data, and commercial ISR.
- Predicting escalation thresholds through behavioural and historical modelling.
- When fused with classified intelligence, AI-OSINT compresses the OODA loop, enabling commanders to act ahead of the adversary, not react after damage is done.
In operational terms, this is not incremental improvement—it is a decisive advantage.
The Cultural Barrier: HUMINT Supremacy vs Cognitive Fusion
The Indian Armed Forces rightly value HUMINT, built on experience, intuition, and ground presence. However, modern warfare no longer allows HUMINT to remain the exclusive source. OSINT and AI are not substitutes; they are force multipliers.
The challenge lies in cultural adaptation. OSINT is often seen as unreliable because it is open, ignoring the reality that adversaries themselves now operate openly digitally and socially, leaving exploitable trails.
AI does not “think,” but it reveals relationships humans cannot see unaided.
The future lies in human-on-the-loop systems, where machines inform decisions and humans retain judgment. Rejecting AI because it lacks intuition is as flawed as unquestioningly trusting it.
Institutional reform is vital. Strengthening the DIA as the central integrator of multi-domain intelligence can empower India to lead in modern warfare, fostering a sense of purpose and urgency among decision-makers to act decisively.
For OSINT to be operationally decisive, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) must be empowered as the central hub for integrating multi-domain intelligence, ensuring cohesive, timely decision-making.
This requires: –
- Dedicated AI-OSINT directorates within DIA.
- Real-time data pipelines to Corps, Division, and Brigade Operations Rooms.
- Automated fusion of HUMINT, SIGINT, TECHINT, and OSINT.
- A web-enabled kill chain, linking sensors, shooters, and decision-makers seamlessly.
Without DIA-centric integration, intelligence will remain fragmented across silos, vulnerable to turf wars and delay.
One of India’s most critical opportunities is developing human capital. Building a new cadre of tech-savvy specialists-data scientists, coders, and cyber Experts-can instill pride in pioneering a modern, innovative defense force capable of winning future wars.
India’s critical blind spot is human capital; developing a cadre of tech-savvy specialists-data scientists, coders, and cyber analysts-is essential for transforming intelligence into a strategic advantage in modern warfare.
These individuals may not conform to conventional military profiles, but they deliver disproportionate strategic value. A hybrid civil-military intelligence workforce is no longer unconventional; it is essential.
Wars of the future will be won not just by warriors, but by nerds who understand the battlespace better than the enemy. Visible in the OSINT videos in Ukraine, being effectively used by the Russians and the Ukrainians.
Recent Operations: Signals of Progress and Warning
Operations such as Balakot and Operation Sindoor indicate a higher degree of intelligence fusion, precision targeting, and narrative control, suggesting mature use of AI-enabled OSINT and ISR. Conversely, cyber intrusions and grey-zone actions highlight persistent vulnerabilities.
Official silence limits public analysis, but the strategic takeaway is clear: success is episodic, not systemic. Lessons learned must be institutionalised, not classified into oblivion.
The MoD Problem: Generalists in a Specialist War
Perhaps the most uncomfortable truth lies within the Ministry of Defence. India continues to entrust military preparedness to a bureaucratic structure dominated by generalists, many of whom lack exposure to the complexity of modern warfare.
The Defence Secretary remains legally responsible for national defence, yet often without operational understanding of AI-driven, multi-domain conflict. This imbalance is no longer sustainable.
India needs: –
- Greater uniform representation in MoD decision-making.
- Domain specialists, not rotating administrators.
- Faster procurement, testing, and doctrinal adaptation cycles.
- Diplomacy without credible military capability is rhetoric; capability without intelligence dominance is illusion.
Three Strategic Imperatives for the AI Age
If India is to avoid future strategic surprise, three imperatives are non-negotiable: –
- Define National Interests Clearly
- Ambiguity invites miscalculation. Political optimism must never override military realism.
- Institutionalise AI-Enabled Intelligence Fusion
- OSINT, AI, and ISR must be embedded into operational workflows, not treated as add-ons.
Rebalance Civil-Military Structures
Specialists must lead defence preparedness, supported, not constrained by bureaucracy.
Conclusion: Surprise Is a Choice
In the AI age, strategic surprise is rarely caused by a lack of information. It is caused by failure to connect dots, challenge assumptions, and empower institutions.
India possesses the technological capability, human talent, and strategic necessity to dominate the intelligence battlespace. What remains is the will to reform structures, trust data without abandoning judgment, and recognise that future wars will be won first in the cognitive domain.
The question is no longer whether India can see the storm coming but whether it chooses to open its eyes.