The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) conducted a meticulously planned operation, designated “Spider Web,” on June 1, 2025, to target Russian military aviation assets that were located deep within Russian territory. This unprecedented attack represented a substantial increase in Ukraine’s use of innovative drone warfare, as it targeted the strategic bomber fleet of Russia and exposed vulnerabilities in its military defenses.
The operation was the result of more than 18 months of meticulous preparation, which was personally overseen by SBU chief Vasyl Malyuk and supervised by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Small first-person-view (FPV) drones were covertly transported into Russia, concealed within mobile wooden cabins that resembled construction site trailers, according to Ukrainian sources. The drones were concealed beneath the roofs of these cabins, which were loaded onto vehicles. The drones were released to attack their pre-selected targets at multiple military airfields when the roofs were remotely opened at the critical moment. In addition, there is speculation that certain drones may have been constructed within Russia, which would further complicate Russian counterintelligence procedures.
The assaults were directed at a minimum of four significant airfields: Belaya in the Irkutsk region, Olenya in the Murmansk region, Dyagilevo in the Ryazan region, and Ivanovo in the Ivanovo region. Satellite imagery and Ukrainian claims suggest that at least ten military aircraft were destroyed in the initial analysis. The SBU has claimed that 41 strategic aviation aircraft, including Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160 bombers, and A-50 early warning planes, were rendered inoperable. The Belaya airbase, which is situated over 4,000 kilometers from Ukraine, was particularly noteworthy due to its demonstration of the extraordinary scope of Ukrainian drone operations. The SBU has estimated that the total damage exceeds $2 billion, with some Ukrainian officials speculating that the figure could be as high as $7 billion. However, these figures have not been independently verified.
The Russian Ministry of Defense formally acknowledged the attacks, characterizing them as a “terrorist attack using FPV drones” and verifying that multiple pieces of aircraft equipment were set ablaze at the Murmansk and Irkutsk airfields. According to Russian authorities, all attacks in the Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions were successfully repelled, and there were no casualties among military personnel or civilian staff. They also stated that certain participants in the attacks had been apprehended. However, the SBU refuted this claim, asserting that all Ukrainian operatives involved had already returned to Ukraine. This implies that any Russian detentions would be for domestic propaganda purposes.
At least 117 drones were used in Operation “Spider Web,” which is the most extensive and largest drone attack on Russian airbases since the beginning of the conflict. The attack targeted airfields in five Russian oblasts and across multiple time zones. The operation has been widely acknowledged as a pivotal moment in contemporary warfare, as it illustrated the capability of drone technology and artificial intelligence to strike high-value targets deep behind enemy lines, thereby profoundly altering the strategic calculus of the conflict.
Why Does Russia Park Strategic Aircraft in the Open?
Legacy infrastructure and Soviet-era practices are the main explanations why Russia stations its strategic aircraft, including the Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160 bombers, in the open on airbase tarmacs, rather than inside hardened shelters. The primary objective of maintaining many Russian airbases was to disperse aircraft across expansive open spaces in order to facilitate rapid deployment. Consequently, the reinforced shelters that remain are frequently outdated, deteriorated, or inadequately sized to accommodate these large bombers. This infrastructure constraint has endured to the present day.
Cost and logistical constraints are also major factors. The building of new, large-scale reinforced shelters for strategic bombers is resource-intensive and costly. Investing significantly in infrastructure upgrades has not been a priority for Russia due to its current economic challenges, which include international sanctions and military expenditures. Additionally, the open parking of aircraft enables maintenance personnel to access the aircraft more easily, thereby facilitating faster pre-flight checks, repairs, and refueling. This supports the maintenance of bombers at a high level of readiness and enables the rapid launch of the aircraft.
In the past, Russia’s perception of the threat has been centered on the prevention of large-scale missile or air attacks, rather than low-cost, small drone attacks. Hardened shelters were intended to withstand conventional or nuclear attacks; however, they were not optimized for the emerging threat of precision drone strikes. The decision to maintain open parking was influenced by this underestimation of drone capabilities. Moreover, in certain colder regions, the main need for shelters was protection from harsh weather rather than adversary attacks, which made open parking appear to be adequate.
Ukrainian drone attacks in June 2025, which effectively destroyed or damaged numerous Russian strategic bombers that were parked in the open, starkly exposed the vulnerability of this approach. This demonstrated the inadequacy of Russia’s multilayered air defenses in the face of contemporary drone threats and underscored the hazards of open parking. The incident has compelled military analysts and foreign observers to underscore the pressing necessity of reinforced shelters to safeguard valuable aircraft from similar attacks in the future.
Compliance with the New START Treaty, which establishes specific constraints on strategic nuclear forces, is an additional factor that affects Russia’s parking practices. Under New START, the United States and Russia are each restricted to a maximum of 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers that are equipped with nuclear armaments. The total number of deployed strategic warheads is 1,550, and there are 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. The treaty mandates comprehensive notifications and inspections, which include the status and locations of delivery vehicles and launchers. Additionally, it permits up to 18 on-site inspections annually. This transparency necessitates that both parties consistently disclose and verify the quantity and location of their strategic bombers, which complicates the concealment of a large number of aircraft. Nevertheless, this is applicable only during periods of peace.
Russia may have a lower incentive to conceal its strategic bombers in shelters or subterranean facilities due to the emphasis on transparency and verification in New START. Rather, open parking facilitates compliance with treaty requirements, including on-site inspections and satellite monitoring, by ensuring that the aircraft are visible and accessible to inspectors. This method is consistent with the treaty’s principle of transparency; however, it is associated with substantial operational vulnerabilities in the contemporary era of drone warfare, as recent events have demonstrated.