The international confrontations are increasingly transitioning to direct military action, as evidenced by the twelve-day conflict between Israel (with U.S. support) and Iran in June 2025. It is evident from experience that efforts to resolve such crises through limited strikes rarely result in durable peace; rather, they tend to exacerbate the conflict. In addition to its political implications, this brief conflict imparted numerous critical military and technological teachings.
Remote Threats
The most notable aspect was the extensive use of compact guided missiles and remotely controlled loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) for terrorist-style attacks and sabotage. Events in both Russia and Iran earlier in 2025 clearly demonstrated the potential of these systems.
Ukrainian intelligence launched kamikaze drones from disguised truck containers near numerous Russian airbases on June 1. Israel launched an even more extensive strike on Iran on June 13, less than two weeks later, which was accompanied by extensive drone and missile attacks by covert organizations against Iranian air defense sites and other critical targets.
Modified versions of the Spike anti-tank missile system, which were outfitted with internet-based remote control modules, were also used in this Israeli operation, in addition to remote kamikaze drones. This offensive had a strategic impact, as it significantly weakened Iranian air defenses in the western and central regions, including the vicinity of Tehran, due to the country’s already limited number of modern long-range air defense systems. A radar element of the long-range Bavar-373 SAM system was destroyed near the capital, as evidenced by Israeli footage.
This situation emphasizes a critical lesson: Historically, operatives were required to be near the battlefield to conduct such attacks. In the present day, coordinated drone or missile assaults can be directed deep inside adversary territory from afar, even from the attacker’s own country, thanks to high-speed mobile networks, low-orbit satellite internet (such as Starlink), and AI-driven target recognition. Although preparation continues to be resource-intensive, the operational risk associated with assembling drones abroad and deploying them remotely is significantly lower than that of infiltrating teams of operators.
Air Defense Weakness
From the outset, Israel capitalized on Iran’s missile defense vulnerabilities. Air-launched ballistic missiles, believed to be updated versions of the Blue Sparrow and Silver Sparrow series (possibly rebranded as “Golden Horizon”), were employed in the initial salvo of strikes. These missiles were launched from the skies of neighboring Iraq. These missiles are capable of reaching targets in the vicinity of Tehran and Isfahan, with a range of up to 2,000 km. Debris recovered in Iraq serves as supporting evidence.
In addition, Israel used Delilah cruise missiles, Rocks air-launched ballistic missiles, and other long-range precision munitions. These methodically destroyed Iranian SAM systems beyond their interception radius when combined with electronic warfare. As a result, only Iran’s newer optical and infrared-tracking SAM systems, like Majid, Ghaem-118, and the loitering anti-air missiles “358” and “359,” had some success, reportedly
Nevertheless, Iran lacks in the quantity of these more recent systems; serial production has only recently commenced. Iran was unable to withstand Israel’s control of the airways in the absence of effective fighters or a robust long-range air defense. Its Air Force, which was still dependent on antiquated F-4s, F-5s, and F-14s from pre-1979 U.S. deliveries, was significantly inferior to Israel’s fleet of over 300 F-15s, F-16s, and F-35s, which was supported by U.S. and Israeli AWACS aircraft.
The Intelligence Factor
The role of U.S. reconnaissance and satellite platforms was crucial. U.S. systems likely warned Israel of impending Iranian salvos, just as NATO provides Ukraine with early warnings about Russian missile launches. American space-based intelligence can reveal the deployment of mass launchers by detecting unusual activity at known missile bases. Israel’s own satellite network is insufficient to provide such coverage, underscoring the United States’ dominance in military reconnaissance.
The Missile Duel
Iran continued to launch ballistic missiles throughout the conflict, despite its underwhelming air and intelligence superiority. Despite limited accuracy, especially with older, inertially guided medium-range models, Iran adapted by using smaller salvo sizes and varying launch patterns to achieve stealth. Fateh-110 and Dezful, which are newer short-range missiles, maintained their accuracy against naval targets that were in motion. However, medium-range missile accuracy suffered a substantial decline as a result of Israel’s extensive GPS interference.
Iran had initiated the development of a new Qasem Basir missile with an electro-optical guidance head, which was derived from the Haj Qasem, to address this issue. However, mass production didn’t start until May 2025, which was too late to have an impact on the conflict.
Nevertheless, Iran launched an estimated 500–600 ballistic missiles and 1,000–1,100 kamikaze drones. Considering the fact that the majority of drones were intercepted (some by Jordanian, French, and U.S. forces), at least 36 missiles targeted populated areas, and several of them fell on Israeli military bases. The Telegraph’s analysis indicated that the proportion of Iranian missiles that penetrated missile defenses increased over time.
The depletion of interceptors posed a significant issue for both the United States and Israel. The Wall Street Journal reported that over the course of 12 days, over 150 THAAD and 80 SM-3 interceptors were launched, resulting in the use of a significant portion of the active American stockpiles (approximately 650 THAAD and 470 SM-3 missiles produced since 2010). Logistics were strained by the continuous operations; destroyers necessitated replenishing, and the redeployment of other U.S. THAAD systems was restricted by global obligations.
Israel’s Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 batteries—only four exist—also ran dangerously low on interceptors. Replacement is both expensive and time-consuming: the cost of a single THAAD missile is $13 million, while the cost of an SM-3 missile ranges from $8 to $25 million. In contrast, Iranian launchers, which were inexpensively built on semitrailers, could be replenished at a rapid pace. Iran maintained substantial reserves within subterranean complexes, even according to conservative Israeli estimates.
The Underground Factor
Sustainability was contingent upon Iran’s extensive subterranean infrastructure. Tehran excavated deep mountain tunnels for years to accommodate missile units, UAVs, aircraft, and nuclear facilities. The June war served as confirmation that Israel’s sophisticated airpower, in the absence of nuclear weapons, is incapable of eliminating fortified underground targets.
The United States employed the heaviest non-nuclear weapons available—GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs—from B-2 bombers to attack enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. However, even these were determined to be ineffective against the deeply concealed Isfahan complex. This underscores the constraints of conventional force in the face of subterranean military infrastructure.
The twelve-day war between Israel (with U.S. support) and Iran in June 2025 confirmed once again that international confrontations are increasingly shifting toward direct military action. Experience shows that attempts to stabilize such crises through limited strikes rarely bring lasting calm—instead, they tend to widen the conflict. Beyond the political implications, this short war provided several important military and technological lessons.
Outcomes and Lessons
Neither faction secured a decisive victory.
Tehran demonstrated the capacity to maintain operations under extreme pressure, while Israel and the U.S. inflicted tangible but limited harm to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Despite the loss of air superiority, its missile and drone forces maintained their strike capability. Yet Iran’s credibility as a deterrent power weakened, and the conflict failed to restore it.
The likelihood of future conflict is high, and the extent to which both parties internalize these lessons—including the strategic significance of deep subterranean fortifications, missile defense saturation, and remote warfare—will be an important factor.