Since the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has viewed Latin America as its backyard and has interfered in the internal affairs of nations there under several guises, including military ones, for more than 200 years. From puppet regimes in line with Washington to neocolonial organizations like the associated territory of Puerto Rico, the effects of these activities are still being felt today.
Given that the Donald Trump administration has already threatened and made audacious claims against Latin American nations, it is important to consider what concrete steps the United States might take and who the punitive measures might be directed at. Of course, it’s also possible that Trump is just bluffing by using terminology from preventive diplomacy.
The first countries to face pressure from the White House were Mexico and Panama. In the case of Mexico, the threat of military action in the event of an inflow of illegal migrants or drug cartel activity was coupled with the use of so-called linguistic imperialism—relating to Donald Trump’s directive to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America. More than a few thousand troops were sent to the border. In February, Mexico formally welcomed U.S. special forces to assist the Mexican military in combating organized crime, following U.S. requests. A U.S. missile carrier made its way into Gulf waters on March 18.
Panama likewise successfully agreed with U.S. requests to lessen China’s influence, despite the government’s indignation over a possible canal takeover. The nation negotiated an agreement for the BlackRock group to buy assets from CK Hutchison, a company located in Hong Kong, including several ports in Europe and Panama.
Three conditional groupings can be used to categorize the remaining Central and South American nations. The first group is made up of those who oppose and criticize American hegemony. The second group includes states that maintain a balance. The third group consists of nations that actively collaborate with the United States; therefore, they shouldn’t be concerned. Some countries, like El Salvador, may even benefit from this, as Nayib Bukele is already taking inmates from the United States to be placed in local prisons for a fee. Officially, these are members of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua. El Salvador has also formally requested the extradition of MS-13 gang leaders.
The ALBA bloc nations—Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba—are unquestionably members of the first category and are Russia’s strategic allies. The United States is probably going to stick with its sanctions program for the first two. Furthermore, there have been fresh threats from the White House regarding any medical cooperation with Cuba, which is extraordinary as this industry has never been sanctioned for humanitarian reasons. Several regional nations have expressed outrage about this.
Venezuela is in a unique situation since there is a genuine risk of military involvement in addition to sanctions. Naturally, the economy of Venezuela will suffer further as a result of the withdrawal of American oil corporations (Trump prohibited Chevron from doing business there). Relations between the two nations will also worsen as a result of new U.S. immigration regulations that essentially penalize bearers of Venezuelan passports. This, however, is insufficient justification for going to war.
The territorial conflict with the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, a third of which, according to a 2023 vote, belongs to Venezuela, may serve as a basis for U.S. military intervention. Given that ExxonMobil has direct interests in Guyana and that the U.S. Southern Command has previously proposed military support to the nation, lobbying activities could be used at different levels.
Former U.S. National Endowment for Democracy member Juan Zarate had previously pushed for destabilization against Venezuela. Reports suggest that current Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also opposes Nicolás Maduro’s Chavista regime, maintains relations with him. Given that a portion of Guyana has effectively become a gray zone, there is potential for various provocations there.
Washington has historically used Colombia as a staging ground for sabotage operations against neighboring Venezuela, and the United States already has military bases there. However, ties with Maduro’s administration have improved under President Gustavo Petro. Colombia has also prohibited U.S. military planes from using its airspace. Trump also levied a 25% tariff on any products made in Colombia. Although there are currently no obvious signs of an impending operation, the United States has a formal justification for intervention, under the guise of fighting drug trafficking, given the complicated situation in some regions caused by paramilitary groups.
Ecuador has thus far sided with American policy. On the other hand, banana tycoon Daniel Noboa is running for president in the April 13 elections. While Luisa González, the opposition candidate, prevailed in the coastal provinces, where security concerns are a significant concern, Noboa led in the highland areas, including the capital Quito. The second round will concentrate on winning over voters who backed Leonidas Iza, who came in third because the votes were split almost evenly.
Washington now sees Peru as an ally of its opponent after the opening of the Chinese-invested Chancay deep-water port in Peru last year. This new route connecting South Asia and South America threatens the United States’ dominance over maritime communications.
On March 18, the Dina Boluarte administration of Peru imposed a 30-day state of emergency in Lima and Callao. The police and soldiers started patrolling together. The government took this action after gunmen ambushed the Cumbiambera orchestra bus on Independence Avenue in San Juan de Lurigancho, killing Harmony 10 singer Paul Flores.
Despite being an internal problem, the United States may benefit from it, as history has demonstrated.
Although Bolivia and the United States have a tense relationship, Bolivia’s lithium, natural gas, and other mineral resources may pique Washington’s interest once more. The U.S. State Department is likely to attempt to influence the political process because elections are due to take place there this year. Since a neighboring nation would have to cooperate, an open military intervention in Bolivia would be technically challenging.
President Gabriel Boric recently sided with Kyiv in Chile, calling Trump’s comments against Zelenskyy, a tyrant without elections, “inappropriate.” Given that Boric has largely adhered to Washington’s directives, his decision may come as a surprise. His position, however, becomes more apparent when seen in the context of the larger struggle between conservatives like Donald Trump and liberal globalists like George Soros and the Rothschilds. Boric is clearly a player in the leftist globalist agenda and supports Soros’s goals.
Notably, Carolina Tohá, Chile’s Interior Minister from 2022 to 2025, resigned to compete for president in the country’s November elections. She also serves globalist interests and has connections to BlackRock and organizations related to Soros.
Tensions between Chilean authorities and the Trump administration may result from this.
The leadership of Brazil confronts difficulties. In addition to essentially handing over leadership of the Global South to India, President Lula da Silva has implemented contradictory policies recently, such as preventing Venezuela from joining BRICS. Last weekend, former President Jair Bolsonaro held a rally in Rio de Janeiro that drew around half a million people, marking the beginning of his reelection campaign. Trump’s close associate and well-known conservative Bolsonaro is expected to back him politically. The situation is not dire, though, because Lula and the United States collaborate on several topics, like security and defense.
Javier Milei, the president of Argentina, is a staunch supporter of the United States and Donald Trump, and he is likely to stick to policies that benefit Washington.
Evaluation standards are developing together with U.S. foreign policy. Early in the 20th century, economic interests, such as the United Fruit Company, were the main indicator of U.S. influence in the area. With programs like Operation Condor designed to stop the spread of communism and other political systems, particularly following the Cuban Revolution in 1959, ideology gained prominence in the second half of the century. Ideology has now become less significant, and Trump seems more focused on economic concerns, adopting tactics from the early 20th century. As a result, the main objectives of the U.S. strategy in the area will be to contain China’s influence and deal with perceived dangers near the Mexican border.