In a significant 2026 hearing of the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, commissioners and expert witnesses discussed a question increasingly vital to American grand strategy: what role should India have in the ongoing US–China competition, and how should Washington formulate its India policy under President Donald Trump?
The framing was unambiguous. Among Asian powers, only India has the scale, demographics, geography, economy, and military heft to serve as a durable counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific. Yet scale alone does not produce alignment. The hearing laid bare both the promise and the fragility of the US–India partnership at a time when deterrence against Beijing increasingly hinges on how closely Washington and New Delhi can synchronise their policies.
India’s structural weight in the Indo-Pacific balance rests on reinforcing factors. Geography places India astride the Indian Ocean sea lanes through which a significant portion of China’s energy imports and trade transits, giving it potential leverage in any extended maritime contingency. Demographically and economically, India’s youthful population and sustained growth trajectory offer long-term industrial and technological depth, positioning it as a potential anchor for diversified supply chains that reduce Western overdependence on China.
Simultaneously, India’s expanding manufacturing ambitions in defence, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and digital infrastructure reflect a strategic intent to scale industrial capacity in ways that align with broader Indo-Pacific balancing efforts.
Yet this rise contains a structural paradox: India’s growth has been accelerated by inexpensive Chinese industrial inputs, and key sectors, especially pharmaceuticals and electronics, remain deeply dependent on Chinese intermediates. The very dynamism that enhances India’s balancing potential also embeds vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Beijing.
Testimony before the Commission characterised the US–India security relationship as an essential component of deterrence against China. At the same time, it acknowledged that the relationship is unlikely to mature into a formal treaty alliance. India’s strategic culture privileges autonomy, and Washington recognises the domestic and geopolitical constraints that make an alliance improbable.
Nevertheless, the argument advanced was that the partnership should evolve towards alliance-like functionality. This would entail embedding officers within each other’s operational commands, integrating meaningful segments of the defence industrial base, expanding joint exercises across the maritime, air, cyber, and space domains, and building interoperable logistics and intelligence architectures. Operational barriers are no longer the principal constraint; rather, the limiting factors are political trust and strategic will particularly after the May 2025 India–Pakistan crisis, which revived doubts in New Delhi about American reliability during periods of acute escalation.
A persistent structural challenge is managing ties with Russia and Pakistan. Neither Washington nor New Delhi is prepared to grant the other a veto over its external relationships. India continues to rely on Russia as a legacy supplier of critical platforms and spares, while the United States maintains calibrated security ties with Pakistan.
The logic articulated at the hearing was pragmatic. Since neither side will abandon these relationships outright, both must set clear red lines for activities that create unacceptable risk to deeper cooperation. This requires candid dialogue on how certain forms of India–Russia defence collaboration might complicate US technology transfers, or how aspects of US–Pakistan engagement might raise Indian concerns about operational or technological leakage. It also demands closer alignment between export controls and technology security standards. Without such clarity, mistrust will constrain cooperation in high-end aerospace, ISR, and emerging technology domains.
The hearing also underscored that India’s two-front challenge involving China and Pakistan is no longer hypothetical. Following the 2025 crisis with Pakistan, Indian planners increasingly assess that collusive pressure from Beijing and Islamabad is plausible in real time. Chinese maritime activity in the Indian Ocean, ranging from research vessels and hydrological surveys to dual-use port infrastructure, heightens Indian anxieties.
On land, infrastructure expansion and PLA-linked activity along contested sectors heighten concerns about sustained pressure. The strategic consequence is one of bandwidth. Every additional formation deployed along the western front, every ISR asset dedicated to counter-terrorism and cross-border contingencies, represents capacity not optimised for the China theatre.
Although most Indian strategists regard China as the primary existential threat, force posture and operational attention are repeatedly drawn towards Pakistan. US policymakers were cautioned against assuming that Washington could drive a wedge between Pakistan and China. The Beijing–Islamabad relationship is more mature and structurally embedded than it was a decade ago. A more realistic approach would focus on scrutinising the risks of technology leakage and ensuring that Western-origin systems or training interfaces do not indirectly benefit China.
India’s Russia calculus remains rooted in both history and necessity. Moscow has long supplied major platforms from air defence systems to armoured vehicles often with fewer political conditions than Western suppliers.
However, China’s material backing of Russia’s war in Europe complicates New Delhi’s long-standing assumption that it can maintain a strategic wedge between Moscow and Beijing. If Washington expects India to diversify away from Russian systems, it must be prepared to fill critical capability gaps in a timely and credible manner. India will not abandon a dependable supplier without assured alternatives.
In this context, Europe is both an opportunity and a constraint. Stronger India–Europe defence cooperation, including fighter acquisitions and jet-engine co-development, can plug specific capability gaps and complement US initiatives. Expanded economic ties can also reinforce supply-chain diversification.
Moreover, India’s stringent stance on Chinese telecom and digital platforms can strengthen European resolve on China policy. Yet Europe has limits. Its Indo-Pacific military reach is constrained, its ability to assist in a land border crisis with China is limited, and residual ties with Pakistan introduce friction. Europe can supplement but not substitute for the United States in India’s core contingencies.
On defence industrial cooperation, the hearing offered a candid critique of past efforts. Earlier initiatives often paired large US prime contractors with Indian state-owned enterprises on long-term projects that failed to deliver operationally meaningful outcomes.
A more agile approach was advocated, centred on shorter-horizon, near-term deterrent capabilities. This includes joint drone manufacturing, dual-use projects involving Indian startups, and leveraging innovation ecosystems rather than relying exclusively on bureaucratic mega-programs.
Reference was made to the defence innovation accelerator framework, INDUSX, and the broader US–India initiative on critical and emerging technologies, often referred to as ICET, as platforms capable of anchoring cooperation in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies, and advanced communications.
These mechanisms, however, have recently stagnated. The priority should be to revive and accelerate them rather than create new frameworks. For Washington, this requires updated risk assessments and a more forward-leaning posture on selected technology transfers. For India, it entails accepting that access to sensitive systems will be accompanied by stringent technology-security protocols and realistic production timelines.
Looking ahead to the coming year, four interlocking objectives were identified for US policy. Washington must restore Indian confidence in US support for military modernisation, particularly in light of tensions that surfaced during the 2025 crisis.
It must accelerate defence-industrial cooperation by prioritising capabilities that enhance near-term deterrence rather than pursuing only long-gestation flagship projects.
The United States should institutionalise frequent high-level dialogues on China policy, especially as both President Trump and Prime Minister Modi prepare for engagements with Xi Jinping in 2026, to avoid misalignment in messaging or strategy towards Beijing.
Finally, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue should be used more deliberately to deepen operational coordination among the United States, India, Japan, and Australia in areas such as logistics, maritime domain awareness, and anti-submarine warfare across the broader Indo-Pacific.
The broader risk identified in the hearing is not a dramatic rupture but an incremental drift. Renewed S-400 acquisitions and intensified European outreach reflect hedging in New Delhi, amplified by voices questioning whether the United States is a reliable long-term partner. Yet the structural logic of cooperation remains compelling.
The United States requires capable regional balancers to prevent a Sino-centric Asian order. In contrast, India requires advanced technology, capital, and high-end defence collaboration to accelerate its modernisation and reduce vulnerabilities. Both share an interest in ensuring that Asia’s balance of power does not tilt decisively in Beijing’s favour.
Deterrence is built in peacetime through industrial integration, operational rehearsal, and political clarity. India’s scale and geography make it indispensable to the Indo-Pacific equilibrium, but indispensability does not automatically translate into alignment. Trust must be reinforced through credible capability transfers, realistic expectations of Russia and Pakistan, and sustained strategic dialogue at the highest levels.
If Washington acts with urgency, reviving critical technology initiatives, delivering tangible defence capabilities, and aligning red lines, the partnership can consolidate into a more coherent balancing framework. If not, India will continue to hedge, preserving autonomy that complicates deeper integration. In an era of intensifying US–China competition, delay itself becomes a strategic choice.
