The 34th meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs, held on 23 July 2025 in New Delhi, occurs at a time when the regional and global geopolitical balance is shifting. While the joint statement from the Indian and Chinese delegations indicates a tone of cautious optimism, it is crucial to evaluate what this dialogue signifies for India’s long-term strategic stance and how it integrates into the broader landscape of regional diplomacy, military realities, and shifting alliances.
The Tactical Pause at the LAC
The most immediate takeaway from the WMCC meeting was the acknowledgment of “overall peace and tranquillity” along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). While this indicates a decrease in overt hostilities, it should not be mistaken for a reduction in overall tensions. China has consistently used periods of diplomatic engagement to strengthen its position on the ground. The reality is that after the Galwan clash of 2020 and the subsequent standoff, the trust deficit remains deep and unresolved.
This latest round of talks may suggest a willingness from both sides to stabilize the situation temporarily, but India should not see this as a turning point. Instead, it should consider the current calm as a tactical pause—a chance to strengthen border infrastructure, enhance surveillance and logistics, and improve its military readiness in the Himalayan theater.
The Strategic Context: RIC and Beyond
One common nuance often overlooked in popular commentary is the role of multilateral platforms like the RIC (Russia-India-China) in shaping diplomatic behavior. India’s engagement with China should be understood not only bilaterally but also through the lens of these groupings. RIC, though underused, represents an effort toward regional stability and multipolarity, especially as Western alliances like NATO adjust after Ukraine.
That said, RIC should not serve as a false comfort. While Russia might play a balancing role between India and China, Beijing’s strategic goals are clear: dominance in Asia, containment of rival powers, and unchallenged control over its territorial claims. India must use RIC as a tool for engagement and dialogue, but not at the expense of ignoring or softening its stance on Chinese incursions or infrastructure development along the LAC.
Economic Realities: A Strategic Vulnerability
Another point often overlooked in border dialogues is India’s economic dependence on China. Despite political rhetoric about decoupling, China remains India’s biggest supplier of critical industrial inputs—raw materials, electronics, heavy machinery, and pharmaceutical ingredients. This imbalance gives China leverage that could, in times of tension, become economic pressure points.
Reducing this dependency is not just about tariffs or trade balances; it’s about building domestic capacity and resilience. India’s “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) strategy needs to go beyond slogans and be grounded in serious industrial policy. Supply chain diversification, incentivizing local production, and investing in critical technologies must be priorities. Until this gap is bridged, India’s strategic autonomy will remain compromised.
The Western Front: Lessons from Operation SINDOOR
India’s recent kinetic engagement with Pakistan under Operation SINDOOR serves as a timely reminder of the constant two-front challenge. With Chinese troops strategically positioned along the northern border and Pakistan presenting ongoing tactical threats to the west, India must remain prepared for both coordinated and opportunistic aggression.
This raises the stakes for maintaining peace on at least one front. A stable LAC, while not eliminating the Chinese threat, at least allows India to focus resources and planning on more immediate threats. It also highlights the importance of credible deterrence—peace should not be sought from a position of weakness but maintained through preparedness and strength.
Decoupling the China-Pakistan Paradigm
For decades, Indian strategic thinking has viewed China and Pakistan through a single lens, often framing them as a joint threat. While this perspective still applies in some operational contexts, especially considering the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and their increasing military cooperation, India must begin to treat them as separate challenges with distinct solutions.
China is a systemic rival—an economic and military peer competing for influence across the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia. Pakistan, despite its nuisance value, remains a tactical concern—a regional spoiler with limited power projection capabilities. India’s China policy must rise above the Pakistan filter. Viewing Beijing’s actions solely through the prism of Islamabad restricts strategic vision.
The Global Order: Flux and Opportunity
The world order is changing. NATO is adjusting, the US is reevaluating its global stance, and Europe (the E3: France, Germany, and the UK) is increasingly caught between Atlantic commitments and Asian interests. In this shifting landscape, India must stay adaptable.
Strategic flexibility is no longer optional—it is essential. India must diversify its diplomatic toolkit. This involves engaging in QUAD (with the US, Japan, and Australia) without alienating BRICS (with China and Russia). It also means participating as a guest in G7 discussions while maintaining leadership in the G20. Additionally, India should explore ASEAN linkages for trade and maritime cooperation and leverage SAARC for regional stability in South Asia.
Taking a cue from the recently concluded Kensington Pact between the E3—France, Germany, and the UK—India must now adopt a more assertive stance as the regional security provider in Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. This is not about military expansion but about strategic presence, capacity building, and regional reassurance. The Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific, driven by coercive diplomacy, economic entrapment, and grey zone tactics, must be effectively countered. Maritime domain awareness, defense cooperation, and infrastructure investment across the region should form the core of India’s outreach. Additionally, in upcoming forums like the 2+2 dialogue with the United States Government (USG), India must recognize the nuance in Washington’s China posture. The U.S. still views China as a competitor rather than a threat—a perspective that may prove short-lived given Beijing’s trajectory. India must consider these issues in its strategic planning, ensuring its national interests are not subordinate to America’s shifting threat perceptions but are grounded in regional realities.
Diplomacy, Backed by Capability
Meetings like WMCC are crucial, but they should not become ends in themselves. Capability must support dialogue. India should align its diplomatic efforts with military modernization, technological self-reliance, and intelligence reform.
India must also invest in border infrastructure—not just roads and airstrips, but forward bases, all-weather logistics chains, and real-time surveillance. The goal should be to develop a posture that enables both deterrence and escalation dominance, should the situation demand it.
Furthermore, India must continue investing in people-focused border development. Communities along the LAC must not feel neglected or abandoned. Civilian presence and economic activity act as de facto indicators of territorial control. Soft power at the borders is just as important as military hard power.
National Interest Comes First
Ultimately, the principle that should guide India’s foreign policy is national interest. Alliances, dialogues, and treaties—all must serve this core purpose. In today’s world, strategic clarity is more important than ideological consistency.
India’s geopolitical landscape includes complex organizations: QUAD, G7, G20, ASEAN, BRICS, SAARC, and now a reinvigorated RIC. Each of these serves a purpose. But none of them will act in India’s interest unless India takes the lead.
This process involves tough decisions regarding trade, defense procurement, diplomatic stances, and alliance-building. It requires maintaining the ability to walk away from deals that do not align with our goals and embracing partnerships that may be unconventional but are strategically sound.
Conclusion: A Long Game of Strategy
The 34th WMCC meeting is part of a larger strategic game—one of patience, perception, and power. While peace talks are essential, they should not distract from the realities on the ground. India must adopt a long-term approach, preparing not only for current challenges but also for future uncertainties.
India must build its future on the pillars of strategic autonomy, economic resilience, military strength, and diplomatic agility. It begins by recognizing that in geopolitics, peace is not a gift—it is earned, secured, and defended.