Few rivalries are as enduring and volatile as that between India and Pakistan. For more than seventy years, the two nuclear-armed neighbours have remained caught in cycles of hostility, broken only by brief moments of engagement. Today, with diplomatic and trade ties severed, trust at an all-time low, and regional tensions heightened by great power competition, the India-Pakistan conflict risks becoming a deadlock. However, external actors, particularly the United States, still suggest the possibility of mediation. This prompts key questions: can third-party intervention lead to a breakthrough, or would it just reinforce the idea that the two countries must resolve issues on their own? Beyond the geopolitics, can the domestic and structural factors that uphold the rivalry be changed to enable genuine dialogue?
Mediation or Bilateralism: The Summit Question
The United States has periodically considered the idea of mediating peace between India and Pakistan, from the Cold War era to President Bill Clinton’s efforts in the late 1990s. Recently, U.S. signals of interest in a high-level summit, similar to Camp David, revive this familiar debate. Would such an intervention be worthwhile?
On paper, a high-level summit led by the U.S. President presents an image of seriousness and urgency. It could theoretically provide a platform for India and Pakistan’s leaders to negotiate away from domestic pressures, similar to how Egypt and Israel reached accords under U.S. guidance in the 1970s. However, there are three core problems.
Firstly, India has consistently rejected third-party mediation, based on the Simla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999), which emphasize bilateralism as the guiding principle. For New Delhi, accepting U.S. mediation would undermine sovereignty, lead to internationalization of Kashmir, and create a strategic precedent it considers risky.
Second, unlike the Middle East of the 1970s, U.S. influence today is limited. Washington no longer wields overwhelming power over both parties. India’s economic growth and strategic importance mean it refuses to be seen as merely one part of a dyad. At the same time, Pakistan remains highly sceptical of U.S. reliability after decades of feeling abandoned.
Third, any summit risks becoming merely performative. Without prior behind-the-scenes groundwork or confidence-building measures, a Camp David-style spectacle could backfire, exposing irreconcilable differences, reinforcing mistrust, and hardening domestic opposition to compromise.
Thus, while U.S. mediation might generate short-term headlines, it risks undermining the principle of bilateralism and destabilising fragile ground realities. A more realistic U.S. role is not in convening summits but in quiet facilitation supporting humanitarian and economic exchanges, encouraging military restraint in crises, and backing regionally-owned mechanisms for dialogue.
Tariffs, Credibility, and Strategic Calculus
Overlaying the conflict is the economic triangle between the U.S., India, and Pakistan. Despite India’s role as a key regional ally and one of America’s largest trading partners, Washington has imposed tariffs that mirror or, at times, exceed those on Pakistan. For Indian policymakers, this disparity feels not only economically punitive but also strategically incoherent. How can the U.S. claim neutrality in mediating South Asia’s tensions while economically disadvantaging its supposed partner?
The credibility issue is twofold. First, U.S. tariffs on India weaken Washington’s reputation as a “trusted partner” in balancing China. Second, by applying formal economic parity to India and Pakistan despite their vastly different trade scales, the U.S. unintentionally suggests they are equal—an idea India opposes.
From Pakistan’s perspective, U.S. trade policy has historically been transactional, linked to counterterrorism efforts or military cooperation. Tariffs only serve to reinforce its view of American unreliability.
These trade frictions shape broader strategic calculus in two ways: –
- For India, tariffs diminish interest in U.S.-led mediation, as Washington seems less reliable and more self-interested. This reinforces India’s leaning toward bilateralism, independence, and partnerships with Europe or Japan.
- For Pakistan, economic exclusion combined with security reliance on China pushes it deeper into Beijing’s sphere, limiting opportunities for U.S.-mediated dialogue.
The paradox is stark: Washington’s tariff regime undercuts its own geopolitical objectives in South Asia. Unless recalibrated, these trade disputes risk entrenching U.S. irrelevance as a mediator.
Pakistan’s Kashmir Strategy: Sustainability and Limits
For decades, the Pakistani military has used a strategy of provocation in Kashmir: cross-border infiltration, militant support, and periodic escalations aimed at internationalising the conflict and pressuring India into talks. Under successive leaders, including General Asim Munir, this approach remains despite repeated setbacks. Is it sustainable?
The evidence suggests not. Militarily, India has developed strong counter-infiltration systems, intelligence capabilities, and retaliatory strategies (e.g., surgical strikes, Balakot airstrikes, and ongoing OP SINDOOR) that weaken Pakistan’s tactics. Politically, the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, though controversial, showed India’s determination to treat Kashmir as an internal matter. Internationally, support for Pakistan’s stance has decreased, with most capitals calling for restraint but stopping short of intervention.
The costs for Pakistan are high. The strategy isolates Islamabad diplomatically, drains resources from an already fragile economy, and fuels cycles of domestic extremism that weaken civilian governance. It also commits Pakistan to a military-first approach, strengthening the army at the expense of political institutions.
What course correction could foster space for dialogue?
A credible shift would involve three elements: –
- Curtailing cross-border militancy. Genuine dismantling of militant infrastructure would send a strong signal, even if done gradually.
- Economic reorientation. Emphasising trade and connectivity, including resuming commerce with India, could foster support for peace.
- Civilian primacy. Giving elected governments more independence in foreign policy could create new opportunities for engagement.
Such steps may not ensure dialogue, but without them, Pakistan’s strategy is likely to stay self-defeating.
Domestic Scapegoating and Structural Barriers
Beyond high politics, the India-Pakistan conflict persists because it is domestically advantageous for both sides. In India, the “Pakistan threat” is frequently used in electoral campaigns, serving as a rallying cry for nationalism and a justification for strong leadership. In Pakistan, the military has historically relied on portraying India as an existential threat to legitimise its control over civilian institutions and budgets.
This mutual scapegoating has solidified into a structural barrier to peace. It reduces the political motivation for compromise: any leader pursuing rapprochement risks being labelled as weak or unpatriotic.
India’s OP SINDOOR, a sustained operational posture focused on readiness against Pakistan, illustrates the dilemma. While militarily necessary in India’s view, its continuation signals the permanence of hostility, reducing space for diplomatic flexibility. Once a military operation becomes routinised, it creates institutional inertia with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.
Breaking this cycle involves changing domestic stories. For India, this could mean slowly shifting public talk from “Pakistan as a threat” to “Pakistan as a neighbour in flux,” which reduces the political risks of limited engagement. For Pakistan, weakening the army’s control over India policy is crucial, allowing political leaders to pursue practical steps.
Neither will occur overnight. However, without tackling the internal foundations of hostility, external mediation or policy adjustments will only be superficial.
Pathways Beyond the Deadlock
What, then, is realistic? Neither dramatic U.S.-led summits nor unilateral concessions are likely. Instead, progress beyond the deadlock requires modest, incremental steps.
Backchannel diplomacy. Silent engagement between national security advisors or intelligence officials can defuse crises and lay the groundwork for broader talks.
Issue-specific cooperation. Begin with small steps—such as humanitarian exchanges, water management, or disaster relief—to build trust in low-politics areas before addressing main disputes.
Trade normalisation. Resuming limited commerce could create stakeholders on both sides who are invested in stability.
Military restraint mechanisms. Restoring communication hotlines and ceasefire monitoring lowers the risk of accidental escalation.
Third-party facilitation, not mediation. The U.S., Europe, or Gulf states can support dialogue by encouraging discussions and providing economic incentives without aiming to impose settlements.
Most importantly, both states must recognise that ongoing hostility drains resources, distorts politics, and leaves them vulnerable in an era of shifting global power. The alternative to engagement is not stability but endless drift, punctuated by crises with nuclear overtones.
Conclusion
The India-Pakistan conflict is not frozen; it is maintained in a fragile balance influenced by military doctrines, domestic politics, and external pressures. U.S. mediation offers limited hope, especially as trade disputes weaken American credibility. Pakistan’s provocation strategy in Kashmir is unsustainable, but structural incentives within its military make it hard to change course. India, on its part, risks reducing its diplomatic flexibility through deeply rooted operational stances.
Peace will not come from summits or tariffs. It will emerge, if at all, from a slow erosion of the scaffolding of hostility: through backchannels, incremental cooperation, and a recalibration of domestic narratives. Until then, the India-Pakistan rivalry will remain less a problem to be solved than a condition to be managed, a sobering reality for policymakers in New Delhi, Islamabad, and Washington alike.