Recently, Munich hosted a forum of Iranian opposition members. The Congress of National Cooperation, which was convened by Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi (son of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the deposed Shah of Iran), was attended by more than 500 Iranians residing abroad. This was Reza Pahlavi’s second attempt to draw attention to Iranian dissidents using Germany as a platform. In February, he tried to coordinate their attendance at the Munich Security Conference; however, the organizers declined his proposal. Even this time, he failed to capture the global media’s attention. Coverage of the so-called “congress” was essentially limited to Israeli publications.
The international neglect of the Iranian opposition is rooted in the understanding that movements associated with it hold little sway, and figures like Reza Pahlavi have lost their political relevance. However, the issues surrounding Iran’s political transformation, actively discussed during the recent 12-day war, are likely to remain pressing. The Islamic Republic is undeniably in a state of upheaval, and it is now crucial to understand which opposition forces operate within and outside Iran, how organized they are, and whether they can unite to influence events.
Reza Pahlavi, who has lived in the United States for many years, believes that with the support of his backers and a regime change, he can return to Iran as monarch. However, his influence within the opposition—both inside and outside the country—is minimal. Many opposition groups view him as a weak figure, convinced that neither he nor his supporters are capable of changing the situation in Tehran.
Nonetheless, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu openly supports the Pahlavi clan, and in return, they endorsed Israel’s attack. Israel’s strikes on Iran signal Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s intent to undermine Iran’s nuclear facilities and slow the development of its military program. He has also publicly stated that war with Iran could lead to regime change in the Islamic Republic. It is widely acknowledged that Israel has harbored a long-standing aspiration to overthrow Iran’s present government.
Reza’s residence and active lobbying efforts among U.S. officials are significant factors in the Pahlavi clan’s close relationship with the United States. Most of the Iranian diaspora consists of families who emigrated after the Shah’s ousting and have some connection to the monarchy, so it is not surprising that Pahlavi enjoys a certain level of support among them. While he continues to call for international pressure on the Iranian government, his influence remains limited, and his role in Iran’s political future is unclear.
His leadership is merely an illusion, and his ideas are unrealistic fantasies. In Munich, he announced the formation of two bodies: an advisory council and an executive council. These structures are supposed to organize the struggle and manage the transition period as a temporary government. The prince also presented his plans for the first 100 days following the overthrow of the Ayatollah regime. He promises to achieve all this with the help of representatives of various ethnic groups, religious minorities, republicans, monarchists, the LGBT community, former political prisoners, relatives of those executed, leftists, liberals, social democrats, and so on. None of them wields significant influence outside their narrow circles.
Fortunately, the congress delegates joined the prince on stage to sing the song “Ey Iran.” But can Munich now be considered, unlike past meetings of Iranian oppositionists, the place where the Islamic regime collapsed? In any case, the return of Reza Pahlavi to power in Iran seems highly unlikely.
Alongside Reza Pahlavi, another frequent name in international headlines is Maryam Rajavi, head of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and the affiliated National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). PMOI was the most active and aggressive force against the Islamic Republic in the early 1980s before it was crushed and forced into exile in Iraq. They have long-standing ties with Israel and are also vying for power. Nevertheless, Iranians from all spheres of life harbor animosity toward them for their support of Saddam Hussein’s regime during the Iran-Iraq War. Today, their leaders are in their 60s and 70s, live in exile, and do not influence domestic Iranian politics. As a political opposition, they have lost relevance.
The NCRI was formed based on the PMOI. It is a political coalition operating from France, Albania, and the United States. The first Trump administration, particularly under John Bolton, maintained contact with them. Prominent American politicians participated in their events. However, the Mujahideen are unpopular in Iran and lack organized support. Their current role consists of collaborating with Western intelligence agencies, gathering intelligence, and disseminating news that erodes trust in the Iranian regime.
Although both Pahlavi and Rajavi assert that they have supporters in Iran, the regime does not regard them as a significant threat. Several other dissident organizations, which are based within the country, are conducting their own anti-government campaigns, both civil and militant. This is more concerning. These militias, which are composed of non-Persian ethnic groups such as Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds, are motivated by a desire for increased decentralization of power or, in certain instances, complete independence.
Kurds constitute about 10% of Iran’s population—around 8 to 12 million people. Most of them are Sunnis, whereas most Iranians are Shia. Like other countries with large Kurdish populations, Iran has a complex relationship with this minority. Some Kurds accuse the authorities of centuries-long repression, while others use force to resist the government.
The Kurdish opposition in Iran maintains many armed organizations in Iraq and operates underground. Other Kurdish dissident movements in Iran, such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, which has fragmented into multiple factions, are in addition to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI). Kurdish militias in Iran have also occasionally engaged in violence among themselves. In a recent interview with Newsweek, Abdullah Mohtadi, the Secretary-General of Komala, declared that his organization had renounced the use of arms to overthrow the Iranian government. Nevertheless, he encouraged the United States and Israel to offer more support to Iranian dissident groups. Since the beginning of Israel’s military operation, many Kurdish opposition leaders have issued statements calling for a nationwide uprising to topple or weaken the regime.
Kurdish organizations have been advocating for increased collaboration with the United States for a long time. Washington supports Kurdish forces, helping them establish autonomous regions in Iraq and Syria. Israel is also interested in drawing the Kurds to its side. During the war, Iranian authorities focused attention on the possibility of internal unrest in Kurdish-majority areas, and additional forces were deployed to those regions.
On the other hand, Arabs overwhelmingly do not support separatist movements, and one Arab terrorist group has been eliminated. As for the Baluchis, there have been no political protests recently in Iranian Baluchistan, but the region remains tense due to the Islamist group Jaish al-Adl, based in Pakistan. It has strong terrorist potential and cooperates closely with the CIA and the Mossad. However, it lacks the strength to enact real change. Therefore, if the U.S. and Israel aim to exploit Iran’s ethnic diversity, their focus will likely be on the Kurds.
Israel has effectively infiltrated Iran to conduct intelligence gathering and sabotage. In the recent conflict, Israeli intelligence agencies demonstrated their ability to establish spy networks and organize large-scale attacks inside Iran. There is evidence that Israeli missiles were assembled and stored inside the country, and thousands of miniature strike drones were found in Tehran. Top generals and nuclear scientists perished in their homes as a result of these attacks. They also destroyed missile launch sites and air defense systems, forcing Iran’s Supreme Leader into hiding.
Yet, during the armed conflict, Iran’s command structure proved resilient, disproving skeptics. They quickly filled vacant government positions, strengthened military leadership, and prevented any organized resistance from exploiting the situation. Their actions showed again that within ruling circles, the discussion is about changes within the Islamic Republic, not dismantling the current system of governance.
Now, the world waits to see whether the ceasefire between Iran and Israel will hold. In any case, we haven’t seen the end of Israel’s covert operations. Iran’s regime is not about to fall, despite tremendous pressure. It still controls the armed forces and the media. Its authority rests not on public approval but on a solid institutional foundation.