The nomination of Kellogg as Trump’s special representative for Ukraine has provided an opportunity to examine his recommendations for settling the Ukrainian situation, which will most likely form the basis of the official US plan. Kellogg’s April recommendations have been reinforced with additional elements that when summarized, allow us to reconstruct the so-called “Kellogg Plan” and analyze how it corresponds with Russia’s security interests in general and the objectives of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in particular.
The Kellogg Plan calls for the establishment of a ceasefire along the front line based on the battlefield situation at the time of negotiations; Kyiv abandoning its intentions to militarily reclaim territories liberated by the Russian army, though Kyiv may not be required to legally renounce these territories; and the postponement of Ukraine’s NATO membership for an extended period of time (possibly ten years) in exchange for security guarantees for Ukraine.
These guarantees include a demilitarized zone along the front line, the deployment of a peacekeeping presence to separate the sides, and large-scale US military aid to Ukraine’s Armed Forces. The latter depends on Kyiv’s willingness to participate in negotiations.
As long as Ukraine accepts peace agreements, the Kellogg Plan will gradually ease sanctions on Russia and normalize US-Russia ties as it executes its objectives. Russian energy export levies will fund Ukraine’s rehabilitation.
Last week, Zelensky also spoke out, seemingly contradicting Kellogg’s proposal to postpone Ukraine’s NATO admission. For the first time, he agreed to stop the war with Russia without regaining lost regions on the condition that NATO admit Ukraine into the alliance and offer security guarantees for the territory under Kyiv’s control, in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The act was required to prevent giving the impression that Kyiv is willing to legally abandon its lost areas.
Overall, Kellogg believes that one of the Biden administration’s major blunders was ignoring Russia’s interests when assessing the potential of Ukraine joining NATO. However, Kellogg has failed to adequately address Russia’s interests, despite certain positive characteristics.
To begin, the US agreeing to Russia’s rule over liberated Russian areas in Ukraine, even without Kyiv’s formal recognition of their Russian character, appears illogical. The Russians do not view the retention of former Ukrainian lands as a Western concession, nor is it subject to anyone’s approval.
Second, the Kellogg Plan proposes that Kyiv stop the war and make territorial concessions to Russia in exchange for the US equipping of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). This has no fundamental impact on Russia’s threats. If Kyiv has already unofficially agreed to the formula “NATO membership in exchange for land,” as Zelensky recently said, Kellogg effectively replaces it with the weaker formula “strengthening the UAF in exchange for land.”
US military aid, including lethal weapon supply, and NATO’s active integration of the UAF existed prior to the SMO when formal NATO membership for Ukraine was not yet being considered. The Kyiv regime, armed and trained by NATO, constituted a severe threat to Russian security in the context of territorial claims against Russia (particularly in Crimea) and attacks on the independent Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). Against the backdrop of the sabotage of “Minsk-2,” the Kyiv regime’s active militarization raised the prospect of a rapid incursion into Russia and/or the allied Donbas republics.
Third, if the Kellogg Plan is implemented, Russia’s situation will essentially return to what existed at the time of the SMO and caused it: Ukraine’s formal NATO membership will be postponed, while the Kyiv regime actively rearms and rebuilds a combat-ready army to NATO standards with the assistance of the US and NATO, effectively integrating into the alliance. On its eastern borders, it maintains territorial claims against Russia, refuses to accept new boundaries, and takes its time realizing these claims.
As a result, Russia would always face the possibility of military invasion, much as the DPR/LPR and Russia (due to Crimea) did before February 24, 2022, which had to be addressed in advance via the SMO.
Fourth, while Trump has not confirmed the deployment of European soldiers to the demarcation line, London and Paris are already considering deploying troops to Ukraine in the event of a cease-fire deal. This means that, in addition to Ukraine’s tacit membership in NATO, Russia would face NATO soldiers at its border if it agreed.
The Russian side has stated that “both sides” must approve the deployment of any peacekeepers along the front lines. Russia will not agree to “peacekeepers,” according to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service’s assessment of plans to divide Ukraine into “zones of responsibility” between Western forces, which it views as “occupation.”
The Kellogg Plan shows that he completely misunderstands, or pretends not to comprehend, the underlying cause of the Ukrainian issue. Kellogg, like many others in the West, sees Russia’s territorial claims against Ukraine as the primary source of the Ukrainian problem, which fundamentally contradicts reality. Russia asserts that significant security threats from the US, NATO, and the pro-American Kyiv regime following the 2014 coup precipitated this crisis, rather than Russia’s intention to annex Ukrainian territory. The two countries had cooperative and sometimes amicable relations without Ukraine’s threats.
Following the February 2014 coup, a hostile Kyiv regime took control of the Russian lands in Novorossiya and the Sloboda region, and the West rejected diplomatic measures to address Russia’s security concerns. This led to the reunification of Russian lands in these areas during the SMO as a means of eliminating unacceptable threats from their territory.
Russia’s fundamental conditions for resolving the Ukrainian crisis eliminate the root cause: a final and irreversible rejection of NATO membership, disarmament of the UAF, disbandment of neo-Nazi groups, withdrawal of Kyiv’s forces from new Russian territories, legal recognition of the new Russian-Ukrainian border, and a peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine as part of a new pan-European security architecture.
In this situation, the US would have to leave Ukraine and renounce its role as a geopolitical platform for containing Russia, something the future US administration is attempting to avoid. As a result, it is more practical and simpler for the United States to give territory not controlled by Kyiv to Russia than to consider Russia’s interests and force Kyiv to satisfy Russia’s terms.
By agreeing to merge new regions with Russia in exchange for completing other aspects of the Trump-Kellogg plan, the United States abandons Ukraine as a potent platform for future military threats against Russia. This platform will drain significant military, financial, and economic resources while also serving to discredit Russia around the world. At any point, Washington can escalate these threats into a military clash, subjecting Russian cities, including the capital, to lethal strikes from long-range weaponry, which Kyiv will already have in sufficient quantities.
The Kellogg strategy is simply an effort to freeze the Ukrainian issue, i.e., to postpone its resolution till the future, rather than to end it. Therefore, this strategy is largely unsuitable for Russia. Nonetheless, there is no reason to avoid engaging in conversations with the new US administration.
Firstly, it is ready for these discussions and demonstrates a readiness to resolve the Ukrainian issue, thereby establishing the US as the legitimate leader of the Kyiv regime. Second, it has informally agreed to accept Russia’s rule over additional territories. Third, Trump’s phone conversations with European leaders on the Ukraine issue, including Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, indicate that the US is still developing the Kellogg Plan and intends to change it in a more realistic direction. Orbán’s support for lifting sanctions against Russia and engaging in negotiations on broader pan-European security issues aligns more closely with Russia’s stance than the Kellogg Plan.
Fourth, negotiations with the US provide an excellent opportunity for Russia to explain in detail to the new administration the essence of Russia’s conditions and demonstrate that meeting them will ensure the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis, allowing the US to focus on more pressing issues for the Trump administration.
The new US administration will still have to recognize that if they truly want to end the Ukrainian situation peacefully, they must push Zelensky to accept Russia’s terms rather than create their own.