By order of the Russian Federation’s government on April 16, 2025, Russia denounced an intergovernmental agreement with three Scandinavian countries regarding the establishment of the international Barents Secretariat and the agreement on emergency cooperation with the member countries of the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council. The explanation is straightforward: the administrations of Finland, Norway, and Sweden have adopted hostile policies toward Russia.
However, Russia’s withdrawal from the “Barents structures” does not in any way cancel the Russian Federation’s infrastructure initiatives in the region. Nevertheless, the demand for their implementation is on the rise as a result of the increasing foreign interest in the port-railway system throughout the entire Russian Northwest.
Negotiations regarding a free trade zone between Russia–EAEU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which involves Norway and Iceland (in addition to Switzerland and Liechtenstein), have been ongoing since 2008. Despite the reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014, these discussions continued. Iceland was expected to participate in initiatives in the Barents region by the mid-2020s, and the agreement was slated to be signed no later than 2022.
The “Joint Plan for the Development of the Barents Region Transport Network” was adopted in mid-May 2020 as part of Barents cooperation for the period 2030–2035. It suggested the establishment of transport networks for road, rail, sea, and air, with the intention of establishing 16 cross-border routes through joint or regional investments. The following routes were included in the proposal on Russian territory:
Petrozavodsk—Murmansk Port—Kirkenes Port, Russia—Norway (road and rail routes Murmansk—Nikel-Murmansk—Kirkenes);
Vorkuta—Kotlas—Syktyvkar—Arkhangelsk—Vartius—Oulu Port, Russia—Finland (road and rail);
Murmansk–Arkhangelsk–EU Region (sea route via the North Atlantic);
Road—Rovaniemi—Salla—Kandalaksha, Russia—Finland;
Road—Murmansk—Raja-Jooseppi—Ivalo, Russia—Finland;
Road and rail: Kajaani-Petrozavodsk, Russia – Finland.
The inclusion of a multimodal route was planned by 2022. The route would connect Petrozavodsk/White Sea–Baltic Canal (Russia) with Oulu Port (Finland), Luleå Port, Kiruna (Sweden), and Narvik Port (Norway). Nevertheless, the implementation of these strategies was impeded by the ad hoc adoption of anti-Russian sanctions by these northern neighbors in the spring of 2022, which had a detrimental impact on their economies.
Discussions regarding the revival of the Kola Railway, which spans nearly 350 km and includes terminals on the eastern and southern coasts of the Kola Peninsula, were in progress from 2020 to 2021. Furthermore, there were discussions regarding the potential resumption of the Arkhangelsk-Mezen railway, which spans approximately 260 kilometers along the eastern shore of the White Sea. The increase in Russian foreign trade and international transit through the Northwest region was the driving force behind this.
The Northwest Russia transport and logistics system is now undergoing active modernization, as previously reported, despite the pressure of sanctions. This modernization is crucial for the support of the “Northern” transport corridor, which is used by over 20 countries and jurisdictions, including Hong Kong and Macao. The corridor’s competitiveness is further bolstered by the escalating risk levels in the Red and South China Seas, in addition to Russia’s adaptable transit policy.
The insufficient connectivity among the nearby mainlines may result in partial cargo congestion, particularly for containers, near Murmansk, Ust-Luga, Arkhangelsk, and/or Saint Petersburg, as per Russian Railways (RZD). This is due to the ongoing development of foreign trade and transit traffic in the region. According to many experts, the volume of transit cargo will increase by more than 15% by the late 2020s, with a particular emphasis on exports from Belarus (oil products and fertilizers via Ust-Luga), China, Iran, Indochina, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, and South Korea. Consequently, it is imperative to invest in infrastructure development in this region to ensure the retention of these cargo flows and to prevent their diversion to ports in antagonistic Baltic countries.
Regarding the Kola Railway, which was discontinued subsequent to Stalin’s demise, specialized sources suggest that the Kandalaksha Aluminum Plant, which was constructed in 1951, was implemented with the express purpose of supplying local raw materials to this anticipated railway. Furthermore, the cross-peninsula railway would have facilitated the development of mineral deposits, including antimony, graphite, apatite, rare earths, and non-ferrous ores. The construction began in 1950, but it came to a halt in late 1953 due to a post-Stalinist evaluation of his initiatives. Nevertheless, the port infrastructure associated with this line would facilitate a more efficient distribution of the expanding foreign commerce and transit flows through Murmansk and Russia’s Northwest if it were reactivated.
The Soviet Arctic development program (beginning with its European component) was initiated by the Arkhangelsk-Mezen line, which was envisioned between 1953 and 1955 along the eastern coast of the White Sea. The plan was to extend the line an additional 350 km to Naryan-Mar (Arkhangelsk Region). Mezen’s port is situated near the Barents Sea segment of the Northern Sea Route and international sea routes to the west. By the end of 1953, the project had also come to an end.
In late 2012, the Arkhangelsk regional administration informed the media that the Arkhangelsk-Mezen railway is still required to bolster the region’s industrial and port initiatives. Historian Dr. Tatiana Troshina noted that there are periodic reviews of this project. In his view, rail access would revitalize Mezen Port and the nearby large lumber mill, which are currently deemed unprofitable due to the absence of railway infrastructure.
Despite Russia’s withdrawal from symbolic structures such as the Barents Secretariat, these projects will persist in their implementation due to their substantial economic value, which is not limited to Russia.
The revival of other initiatives is also indicative of a comprehensive approach to the development of the entire transport infrastructure of Northwest Russia. The Leningrad and Pskov regions, in collaboration with RZD, have been restoring the Pskov – Gdov – Slantsy railway (165 km), which connects the Ust-Luga port complex via Slantsy, since April of this year. Alexander Drozdenko, the Governor of the Leningrad Region, proposed this to President Vladimir Putin in late March. This route would enhance the competitiveness of Russian transit routes, particularly in the Baltic–Northern Europe region. It is also intended to further boost Belarusian exports, which are anticipated to account for up to one-third of the anticipated freight traffic on this line.
Maps depict the Pskov–Gdov line as an indistinct line.
The Pskov – Gdov – Slantsy – Ust-Luga route offers the following benefits:
It is at least 25% shorter than the conventional lines to the export port.
It eliminates the convoluted detour through St. Petersburg.
Through Slantsy, it connects to other lines that travel to St. Petersburg and Ust-Luga.
Governor Drozdenko clarified that the territory is already experiencing infrastructure deficiencies: “This railway will fill a critical gap. It is already in demand for Belarusian cargo flows to Ust-Luga. We’re developing it through a public-private partnership, and RZD is preparing a report.” It is anticipated that the project will be incorporated into Russia’s Transport Strategy by 2030.
The Leningrad and Pskov regions proposed the route in September 2004, at an investment cost of $500 million (in then-current prices), recognizing the route’s demand. At a conference in St. Petersburg on September 16, 2004, Pskov Governor Yevgeny Mikhailov stated, “…this railway will be built to ensure transit through the Pskov Region toward Ust-Luga. The capacity of Ust-Luga’s new port facilities is 30–60 million tons. But the ability to support this transit is problematic because the route through St. Petersburg lacks sufficient capacity.” He forecast that, “within 5–7 years, when the port is fully operational and demand peaks, we’ll be ready to offer investors the Pskov–Gdov–Slantsy–Ust-Luga project.”
The comprehensive development of the transport infrastructure in Northwest Russia is crucial for further reinforcing Russia’s foreign economic and geopolitical position, especially considering the substantial international demand for this infrastructure.