Syria has made significant strides in the seven months since the collapse of Assad’s regime, particularly in the areas of international diplomatic recognition and integration into the broader global community. A symbol of this development is Syria’s economic opening to investors from neighboring countries, Trump’s approval for the lifting of sanctions, and a wave of new investment agreements worth billions of dollars.
The internal situation in Syria remains exceedingly uncertain and unstable, despite the significant improvement in relations with foreign actors such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Hardened anti-government militants, particularly ISIS, pose major threats to Syria, as they continue to conduct numerous terrorist attacks within the country. Another complication arises from the integration of pro-government foreign combatants, who frequently possess extremist backgrounds, into Syria’s multicultural and multiethnic political mosaic.
Nevertheless, political fragmentation is the most significant systemic challenge that the new government of “reformed jihadists” commanded by Ahmad al-Shara is confronted with. A substantial portion of Syrian territory is still under the control of actors who are resisting integration into the new state, which poses a potentially existential threat to the regime or transitional government.
An important summit was held in Damascus a week ago between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are led by Kurds and control 25% of Syria’s northeast, and the transitional government, which is composed of cadres from the Islamist militia Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant). The summit did not result in any progress, despite the fact that it was facilitated by American and French diplomacy. Conversely, both parties
Massacres in Suwayda
The province descended into horrific violence: five days of bloody clashes resulted in several hundred casualties, mostly among fighters, but, as is often the case with sectarian and tribal conflicts, militias also killed civilians on practically all sides.
Untangling the web of relationships and the spiral of escalating violence is extremely difficult, as in much of Syria. Most of the shocking videos circulating on social media lack context, often featuring false information or decontextualized footage used for propaganda by one of the sides.
A clear chronological account of events—at least in the English-speaking world—is traditionally offered by longtime Syria and jihadism analyst Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute and the author of the Syria Weekly project.
Disputes between local Bedouins and Druze are long-standing and complex. The recent outbreak of violence likely began on the night of July 11, when a handful of Bedouin gunmen stopped a vegetable truck en route from Damascus to Suwayda, beat up its Druze driver, and stole the truck and its cargo.
The following morning, July 12, Druze militiamen in Suwayda retaliated by kidnapping eight Bedouin men. Bedouin militias responded by abducting five Druze. Local elders, tribal leaders, and other authorities attempted to resolve the matter through traditional tribal bargaining, a common approach in this context. Since the beginning of the year, similar incidents have occurred at least four times, all resolved without large-scale violence.
This time, however, negotiations broke down. Tensions escalated, and both sides kidnapped more and more hostages—seemingly beyond the control of their elders. It’s important to remember that this is not a society in our traditional sense, but one governed by tribal rules and honor codes foreign to us, without a central authority to enforce uniform law.
The withdrawal of Assad’s forces from the area during the civil war led to a complete absence of the state. This enabled rising tensions and occasional hostilities between Sunni Bedouins and Druze, who compete for control over smuggling routes (mainly drugs) and land in a resource-poor area. The Assad regime deliberately fueled this tension during the war, arming the Druze and entrusting them with part of its drug empire to ensure they were preoccupied with internal power struggles rather than efforts to overthrow the regime.
These long-standing disputes are now simmering in post-Assad Syria’s transitional environment, where some Druze militias in Suwayda—with ties to the previous regime and the drug trade—resist integration into the new state. Meanwhile, local Bedouins support integration, hoping to benefit from ties with their Sunni brethren who control the transitional government in Damascus.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that another faction of the Druze militias does not share this rejectionist stance—instead, they are seeking a modus vivendi with the new government and are prepared to accept its presence in Suwayda in exchange for a degree of autonomy. Historically, the Druze have tended to align with Syrian nationalism, with separatism within this community being a relatively minor and recent trend. It stems more from the commercial interests of a specific faction—supported by tribal fears of the jihadist past of the new government—than from any longstanding vision of independence.
Now to recent developments
By the morning of July 13, local negotiations had completely collapsed, and full-blown violence erupted. Druze and Bedouin areas were shelled, and by the end of the day, at least 30 people were dead and over 100 were injured. Since the Syrian government had so far avoided direct involvement in the province—preferring a political agreement to military conquest—it had not yet intervened and thus could not separate the warring sides.
But on July 14, the government in Damascus announced it would intervene to restore order and end the violence, at least in theory. Druze militiamen ambushed regime soldiers as soon as they crossed into the province. The militias surrounded and executed 10 soldiers, dumped their bodies by the roadside, and used them in grotesque celebrations. Eight more were captured, stripped to their underwear, taken to a nearby village, and executed.
This incident became an explosive flashpoint in an already smoldering conflict. Government forces then declared they would take control of the entire province and impose state authority—a major escalation that President al-Shara had tried to avoid for six months.
The outcome placed the regime forces against a wide spectrum of Druze militias—including those who support integrating into the new Syria but distrust the regime in Damascus (or at least its ability to control its own troops). They fear they may face massacres or reprisals during the conflict.
A key player in the Druze resistance is the so-called Sweida Military Council (SMC), whose role needs a closer examination.
Israel backs the “Narcosheikh”
The SMC is a militia formed the day after Bashar al-Assad’s fall and is led by prominent Druze cleric Hikmat al-Hijri. He was born in Venezuela, where his father served, but returned to Syria as a child and later inherited religious leadership—a common practice among the Druze.
Hijri is one of Syria’s three most important Druze sheikhs. Half of his militia leadership consists of former Assad regime officers, through whom Hijri profits from the drug trade. The same trade became the backbone of Assad’s economy during the civil war. Even amid heavy fighting in Suwayda, Jordan seized two large drug shipments originating from this region.
The situation has been further exacerbated by Israel’s support for Hijri, which has launched airstrikes on Syrian government personnel on numerous occasions. Israeli airstrikes continued to target light motorized and infantry units, even though the tanks and armored vehicles were evacuated from Suwayda province, despite Israel’s initial demand for the withdrawal of Syrian armored units.
On the morning of July 15, the transitional government reached a ceasefire agreement with representatives of the Druze, Christian, and civilian communities. Under this deal, government forces were to restore order in the province and pave the way for future discussions about Suwayda’s status in the new Syrian state.
However, just 30 minutes after the ceasefire announcement, Hijri withdrew his support and ordered his forces to resume fighting. His militia immediately launched nine near-simultaneous attacks on government troops, followed by more Israeli airstrikes. This unpredictable and deceptive tactic by the SMC, bolstered by Israeli backing, plunged the area into total chaos. This was already the third ceasefire that Hijri had unilaterally broken since the fighting began.
Various Syrian actors have repeatedly accused the Sweida Military Council (SMC) of acting in bad faith and deliberately sabotaging peace efforts in the province. The Damascus government would likely target the region’s profitable drug trade first if it restored order.
Thus, the SMC has nothing to gain from peace and everything to lose. Moreover, it benefits from external support, especially from Israel, whose involvement appears less ideological and more pragmatic. Israel likely seeks to keep Syria weak, fragmented, and entangled in internal conflicts. By empowering factions like Hijri’s militia, Israel ensures a prolonged disintegration of its longtime adversary.
According to Charles Lister, the other two Druze sheikhs (alongside Hijri) have condemned the SMC’s actions and expressed willingness to negotiate. Even the majority of Suwayda’s civil society reportedly supports integration into the new Syria. However, due to the military strength and foreign support of the SMC, they are unable to assert their will.
This exposes a deeper paradox of Syria’s post-war transition
While the new government in Damascus—led by former jihadists—has secured diplomatic recognition and regional cooperation, it faces armed resistance not only from ISIS remnants but also from former regime-linked warlords and narcotics-financed militias, often supported by foreign powers. This dynamic undermines the notion of a simple victory over extremism and reveals a far more complex post-conflict reality.
The collapse of the Suwayda ceasefire and the renewed fighting demonstrate how fragile the new Syrian state remains, riven by factionalism, tribal rivalries, warlordism, and great power interference. Even the best intentions from Damascus or foreign diplomats may mean little without unified military control and the disarmament of rogue militias.
Currently, the Syrian government is pursuing a military resolution in Suwayda, despite publicly expressing a preference for negotiated reintegration. It is uncertain whether it will be successful without inciting a more extensive ethnic and sectarian retaliation.
What’s certain is that Syria’s “peace” is not yet peace and may not be for years to come.