US President Donald Trump has a long-standing desire to use tariffs to punish countries he believes have robbed the United States, especially China, and his determination to accumulate as much power as possible in the office of the president. Added to this was Trump’s thirst for revenge against those who dared challenge him in the past.
These factors led to several actions, including deportation of illegal immigrants, mass firings of federal employees, elimination of some federal agencies, removal of leadership in various agencies and government departments, attempts to intimidate external institutions, particularly universities and law firms, and now, possibly most significantly, a trade war that is overturning the global economic order.
However, as the administration moved forward, it stumbled on many of these fronts, reviving questions about the competence of the president and those he empowered.
The tariffs he introduced more than a week ago were based on a formula that confused mainstream economists. The scope of the tariffs, which affected allies around the world, alarmed foreign policy analysts who saw it as leading to the isolation of the United States and undermining its credibility as a reliable partner.
The decline in stock and bond markets forced the president to partially roll back the policy, instituting a 90-day pause on many tariffs, which sparked a rally on Wall Street. Subsequently, Trump escalated tariffs on China to an unprecedented level, potentially causing significant harm to the global economy.
White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller summed it all up in a recent post on “X” that the world is witnessing the greatest economic strategy of an American president in history.
However, the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal stated on April 11 that the reality is that Trump is making it up as he goes, and it would be helpful if he had a real strategy, particularly regarding China.
Trump told reporters that the bond market had a little moment, but he fixed it rapidly.
No amount of White House spin can dispel the impression that the president — spooked by the financial markets and influenced by a public warning from JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon about upcoming economic troubles — blinked. The chaos in the bond market is likely to cost the government—and thus taxpayers — billions of dollars in interest on the national debt.
The White House also cannot confidently explain what the endgame of the tariff “arms race” with China — its most significant economic adversary — should be. Is it the end of trade relations between the two largest economies in the world? Is it an attempt to establish fair conditions with a nation that has breached the rules? If so, what are the terms of a peaceful settlement?
Trump imposed tariffs on China during his first term but never successfully addressed the underlying issues.
Now, he’s significantly raising the stakes and must prove he knows what he wants and how to get it from Chinese leader Xi Jinping. But he is also improvising, as evidenced by the sudden reduction of tariffs on electronics and computers, which could have otherwise raised prices on popular products like the iPhone by more than $700.
This sudden shift toward smartphones, computers, and other electronics adds yet another layer of inconsistency to the administration’s claim that the goal is to bring manufacturing back to the United States. At the same time, Trump called on Congress to repeal the bipartisan law encouraging chip production in the U.S., which was passed under the Biden administration — creating even more confusion about which manufacturing sectors he wants to bring home.
The tariff policy is just the most extreme example of how the administration is floundering as it advances. Trump enjoys strong public support for closing the U.S.-Mexico border and deporting illegal immigrants with criminal records, as well as broader support for tougher deportation policies. But implementation risks undermining public trust.
On April 10, the Supreme Court told the Trump administration it must “facilitate” the return of Kilmar Abrego Garcia, an immigrant from El Salvador married to a U.S. citizen and resident of Maryland, who was mistakenly imprisoned in El Salvador. The administration admitted that Abrego Garcia was deported in error but claimed it had no means to bring him back. Even with a court order, the administration failed to meet the deadline set by a federal district judge to explain how they would return him.
This case is one huge mistake, but the problems with deportation policy go beyond this one incident. Trump promised to deport millions. So far, the numbers are far away from that goal. In response, the administration is taking more radical measures.
Most recently, the Trump Social Security Administration decided to transfer more than 6,000 migrants to the so-called “Death Master File,” essentially declaring them dead — which means they can no longer legally earn wages. The Trump team hopes that the move will pressure the migrants to self-deport. A senior Social Security official objected to the changes, leading to his forced resignation.
Then comes Elon Musk and his wild march through the federal government under the banner of the US DOGE Service. Musk and his team exaggerated their claims of huge cost savings.
The initiative dismantled or shut down various agencies, from the Department of Education to the U.S. Agency for International Development and Voice of America. In some cases, the justification was cost savings — though some warn the cuts could lead to famine for millions worldwide. In others, the rationale was that the agencies had become nests of leftist bureaucrats. In others, the charges were fraud and misuse of taxpayer money.
Cutting bloated bureaucracy is a necessary and ongoing challenge in a broad sense. Many officials who have managed government institutions acknowledge the need for reform. However, as with the president’s tariff policy, blunt tools and a lack of clear strategy raise doubts about whether the administration has any goal beyond pure disruption.
The haphazard nature of the job cuts has prompted warnings about the consequences for the health and safety of Americans. In certain cases, the haste with which administration officials implemented some of the cuts forced them to reverse them.
Trump claims he won a decisive victory in the election and has a full mandate. In reality, he fell short of a majority of the popular vote and defeated Vice President Kamala Harris by just 1.5 percentage points. His 86-vote margin in the Electoral College cannot be considered a convincing advantage.
Compared to recent presidents, Trump’s victory pales compared to the Electoral College margins achieved by Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Richard M. Nixon, Lyndon B. Johnson, and John F. Kennedy.
Some might see his forceful rhetoric as a harmless exaggeration. In practice, it has justified the most radical efforts of any recent president to change the government.
Trump presented himself as a successful business leader capable of managing the economy. Many voters believed this. His biggest economic promise was to lower prices. This promise is now in doubt.
The downturn in financial markets has been one reaction to Trump’s actions. The drop in consumer sentiment amid fears of recession has been another. The Washington Post’s average of polls indicates that Trump’s approval rating declined over the past month, and several early April polls show a sharper drop.
Unless Trump demonstrates the competence expected of a leader and begins delivering the promised results, these trends are likely to continue downward, Republican anxiety will grow, and confidence in his leadership will erode, the author concludes.
The Washington Post’s article from April 13, 2025, “What President Trump’s Team Wants from the Rest of the World,” concludes that while there remains significant uncertainty about the White House’s goals, a clearer picture of the trade negotiations is beginning to emerge.
It includes more purchases of natural gas from American companies, lower tariffs on U.S. exports, tax reductions for Silicon Valley tech giants, and promises to prevent China from using other countries to route its products into the U.S.
These are just some of the demands the Trump administration is expected to make in negotiations with dozens of countries trying to avoid the high tariffs briefly imposed last week and then suddenly postponed.
Although much confusion remains about exactly what the White House wants, a clearer picture of what these bilateral agreements might look like is emerging, according to interviews with more than a dozen people involved in or briefed on the talks, some of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to reflect private discussions.
On April 9, President Trump suddenly suspended major tariffs that were set to take effect on more than 70 countries, partially citing troubling swings in the bond market. Trump said the tariffs would be paused for 90 days to give his advisers and their foreign counterparts time to strike individual deals—a process he said had already begun with Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and Israel, among others.
At the same time, Trump left in place a 10% tariff on nearly all U.S. imports while increasing tariffs on China to over 100%, even as the pause for other countries remains in effect.
After announcing the 90-day tariff pause on April 9, President Trump said many countries, including China, want to negotiate.
White House officials expressed optimism that deals could be reached in the coming weeks.
However significant uncertainty remains over what exactly these deals might look like, partly due to the lack of clarity about the president’s objectives. Even some of Trump’s advisers privately admit they lack clear direction, according to two sources.
Trump, for example, has repeatedly emphasized that he wants to close the U.S. trade deficit with other countries. This idea has been criticized by both liberal and conservative economists—arguing it doesn’t make sense for the U.S. to export as much to poorer countries as it imports, and even attempting to do so could be painful.
Trump might agree to deals that reduce these deficits through arrangements requiring the U.S. to sell more goods to these countries. But that would still leave unclear the nature of negotiations with developed economies that have trade surpluses with the U.S., like Australia and the United Kingdom.
And deals in which foreign countries agree to buy more U.S.-made goods are unlikely to achieve the global trade balance Trump seeks, which is primarily driven by the trade practices of several large exporting nations.
Further confusing some foreign and American officials were comments last week by White House aide Peter Navarro, who criticized BMW’s multibillion-dollar investment in a plant in South Carolina, calling it “bad for America.” That plant seemingly represents exactly the kind of U.S.-based manufacturing Trump has long demanded.
Doug Holtz-Eakin, president of the American Action Forum, a center-right think tank that is skeptical of Trump’s tariffs, states that they have no idea what they want from other countries, and the worst part is other countries don’t know what Trump wants from them.
Lacking information, ambassadors, trade representatives, and other senior officials have been calling and messaging one another to share ideas.
They have discussed the relative merits of dealing with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent or Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and have tried to figure out which proposals energize Trump’s team.
But it’s a slow process. A senior diplomat from a major U.S. trading partner said that in the days after the Rose Garden tariff announcement, the White House did not respond to questions about what could be offered to reduce tariffs. Now that the highest tariffs have been paused, Trump officials finally seem ready for normal negotiations rather than simply demanding concessions without offering anything in return—but it’s still unclear how exactly the White House wants to proceed, the diplomat said.
Officials and experts said that the broad outlines of what Trump’s team is after have emerged in initial conversations.
The deals will likely focus on specific problems identified by U.S. officials in each country. Senior Trump aides such as Navarro and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer have said they want other countries to lower both tariff and “non-tariff” barriers, such as intellectual property theft and import quotas.
Officials from the White House Council of Economic Advisers and the U.S. Trade Representative’s office have spent weeks studying policies they believe fuel large trade deficits with countries like China and potential opportunities to promote U.S. exports. This work may inform specific requests made by the administration.
Chief among the expected demands is that countries like Vietnam and Mexico no longer serve as intermediaries for Chinese firms and goods seeking to circumvent U.S. tariffs—a practice that has alarmed officials from both parties.
The United States will focus on ensuring that “goods from Vietnam are truly Vietnamese,” said Daniel Kishi, policy adviser at American Compass, a center-right think tank. Kishi said the Trump team will likely push other countries to match U.S. tariff levels on China and coordinate the use of other tools to prevent China from controlling supply chains in critical sectors.
Richard Mojica, a trade attorney at Miller & Chevalier and former U.S. Customs and Border Protection official, says he was convinced that the central target was China. Mojica said he expects Mexico to reach a deal with the United States, particularly by agreeing to limit imports of Chinese-origin goods. That would completely align with the idea of not only getting greater access to other countries’ markets for U.S. goods but also limiting China’s access to the U.S., he adds.
However foreign governments may be reluctant to agree to these restrictions. Vietnam depends on China for about 40% of its imports, and Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to visit the country this week. Other Asian countries the U.S. is targeting for deals—Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Thailand—are also more economically tied to China than to the United States.
Sarah Bianchi, the second-highest trade official in the Biden administration and now a senior managing director at Evercore ISI, said many of these countries have no incentive to antagonize Beijing, especially after Trump’s unilateral tariff threats caused global chaos. Many countries, especially in Asia, have economies that are deeply intertwined with China, Bianchi said, adding that they’re not eager to join with the U.S. in openly confronting China, particularly after experiencing the political shock from the U.S.
Deals could be easier if Trump agrees to replicate the model from his first term. In 2019, China agreed to buy more American goods as part of a tariff relief deal—although Trump later complained that Beijing never fully followed through.
Two people briefed on Trump administration views said the deals are likely to include commitments benefiting specific domestic industries. For instance, negotiations could push Japan to commit to purchasing large volumes of U.S.-produced natural gas. In Europe, taxes and regulations on tech giants and beef import restrictions could become negotiation topics.
American farmers, still suffering from the trade war, could also benefit from country-specific deals, especially if European nations are willing to ease restrictions on certain U.S. agricultural exports.
Some trade experts doubt these sectoral deals can restore American manufacturing glory. But with bond markets still volatile even after the tariff pause, the president may feel compelled to pursue narrower deals rather than allowing destructive tariffs to take effect for dozens of countries again.
Other nations may also take their countermeasures, especially if they are ready to divest from U.S. Treasury assets. And Trump has already shown a willingness to retreat in the face of financial market volatility, which could weaken the U.S. position.