The 1988 Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between India and Pakistan is more than just a diplomatic formality. It is a lifeline—one of the last remaining structures of mutual restraint in a relationship marked by recurring hostilities and deep-rooted mistrust. Amid the volatile backdrop of Operation Sindoor (2025), this agreement is once again demonstrating its silent strength. But is it sufficient? Does it remain strategically sound in today’s more complex conflict landscape? This article examines both the strengths and vulnerabilities of the pact while clarifying the intricacies of nuclear weapons integration—what it entails, how long it takes, and why timing is more crucial than ever.
The Core Strengths of the 1988 Agreement
A Red Line That Holds
Despite four major military crises since 1991—including Kargil (1999), Parakram (2001–02), Surgical Strikes (2016), and Pulwama-Balakot (2019)—the annual exchange of nuclear facility lists has never been missed. Even now, during Operation Sindoor, both governments confirmed the 2025 exchange.
This ongoing adherence indicates a rare mutual understanding: nuclear war is unwinnable and must never be fought.
Strategic Stability Through Clarity
Nuclear facilities, due to their size and signature, can be mistaken for military installations. The list exchange helps military planners and intelligence agencies on both sides differentiate these sensitive sites from legitimate military targets. In a live combat scenario with fragmented data and high-pressure decisions, this clarity can be the difference between containment and catastrophe.
A Deterrent Within Deterrence
By specifically pledging not to target nuclear infrastructure, both nations reinforce a layer of deterrence beneath their broader atomic postures. This secondary deterrent doesn’t depend on threats but on a mutual acknowledgement of risk—a strong form of restraint.
Confidence-Building That Endures
The agreement serves as a Cold War-style Confidence and Security Building Measure (CSBM). While diplomatic contacts often freeze during crises, this treaty requires communication, at least once a year. It represents a flicker of continuity in an otherwise hostile environment.
The Cracks in the Armour: Limitations and Risks
No Enforcement Mechanism
There is no verification or inspection protocol. Both sides depend entirely on trust that the list is complete and accurate. In the intelligence world, where deception is a key aspect of tradecraft, this is a glaring vulnerability.
Ambiguity in “Non-Aggression.”
The clause prohibits attacks “directly or indirectly,” but cyber sabotage remains a grey area. What if a cyber operation turns off a reactor’s cooling system? It wouldn’t be a missile strike, but the outcome could be just as catastrophic.
Missile Targeting Dilemma
The agreement doesn’t limit the targeting algorithms of nuclear-capable missiles. The agreement doesn’t limit the targeting algorithms of nuclear-capable missiles.
Nuclear Assets Outside the List
Most nuclear weapon delivery systems (missiles, aircraft, and mobile launchers) are not included in the agreement. Nor are covert storage depots or transit routes. This means the most dangerous components of a nuclear war machine are outside its scope.
India’s Nuclear Triad: A Deterrent by Design
India’s nuclear posture is based on credible minimum deterrence and a self-declared No First Use (NFU) policy. The operational status of its nuclear triad—the ability to deliver nuclear weapons via land-based missiles, aircraft, and sea-based platforms—strengthens this posture. With the Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) now actively deployed, India has a viable second-strike capability and possibly a third-strike option in the event of a nuclear exchange. These submarines enable India to maintain hidden, survivable retaliatory forces that are nearly impossible to target in a first wave. The triad ensures that any adversary considering a nuclear first strike must account for the certainty of devastating retaliation, thereby reinforcing deterrence without violating the NFU principle.
Anatomy of a Nuclear Weapon: Assembly and Launch Timeline
To understand the stakes, one must know how a nuclear weapon is made operational:
Components Involved:
- Fissile Material. Either enriched uranium or plutonium is stored securely and often kept separate from delivery systems.
- Fuze System. The Fuze System utilizes advanced arming and triggering mechanisms, ensuring that the warhead only detonates under specific conditions.
- Delivery System. Typically, delivery systems consist of missiles such as India’s Agni series or Pakistan’s Shaheen series, bombers, or tactical platforms.
Integration Process
A full nuclear strike capability involves several steps, from assembling the warhead to obtaining launch authorisation. This process includes:
- Assembly of the Warhead—Attaching fissile material to the fuze system. This is typically kept disassembled during peacetime to reduce the risk of accidental detonation or unauthorised use.
- Mating with Delivery System – Warhead is installed on a missile or aircraft.
- Targeting and Launch Prep – Missile is calibrated, coordinates programmed, and command authentication protocols are activated.
- Launch Authorization—Requires political clearance at the highest level (Prime Minister or military command authority).
Estimated Timeframe
- Peacetime Readiness. Assembly can take several hours to 2 days, depending on alert status.
- Elevated Alert. In heightened conflict, integration could be completed in less than 4 hours.
- Pre-mated Systems. Some tactical systems may be launch-ready in under 30 minutes. Still, both countries are believed to maintain a “recessed deterrence posture,” meaning warheads and delivery systems are kept separate in most cases.
24/7 Surveillance: The Unspoken Reality
Though not specified in the treaty, real-time surveillance of each other’s nuclear sites serves as a silent guarantee of the agreement’s effectiveness. Satellite imagery, UAV reconnaissance, human intelligence, and cyber monitoring ensure that: –
Any movement near listed facilities is monitored. Suspicious military activity is detected and assessed. Command authorities are notified in near real-time. This surveillance is mutual, continuous, and perhaps the most underestimated factor in maintaining this agreement. It forms a quiet standoff—two nuclear-armed states observing each other, aware that a single misstep could have catastrophic consequences.
Strategic Implications Amid Operation Sindoor
Operation Sindoor, while officially unclear, includes ongoing military tension along the Line of Control (LoC), cyber confrontations, and activities by deep-state actors. In such times, the 1988 agreement is not just a diplomatic formality. It is: A tripwire preventing conventional strikes from veering into nuclear provocation; A strategic lens through which intelligence analysts separate real threats from misidentification, highlighting its crucial role in maintaining peace; A testament that even in near-war conditions, both nations honour atomic restraint.
Delivery Platforms and Denial: Reading Between the Lines
The Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) F-16 fleet—long regarded as a reliable nuclear delivery platform—is mainly based at Sargodha (PAF Base Mushaf) and Nur Khan Airbase, both of which remain under heightened operational readiness. While the 1988 agreement requires the annual exchange of nuclear facility lists, it does not include nuclear-capable aircraft or their operating bases, thereby leaving a significant portion of strike potential outside formal transparency.
Furthermore, despite the list exchange on 01 January 2025, it is an open secret within military circles that nuclear warheads—kept disassembled—are stored in hardened, blast-proof shelters in the Kirana Hills.
When the Director General of Air Operations (DG Air OP) was asked during a press briefing about the presence of nuclear weapons in these shelters, his denial—”I’m not aware of that”—aligned with doctrine and strategic ambiguity. It was also technically accurate: the physical separation of warheads from delivery systems allows such statements to be made plausibly, even amid well-informed speculation.
Conclusion
A Fragile but Vital Firewall. The 1988 India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement on Nuclear Installations isn’t a peace treaty. It doesn’t resolve the Kashmir dispute, end ceasefire violations, or eliminate the risk of conflict.
What it does is far more precise. It draws a red line around nuclear infrastructure, ensuring that both sides are aware of it. In today’s strategic environment, where war can begin with a cyberattack and escalate before diplomats can intervene, this agreement serves as a firewall against the worst-case scenario. But firewalls need constant reinforcement.
As technology evolves and new domains of warfare emerge, this agreement must be updated, verified, and possibly expanded. Because the moment it fails, it won’t be a policy failure—it’ll be a catastrophe.