Operation PAWAN was India’s first significant overseas military intervention, launched in 1987 as part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, a bilateral agreement between India and Sri Lanka aimed at resolving the Sri Lankan Civil War. The mission aimed to disarm the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and bring stability to Sri Lanka. However, the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) soon engaged in a prolonged counterinsurgency operation against a highly motivated and well-equipped guerrilla force. The operation revealed critical gaps in planning, intelligence, logistics, and force coordination, offering valuable lessons for future military interventions and mechanized warfare.
Introduction
Operation PAWAN’s strategic and operational challenges underscore the complexities of out-of-country military interventions, particularly in hybrid warfare environments. India’s military intervention aimed to secure its neighborhood, but the lack of a unified military and diplomatic strategy resulted in ‘mission creep,’ a term that refers to the gradual expansion of a mission’s objectives beyond its initial scope. This led to intelligence failures and operational inefficiencies. For mechanized and armored units, the operation demonstrated the pitfalls of deploying tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in terrain unsuitable for conventional warfare.
This article explores Operation PAWAN’s geostrategic, geopolitical, military, and doctrinal lessons while examining specific takeaways for mechanized forces, logistics, intelligence, and the importance of an integrated command structure.
Geostrategic Lessons
Regional Power Projection & Force Projection Capabilities
Operation PAWAN was India’s first significant military intervention beyond its borders, demonstrating its willingness to act as a regional security provider.
However, the challenges highlighted gaps in rapid deployment, joint operations, and strategic airlift capabilities. Since then, proactive measures taken in India’s modern military doctrine have effectively addressed these gaps, reassuring us of India’s military preparedness.
Island Warfare & Maritime Strategy
Jungle terrain, coastal enclaves, and urban centers dominated the Sri Lankan theatre of operations, limiting the effectiveness of conventional armored and mechanized forces.
The LTTE’s control of sea routes demonstrated the need for dominance in maritime supply lines, a lesson that has since influenced India’s focus on amphibious capabilities and naval logistics.
Securing India’s Neighborhood
India’s strategic objective drove the mission to maintain stability in its immediate neighborhood.
However, the intervention ultimately strained Indo-Sri Lankan relations, demonstrating the diplomatic risks of direct military involvement in another nation’s internal conflict.
Geopolitical & Strategic Lessons
Diplomatic-Military Synchronization
A disconnect between political objectives and military execution led to ambiguity in operational goals.
The assumption that the LTTE would willingly disarm proved false, and the lack of a clear exit strategy prolonged the conflict.
Intelligence Failures & Strategic Miscalculations
India underestimated the LTTE’s preparedness, failing to reassess its military strategy after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord.
The LTTE’s past treatment by Indian agencies and the self-imposed limits on interaction resulted in flawed intelligence assessments.
The Fog of War at Higher Echelons
India’s intelligence agency, R&AW, continued to support the LTTE even as the IPKF engaged in operations against them.
This lack of strategic clarity and coordination between military and intelligence agencies hindered operational effectiveness.
Military Lessons: Planning and Execution for Mechanized Warfare
The Importance of Terrain Analysis
Sri Lanka’s terrain was highly restrictive for mechanized forces, limiting the effectiveness of tanks and BMPs.
Dense jungles, narrow roads, and weak bridges severely restricted mobility, making detailed terrain study necessary for future intervention.
Induction & Deduction of Forces
Force structuring must align with the operational environment.
A mix of mechanized infantry, special forces, and rapid reaction units should have been prioritized over heavy mechanized forces poorly suited for jungle warfare.
Logistics & Supply Chain Considerations
Inadequate logistics planning led to supply shortages and vulnerability to LTTE ambushes.
To avoid road-bound vulnerabilities, future interventions must pre-position logistics hubs and establish secure air and sea resupply networks.
Effective Communication for Joint Operations
The operation suffered from poor battlefield communications, leading to delayed responses and uncoordinated assaults.
Seamless data sharing between ground forces, aviation units, and intelligence agencies is crucial for future out-of-country operations.
Lessons for Armoured & Mechanized Forces
Avoiding Tanks & BMPs as Static Defensive Pillboxes
A significant mistake during Operation PAWAN was the use of tanks and BMPs in static defensive roles, making them easy targets for LTTE RPG teams and IED ambushes.
Armour must be used dynamically for mobility, fire support, and rapid maneuvering rather than as stationary strongpoints.
Adapting to Hybrid Warfare
The operation exposed gaps in India’s armored counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrine.
The lessons learned directly influenced India’s later counterterrorism successes in Punjab, Assam, and Jammu & Kashmir.
Integrated Theatre Commands & Future Warfare
The lack of a unified command structure during PAWAN resulted in delayed decision-making and inter-service coordination failures.
The experience reinforced the need for Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC) to ensure seamless coordination between Army, Navy, and Air Force assets.
Conclusion: Future Implications for Military Interventions
Operation PAWAN remains a pivotal case study in military strategy, counterinsurgency operations, and mechanized warfare. The lessons from terrain analysis, intelligence failures, logistics planning, and joint-force coordination have significantly influenced India’s modern defense doctrine.
The operation highlighted the need for dynamic maneuver warfare, flexible logistics chains, and proper force structuring for armored and mechanized forces. Tanks and BMPs must be deployed, and detailed intelligence assessments and clear exit strategies must guide mobile strike forces rather than static defensive positions and future interventions.
Any military operation ultimately depends on the integration of strategy, logistics, intelligence, and force projection, ensuring the application of past lessons to improve India’s future military preparedness.