There can be no denying the fact that while the advent of nuclear weapons not only changed the very nature of warfare, but also, given the likelihood of escalation into the nuclear realm, ensured their utility being severely constrained as weapons of last resort, a deterrent against any existential threat posed to the State.
As the Kargil Conflict clearly showed, they do not provide a deterrence against an adversary intent on limiting themselves to either grey-zone warfare or undertaking a limited conventional conflict. The only deterrent for tackling these contingencies is the possession of an appropriate and robust conventional punitive capability.
In the context of conventional conflicts over the past couple of years, especially the Russia-Ukraine conflict and operations by Israel in Gaza, technology has clearly emerged as an important factor, especially the whole gamut of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), from cloud computing and big data analytics to advanced technologies, such as embedded devices, robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturisation and Artificial Intelligence (AI).
They are coming to be increasingly seen as game changers in the theatre of operations, as they allow for vast amounts of information to be collected through electronic means, speedily collated, accurately analyzed and rapidly disseminated and acted upon. This has a direct impact on the OODA Loop, operational planning, the positioning, movement, and utilization of forces, as well as fire planning. In essence, technology has transformed into a powerful force multiplier.
Additionally, the incorporation of technology into equipment and weapon systems within the military has its own peculiar problems. Apart from being simple to use and repair, it needs to be rugged so that it can operate in diverse terrain under a wide range of climatic and terrain conditions. As doctrine shapes the military for the role it is required to successfully fulfill, the importance of visualizing the existing and future technological environment cannot be overstated. Weapon and equipment profiles, force structures and tactics are very closely interlinked and interdependent.
While visualizing the impact of technological advances in itself may not be too difficult, the complexity of the problem is increased manifold due to such factors as the rapid rate of technological obsolescence and the inevitable time lag that is associated with the R&D and procurement cycle that normally tends to extend over 7-10 years on average. Even more importantly, once this technology has finally been introduced into the military, it needs to remain in service for another two to three decades to be economically viable and provide an acceptable return on investment, apart from issues connected with skills development and training infrastructures. All of these issues and timelines have costing implications and impact the defence budget over the long term, as one needs to cater for not just the numbers required but also war wastage reserves, etc.
Furthermore, in our context, while technology does play a critical role, its utility is greatly constrained by the fact that our major operational areas are in the mountains, the overwhelming majority of them being in extreme high-altitude terrain (HAA). It is greatly impacted by the rugged terrain, strong winds, extreme cold, thin atmosphere and rapidly changing climate. In the circumstances manpower-heavy land forces are unavoidable, further necessitated by political directives to the military that reportedly require them to ensure no loss of territory along the ill-defined and unrecognized Line of Actual Control (LAC)/Line of Control (LOC).
This directive, in turn, requires heavy forward deployment of forces as well as catering for additional forces for systemic relief to ensure troops are not kept in HAA for long periods of time, which would adversely impact their physical and mental well-being. Add to this the necessity for forces to guard our Western and Southern borders, as well as troops for conducting Counter Insurgency operations in our critical border states of Jammu and Kashmir and in the North East. Thus, manpower requirements and the related issue of pensions puts an excessive stress on our defence budget, especially the revenue budget, leaving little aside on the capital side for modernization. It is a situation that needs to be addressed with speed.
In an effort to control the increasing pension bill, the Indian military has introduced a few measures, such as the Agnipath Scheme, wherein personnel are recruited for a tenure of four years, including training, with only 25% being retained subsequently. Not only does this initiative have some inherent flaws, that have been brought out extensively in public forums, but more importantly, in its present form is wholly unsuitable with regard to training and retention of specialist manpower required for operating critical and sensitive systems. As it is, specialist manpower endures challenges with regard to their career progression, meeting command criteria and ensuring an equitable peace/ field tenure profile. This results in frequent turnover of personnel, which in turn adversely impacts on their gaining continued expertise and experience. This, in turn, adversely affects operational capabilities and maintenance of the systems.
It is here that the concept of outsourcing, extensively utilised in the corporate sector, suitably modified, can be considered, either in the form of “Government Owned Company Operated” (GOCO) or “Company Owned Company Operated” (COCO). Not only would it result in savings in manpower and the consequent reduction in the financial burden on expenditures, but it would also assist in retaining and enhancing specialist skills. In this regard the Ministry of Defence constituted a ‘Committee of Experts,’ under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen DB Shekatkar (Retd), to recommend measures to enhance combat capability and rebalance defence expenditure of the armed forces. Following the submission of its report in December 2016, the MoD took some key steps with regard to the following:
- Optimization of Signals Establishments to include Radio Monitoring Companies, Corps Air Support Signal Regiments, Air Formation Signal Regiments, Composite Signal Regiments and the merger of Corps Operating and Engineering Signal Regiments.
- Restructuring of repair echelons in the Army to include Base Workshops, Advance Base Workshops and Static/Station Workshops in the field Army.
- Redeployment of Ordnance echelons to include Vehicle Depots, Ordnance Depots and Central Ordnance Depots apart from streamlining inventory control mechanisms.
- Better utilization of Supply and Transportation echelons and Animal Transport units.
- Closure of Military Farms and Army Postal Establishments in peace locations.
In essence, some incremental steps were initiated to restructure combat support and logistic elements to make them more effective within the overall existing traditional structures. In addition, base level repairs, logistics, warehousing and supply chain management, with regard to selective inventory controlled by the Corps of Ordnance were also outsourced. There is ample scope for this initiative to be greatly expanded. For example, we have a large number of specialist establishments at the theatre and national level that operate high technology systems and are presently manned by combatants.
We could consider replacing combatants with specialists, preferably military veterans, provided by the OEM’s or other Indian corporate entities, with the requisite skills and capabilities, for effectively providing ‘Womb to Tomb’ cover for its deployed systems anywhere deemed necessary. Apart from the known advantages of outsourcing, the specific utilisation of military veterans would be advantageous for the following reasons:
- Given their service experience, discipline and training their understanding and suitability for dealing with classified matters would be better and they would be more amenable to following procedures.
- Better situational awareness especially with regard to military matters and procedures.
- Optimum utilisation of the experience and skill sets developed over the years even after their retirement as a second career. In some case even Agniveers with the appropriate skill sets could be hired by these companies which would be a win-win situation for all sides.
Both GOCO and COCO models have benefits over the existing model in place as follows:
- Manpower Management. – Military can optimise it manpower challenges and use soldiers on its core functions.
- The whole model can be made part of Capital procurement and will be very effective in optimising Revenue expenditure percentage.
- Skilled and experienced manpower will be managing the systems, making the system more productive and effective.
- Since OEM will be responsible for continued maintenance, management of spares and downtime of the systems and equipment’s can be very effectively optimised.
- This will also generate a lot employment opportunities for veterans across all ranks.
- Corporates tend to be highly agile organisations capable of quickly absorbing and fielding the latest technologies with the minimum of organisational disruption. Given the rapid rate of obsolescence in the high technology domain, this will be a critical battle-winning factor that the military with its size and processes, can never hope to match.
There are international precedents in this regard, especially ‘Project Voyager,’ which was adopted by the Royal Air Force over a decade and a half ago. Back in the late 1990s, despite its rapid decline as a financial power, they continued to see themselves as an important global power. At the time their Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) assets were of 1960s vintage and needed urgent replacement. An exceedingly difficult proposition for a cash-strapped military with competing priorities. To meet their aspirations, they then came up with the innovative concept of Project ‘Voyager.’ In essence, they rented a fleet of 14 Airbus A330-200 aircraft, owned and maintained by the AirTanker Consortium—a collaboration between Airbus Industries, Babcock, Eaton, Equitix Investment Management Limited , Rolls-Royce and Thales.
Flown almost entirely by RAF members or reservists, the fleet meets the military’s AAR, transportation, aeromedical and ancillary services needs for an annual cost. When not in RAF service, the aircraft are able to operate within the civil charter market. While this model certainly has some drawbacks, such as the question of accountability as ownership routinely changes hands, with much of the details remaining confidential as investing companies are registered in tax havens. However, it does allow the United Kingdom to box well above its weight, so to say, in its efforts to retain military capabilities that give it global clout. In our context, given our business environment, we can certainly ensure accountability of the that companies cannot change ownership easily and thereby ensure accountability.
In conclusion, it can be averred that while technology has indeed greatly impacted how militaries operate, the necessity for traditional elements of combat power has not reduced. In our context, the necessity for a manpower-heavy military is inescapable. In the circumstances the Government will have to indulge in “out of the box” solutions if it wishes to optimally utilise its defence budget to get maximum bang for the buck. In this context the gradual adoption of the GOCO and COCO models, at the theatre and national level, will pay very great dividends.