Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan has long been a story of ambition, apprehension, and strategic misjudgment, whose weight is still felt today. It is intricately woven into a complex tapestry of regional power politics and the ever-shifting allegiances. From colonial fears about Russian advances toward the Indian Ocean to today’s realities involving the Taliban, fragmented national interests, and the looming influence of international players, Afghanistan remains a challenge for Pakistan’s policymakers as both a problem to resolve and a danger to face.
The Historical Roots of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy
Pakistan’s policies towards Afghanistan did not develop in isolation. Their roots are closely linked to British India’s ‘Great Game’ era, when Russian expansion was seen as an existential threat to British interests in South Asia. Afghanistan was planned as a buffer state, but the failure of British military expeditions revealed not only the resilience of the Afghan people but also the lasting complexity of the geopolitical situation.
Sir Olaf Caroe, one of the principal architects of British frontier policy, argued that a united Islamic northwest was crucial for securing the Middle East’s oil reserves. This perspective led to the idea of Pakistan’s strategic depth in Afghanistan. Strategic depth, a concept rooted in fears of encirclement and strategic vulnerability, entails utilising Afghan territory to bolster Pakistani defences against India. It became a fundamental part of Pakistani defence policy, influencing its strategies and actions in the region.
Soviet Intervention, Mujahideen, and the Rise of Strategic Depth
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 transformed the region’s geostrategic landscape. Pakistan, with strong support from the United States and Saudi Arabia, became the main conduit for supplying arms and training the Afghan Mujahideen. For Islamabad, this was an opportunity to expand influence westward and create a buffer along its unstable western border.
The concept of “strategic depth,” utilising Afghan territory to bolster Pakistani defences against India, gained popularity within military and intelligence circles.
Yet, the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal exposed the limits of this strategy. The influx of millions of refugees, proliferation of weapons and radical ideologies, and emergence of warlordism and chaos eroded hope for a pliant and stable Afghanistan. Pakistan’s attempts to install the Taliban regime in the 1990s were partly driven by desperation and partly by ambition, a gamble to secure an ally that would stabilise its western front and provide cover in the event of confrontation with India.
American Intervention and the Taliban’s Resurgence
11 September 2001, shattered any illusion of strategic stability. Pakistan suddenly found itself both an indispensable U.S. ally and a suspect in the global war on terror. The American occupation of Afghanistan ushered in two decades of brutal war, vast expenditure (around $4.5 trillion by some estimates), and ultimately a chaotic withdrawal that left regional powers scrambling to redefine their interests.
For Pakistan, the American exit in 2021 was a bittersweet development. While Islamabad welcomed the return of the Taliban as a buffer against Indian influence, the reality quickly proved more complicated. The Taliban, far from being reliable Pakistani proxies, started to assert their independence, reassess relationships, and sometimes antagonise Pakistani interests, especially regarding border controls along the Durand Line and the treatment of Pashtun populations.
Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires and the End of Pakistan’s Strategic Depth
Afghanistan’s reputation as the ‘graveyard of empires’ reflects its history more than it is a boast. This reputation, gained through its successful resistance to foreign invasions, has important implications for Pakistan. For Pakistan, the idea of gaining strategic depth through Afghan territory has shifted to harsh realities.
The concept of ‘strategic depth’ is challenged by Afghanistan’s long-standing resilience and the difficulty of controlling its territory.
The Taliban’s resurgence has not yielded a compliant neighbour. Instead, Pakistan faces frequent border clashes, the strengthening of anti-Pakistan militant groups (such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), and a diplomatic environment where the Taliban increasingly seek some level of independence.
The Durand Line, inherited from British colonial arrangements, remains a contested border. The Taliban refuse to officially recognise it, resulting in skirmishes, border closures, and an increase in smuggling and refugee flows.
The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan spills over into Pakistan. Refugees strain already overstretched systems, and Islamabad’s attempts to deport undocumented Afghans have further worsened relations.
Militant sanctuaries on both sides of the border challenge Pakistan’s security strategy. Despite years of counterinsurgency efforts, the ongoing militant violence indicates that Pakistan’s issues are worsened, not resolved, by instability in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s Regional Isolation and Afghan Autonomy
As global focus on Afghanistan diminishes, Pakistan faces increasing isolation in its stance. The Taliban-led government, striving for legitimacy, has contacted other regional players, including India, Iran, Russia, and China, reducing Islamabad’s exclusive role as a supporter or protector. India’s ongoing investment in Afghan infrastructure, education, and humanitarian aid offers Kabul alternatives to relying solely on Pakistan.
Furthermore, the rapid decline of U.S. interest has created a vacuum that regional states are eager to fill. China pursues interests in Afghanistan’s untapped mineral resources and connectivity options that link Central Asia to the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia aims to prevent instability on its southern borders and to maintain influence in the post-American era. Iran seeks to protect Shia minorities and counter Sunni extremism on its eastern frontier.
All these dynamics leave Pakistan vulnerable: –
- Islamabad’s dream of “strategic depth” through a compliant regime in Kabul is currently on hold.
- The Taliban now distrusts Pakistani influence, sometimes refusing cooperation and engaging in diplomacy outside Islamabad’s control.
The India Factor: Strategic Partnerships and Pakistan’s Anxiety
India’s outreach to Afghanistan is a notable concern for Pakistani strategists. New Delhi’s soft power, exerted through education, infrastructure, medical aid, and diplomatic efforts, has strengthened connections with both the Afghan people and the elite. Even under Taliban rule, India has kept channels of communication and influence open, partly recognising Afghanistan’s central role in South Asian security.
Pakistan’s inability to monopolise Afghan attention has thus weakened the idea of “strategic depth”. If India manages to establish even informal alliances or détente with the Taliban, Islamabad’s security strategy could be completely disrupted.
Pakistan’s Problems with Contemporary Afghanistan
Border instability continues. The Afghan government does not recognise the Durand Line. Disputes over border fencing, cross-border terrorism, and lawlessness escalate military tensions and public hostility.
Refugee Crisis. The return of the Taliban has caused mass migration, straining Pakistan’s resources and law enforcement as hundreds of thousands of Afghans seek safety and livelihood across the border.
Security Threats. Militant groups with bases in eastern Afghanistan pose a direct threat to Pakistan’s national security. Operations against these groups, however, risk antagonising the Taliban, who are reluctant to crack down on co-ethnic or co-ideological actors.
Economic Strains. Trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains hindered by political tensions, bureaucratic restrictions, and military blockades. Informal economies flourish, but official connections are hostile to cooperation.
Diplomatic Isolation. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban is increasingly viewed as a source of instability, hindering broader regional cooperation and alienating international development partners.
Strategic Depth Myth. For years, Pakistan’s military doctrine depended on using Afghanistan as a buffer against India. Now, that idea is outdated, and Islamabad is at the forefront of regional instability and strategic risk.
The Deeper Implications for Pakistani Policy
Pakistan is now compelled to reconsider old assumptions. The concept of strategic depth was primarily based on a flexible Afghan government that would consistently align with Islamabad’s interests and provide territory, sanctuary, and leverage in the event of conflict with India. The Taliban’s independence, Afghanistan’s new network of regional alliances, and international disengagement have revealed the risks of over-relying on proxies and underinvesting in genuine bilateral diplomacy.
India, meanwhile, has steadily strengthened its influence through investment, cultural diplomacy, and strategic patience. Today’s Afghanistan, impoverished, war-weary, yet fiercely independent, understands the cost of being a graveyard for foreign ambitions, and Pakistan faces the reality of being next in line to pay the price.
Conclusion: Afghanistan—Not Going Away
Afghanistan will not vanish from Pakistan’s strategic considerations. It remains an existential threat, a hotbed of instability at Islamabad’s border, capable of exporting refuge, revolution, and retaliation equally. The myth of strategic depth is gone; the era of strategic vulnerability has started.
Pakistan’s problems with Afghanistan stem from histories of distrust, cycles of violence, and failures of imagination. The new reality is characterised by Afghan autonomy, competing regional interests, and a persistent inability to convert geography into security. For Indian strategists, this presents an opportunity; for Pakistan, it is a call to fundamentally rethink its western border not as a buffer to manipulate, but as a neighbour whose stability is vital to its own survival.
Only by recognising the real costs of ambition and the need for true partnership can Pakistan start to overcome its persistent Afghan dilemma.
About the author
Lt Col Manoj K Channan (Retd) served in the Indian Army, Armoured Corps, 65 Armoured Regiment, 27 August 83- 07 April 2007. Operational experience in the Indian Army includes Sri Lanka – OP PAWAN, Nagaland and Manipur – OP HIFAZAT, and Bhalra - Bhaderwah, District Doda Jammu and Kashmir, including setting up of a counter-insurgency school – OP RAKSHAK. He regularly contributes to Defence and Security issues in the Financial Express online, Defence and Strategy, Fauji India Magazine and Salute Magazine.
*Views are personal.
