Russia’s aviation engine industry is currently reassessing its strategy due to technology goals, industry limitations, and the urgent need for engines made in the country for new civil and military planes. Recent assertions by prominent engineers and aviation specialists provide insight into the progress of two of the nation’s most eagerly awaited initiatives: the high-thrust PD-35 and its more cost-effective counterpart, the PD-26. Although both engines continue to be integral to Russia’s long-term aerospace strategy, their trajectories seem increasingly dependent upon the development of specific aircraft programs and the changing requirements of national carriers and manufacturers.
The PD-35: Aspiring yet Powerful, Confronted by Practical Challenges
The PD-35 originated as Russia’s premier advanced high-thrust turbofan, designed to rival leading international engines within the 35-ton thrust category. The main objective of the program was to prepare the future long-range widebody aircraft, covering potential successors to the Il-96 or the Russia-China CR929 projects. Over time, however, the PD-35 initiative has faced considerable industrial and financial challenges.
Although a full-scale prototype of the PD-35 is currently undergoing testing at facilities in Perm, where engineers are verifying basic technologies, it remains purely a demonstrator and is not yet a flight-ready engine. Achieving near-target thrust in laboratory testing demonstrates that Russia has successfully mastered numerous advanced materials, turbine technologies, and compressor architectures essential for such a high-performance engine. Engineers underscore that beating these obstacles represented an important turning point, demonstrating the technical feasibility of the project.
Nevertheless, the path forward beyond this technical demonstration remains extensive and uncertain. Aviation specialists have noted that achieving a certified, serial-production status for the PD-35 presents far more challenges compared to the development of its smaller siblings. The engine’s magnitude necessitates the use of more advanced materials, more sophisticated cooling systems, and a more extensive manufacturing infrastructure than Russia currently has in serial production. Some experts have even stated that developing such an engine is more challenging than creating a rocket, considering the exact tolerances and reliability standards necessary for commercial aviation.
Another notable obstacle is the lack of a specified aircraft for the PD-35. Without an established platform, the engine risks transforming into a motor without an aircraft. Currently, there is no widebody aircraft program in Russia that necessitates a 35-ton-class engine, and the long-debated revival of widebody civil aircraft manufacturing remains at the conceptual phase. Without a well-defined customer and specified requirements, the PD-35 cannot proceed to the full development phase.
Despite these challenges, the PD-35 continues to attract political and industrial backing, and its demonstrator remains a significant technological accomplishment. It also provides a valuable foundation for derivative engines, ensuring that its research is not in vain. Nevertheless, its progression toward mass production is expected to continue into the following decade, if not beyond.
The PD-14 and PD-8: Developing the Industrial Foundation
Although the PD-35 remains in a lengthy experimental stage, Russia is actively advancing preparations for mass production of engines within the PD-14 family. The PD-14 serves as the main engine for the MC-21 aircraft, which is regarded as the foundational element of Russia’s civil aviation resurgence. Establishing mass production of the PD-14 is a strategic priority, guaranteeing that the MC-21 can commence operations without reliance on foreign engines.
Simultaneously, the smaller PD-8 engine is advancing through the testing and certification phases. The PD-8 is designed for a range of applications, including the Sukhoi Superjet variants, and is vital for substituting Western powerplants constrained by sanctions. The successful development of the PD-8 and PD-14 establishes the industrial foundation upon which the larger PD-26 and PD-35 programs depend. Both engines use technologies and manufacturing processes originating from the PD-14 program, emphasizing the necessity of establishing reliable mass production for the smaller engines initially.
The Debated Transition to the PD-26
Over the past year, numerous experts and former officials have indicated that Russia might be redirecting its emphasis from the costly and technically complex PD-35 to a more economical and feasible alternative—the PD-26. This engine, producing approximately 26 tons of thrust, is regarded as more appropriate for the upcoming generation of Russian civil and transport aircraft.
The PD-26 finalized its preliminary design phase in September 2025. The design is directly derived from the gas generator developed for the PD-35, indicating that the foundation established for the larger engine has been adapted to expedite the development of a smaller, more manageable powerplant. Unlike the PD-35, which does not have a verified aircraft application, the PD-26 presents significantly more defined potential use cases. It may serve as the power source for enlarged variants of the MC-21, massive transport aircraft, or upcoming domestically developed widebody aircraft. Its capabilities are more closely aligned with Russia’s current aviation production plans, and its development timeline is anticipated to be considerably shorter.
Aviation specialists assert, however, that despite its more modest specifications, the PD-26 continues to be a “virtual engine” until a client supplies a detailed set of performance criteria. In Russia’s aviation sector, engines are not created in isolation but are customized for particular aircraft. Absent a formal request from an aircraft program for the PD-26, the project cannot progress to full-scale engineering and prototype production.
This repetition of the PD-35 issue highlights more extensive systemic challenges within the industry: engine development initiatives and aircraft programs must be coordinated, adequately financed, and effectively managed in tandem. The lack of a designated widebody aircraft project in Russia at present hinders the progression of both engines to subsequent development stages.
Reasons for the Divergence of Expert Opinions on Both Projects
Although the PD-26 is regarded as more plausible than the PD-35, experts continue to exercise caution regarding its potential. The completion of the design phase signifies progress; however, the shift from concept to mass production generally necessitates an additional period of five to seven years, even under optimal conditions. The lack of a definitive aircraft program implies that the PD-26, similar to the PD-35, may face an indefinite postponement.
The PD-35 encounters even greater skepticism. The technology required for this propulsion class is considerably more sophisticated, resulting in higher development costs, and the manufacturing infrastructure necessary to sustain it is still in the process of being established. Without an aircraft such as a modernized widebody or next-generation transport aircraft, the justification for proceeding with the PD-35 beyond the demonstration phase remains uncertain. Many industry experts believe it is likely to remain a technological initiative rather than evolve into a commercially viable enterprise.
Simultaneously, advocates of the PD-35 contend that discontinuing the project would be an imprudent decision. They assert that Russia must maintain its ability to develop large engines in order to stay competitive in the global aerospace industry and prevent falling irreversibly behind the world’s leading manufacturers. The PD-35, despite not being mass-produced, functions as a research platform and a representation of technological prowess.
Projected Future Scenarios
Based on the present circumstances, two main future trajectories seem most likely for Russia’s high-thrust engine initiatives.
Scenario 1: The PD-26 Emerges as Russia’s Primary Workhorse
In this scenario, the PD-26 advances to become the principal propulsion system for future Russian aircraft necessitating mid-range high thrust. It will proceed to full development once a customer—most likely a major airline such as Aeroflot or a government aerospace manufacturer—establishes definitive requirements. Serial production may commence several years subsequently, facilitating heavy transport aircraft, extended MC-21 variants, or a new widebody program. The PD-35 would continue as a technology program, providing advancements in materials science, compressor designs, and test data for subsequent engine developments.
Scenario 2: A New Russian Widebody Revitalizes the PD-35
If a new widebody aircraft initiative arises—whether a rejuvenated Il-96 modernization or an entirely new long-range platform—the PD-35 could advance to comprehensive engineering development. This scenario necessitates political backing, major investments, and a well-defined commercial or strategic imperative. Under these conditions, the PD-35 would develop into Russia’s premier ultra-high-thrust engine. The PD-26 may subsequently function as a supplementary engine for medium-thrust applications, thereby concluding the overall lineup.
Both scenarios are heavily contingent upon Russia establishing a comprehensive long-term strategy for its widebody aircraft industry. Until such clarity is attained, engine development will proceed with caution.
Final Remarks
As of 2025, Russia’s PD-35 and PD-26 programs continue to be at a critical juncture. The PD-35 has exhibited promising technical performance; however, it lacks an established aircraft platform and encounters sizable development challenges. The PD-26 presents a more cost-effective and feasible route ahead; however, its future is contingent upon the receipt of a formal request from an aircraft manufacturer.
What becomes apparent is that Russia’s aviation engine industry is seeking equilibrium — between ambition and practicality, between technological progress and industrial capability, and between strategic vision and immediate requirements. Whether the upcoming years will favor the extensive PD-35, the pragmatic PD-26, or a hybrid strategy will hinge on decisions yet to be determined by government bodies, manufacturers, and national carriers.