Far removed from the sensationalized portrayals of Hollywood cinema, piracy remains a formidable challenge for coastal states, seafarers, and the maritime industry. Like other asymmetric maritime threats, piracy is deeply intertwined with regional crises, economic fluctuations, and geopolitical tensions. The complexity of the threat often makes it difficult to classify or quantify, as maritime attacks frequently involve connections to local criminal syndicates, illicit trade networks, and, in some instances, terrorist organizations.
Historically, piracy has proliferated in areas with significant maritime trade, originating in the Mediterranean before expanding to the Atlantic, Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Today, modern pirates continue to operate near major Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), targeting chokepoints and strategic maritime corridors. Given that 90% of global trade by volume and 80% by value is conducted via maritime routes, securing these passages is imperative for states reliant on the movement of natural resources, energy, and manufactured goods.
Piracy, often described as one of the oldest illicit professions, has evolved in its tactics but remains geographically entrenched. This article will first explore the factors contributing to the fragile yet significant reduction in piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea. Subsequently, attention will turn to the persistent risks in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, where vessels continue to face threats.
Piracy in the Indian Ocean: The Tide Turned, But the Threat Lingers
The Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) emerged as global hotspots for piracy, experiencing an alarming surge of 571 attacks in 2008, compared to the previous average of approximately 50 incidents per year. These attacks included hijackings of oil tankers, crew kidnappings, and ambitious boardings that marked a turning point in modern piracy.
Geographically, Somali-based pirate groups capitalized on their proximity to the Bab el Mandeb Strait, a critical trade passage. The social dimension of piracy in Somalia was also crucial; coastal communities, deprived of their fishing resources by foreign fleets engaging in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, turned to piracy as an alternative livelihood. Initially acting as self-styled coastguards targeting illicit fishing vessels, these groups soon realized that ransom payments far outweighed the profits from stolen fish hauls. This led to the establishment of a sophisticated economic model incorporating armed raiding groups, translators, negotiators, and logisticians operating from ungoverned spaces.
The modus operandi involved using small, fast skiffs, often deployed from larger motherships, enabling raids beyond 200 nautical miles offshore. Armed with AK-47s, RPG-7s, and ladders for boarding, these pirates presented a substantial threat to commercial vessels.
The International Response and Its Impact
To counter this crisis, an international coalition responded with robust military interventions. Measures included:
- Deployment of Embarked Protection Teams (EPEs)
- Launch of the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, extended until December 2024 with a revised mandate
NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, which established the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) to escort vulnerable vessels
In parallel, private maritime security firms (PMSCs), particularly from Anglo-Saxon countries, provided armed guards, while the International Maritime Organization (IMO) endorsed Best Management Practices (BMPs) to enhance vessel security. These collective efforts significantly reduced the success rate of pirate attacks post-2012, shifting the risk-reward ratio unfavorably for Somali pirates.
However, despite the waning of large-scale operations, with the last verified sophisticated attack occurring on April 21, 2019, 240 nautical miles from Mogadishu, the root causes of Somali piracy persist. The absence of attacks does not equate to the elimination of threats, with sporadic hijackings still possible within a 300-nautical-mile radius, particularly in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, the region remains rife with illicit trafficking, narcotics, arms, and contraband cigarettes, complicating maritime security.
The profile of the modern pirate has also evolved, with individuals engaged in multiple criminal enterprises. While direct attacks have diminished, vigilance remains critical, especially as the withdrawal of multinational naval forces could trigger a resurgence. The removal of the High-Risk Area (HRA) designation for the WIO in January 2023 has not diminished industry concerns, with BMP5 recommendations still in place.
Gulf of Guinea: Organized, Violent, and Adaptive Piracy
Despite increased security efforts, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) remains a highly organized and violent threat. Most incidents occur in Nigerian Territorial Waters (TW) and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), but neighboring waters of Togo, Benin, and Cameroon are also affected. While opportunistic thefts occur at anchorages and ports, organized pirate groups operate up to 250 nautical miles offshore, often targeting fishing vessels, offshore oil platforms, and small cargo ships.
The region’s pirates utilize high-speed boats and are heavily armed, frequently employing sophisticated navigation techniques. Although some attacks fail, slower, low-freeboard vessels remain primary targets. Approximately 75% of the most dangerous pirate groups are concentrated in Nigeria’s Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Delta states, leveraging secure onshore bases to facilitate ransom kidnappings and oil bunkering operations.
The use of motherships has increased attack ranges, as seen in Somalia. The 2014 hijacking of the Kerala off the coast of Angola is an example of this. Other high-seas attacks include the April 2022 attack on the Arch Gabriel (270 nautical miles from Lomé) and the November 2022 hijacking of the B Ocean (230 nautical miles from Côte d’Ivoire).
Although illegal oil bunkering at sea has declined due to increased security measures, pirates have shifted focus to land-based oil theft, which presents a lower risk-reward ratio. Regional naval capabilities have improved since the 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct, leading to reduced incidents, from 135 in 2020 to 78 in 2021, and only two recorded kidnappings in 2022. However, corruption, inconsistent governance, and differing national interests continue to hinder cohesive security operations.
Southeast Asia: Endemic, Opportunistic, and Persistent Piracy
Unlike the WIO and GoG, piracy in Southeast Asia remains a persistent, low-violence phenomenon, particularly in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Accounting for over 100 incidents in 2022, these waters remain hotspots for opportunistic boardings, typically carried out at night by lightly armed pirates seeking easy targets. Small tankers, barges, and tugs, often with low freeboards and poor lighting, are particularly vulnerable.
Although many boardings result in minor thefts of engine parts and equipment, sophisticated tanker hijackings have occurred, likely incentivized by fluctuating fuel prices. Coordinated patrols under the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP) and Eyes in the Sky (EiS) initiatives have improved security, though longstanding geopolitical tensions between bordering states hinder full cooperation.
A Persistent and Evolving Challenge
Maritime piracy remains a complex, multifaceted threat, influenced by economic conditions, geopolitical tensions, and regional governance disparities. The Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico also experience sporadic incidents, often linked to drug trafficking, but reliable reporting remains a challenge due to reputational concerns.
Ultimately, piracy is not merely a law enforcement issue but a broader strategic concern. The presence of naval forces in pirate-prone regions serves not only to combat crime but also to assert geopolitical influence over vital trade routes. Thus, while piracy poses a clear and ongoing risk to maritime security, it also presents strategic opportunities for global powers to maintain a military presence in critical waters, potentially making it a matter of “geopolitical utility.”