The 23rd India–Russia Annual Summit in New Delhi on 4–5 December 2025 and the Joint Statement that followed indicate not only the continuation of a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership,” but also its adaptation to a volatile, sanctions-heavy, and sharply polarised international system.
In an era where the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, and key West Asian actors (KSA, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan) are reshaping global alignments, Vladimir Putin’s visit to India highlights Moscow’s pivot to Asia and New Delhi’s determination to maintain strategic autonomy amid a growing multipolar landscape. Explaining these shifts helps analysts understand the evolving regional and global strategic environment.
The Summit in Context
The summit coincided with the 25th anniversary of the 2000 Declaration on Strategic Partnership, reaffirming India–Russia relations as a long-term structural feature rather than a Cold War relic.
It was Putin’s first visit to India since 2021, following the Ukraine war, sweeping Western sanctions on Russia, and increased U.S. tariff pressure on India related to discounted Russian energy imports.
The Joint Statement frames this continuity with terms like “resilience” and “multipolarity,” explicitly describing India–Russia relations as an “anchor” for regional stability and reaffirming Russia’s support for India’s permanent membership in a reformed UN Security Council. This should reassure policymakers about the strength and reliability of their strategic partnership.
Trade, Energy, And Payments: Establishing A Sanctions-Resistant Corridor
The summit’s goal of reaching 100 billion USD in bilateral trade by 2030 should motivate policymakers by showing a shared commitment to economic resilience and growth.
Two elements stand out.
First, the clear push for long-term fertiliser supplies and joint ventures, which links Russia’s resource strength to India’s agricultural and food security goals.
Second, the honest acknowledgement that payment systems must be made “third‑country‑proof”: the partners are committed to bilateral settlements in national currencies, interoperability among National payment systems, and the exploration of central bank digital currency platforms to bypass Western-dominated financial networks, thereby strengthening regional economic stability and strategic autonomy for India and Russia.
In energy, Russia commits to uninterrupted oil, gas, and critical raw material supplies. Meanwhile, India continues to develop its nuclear and conventional energy projects, notably Kudankulam, additional NPP sites, and potential cooperation on the fuel cycle and equipment localisation.
For Japan and South Korea, both heavily reliant on stable energy supplies and aligned with the U.S., India’s expanding energy partnership with sanctioned Russia sends a complex message: New Delhi remains a key player in Indo-Pacific balancing but will not risk its energy security by fully complying with Western sanctions. Clarifying this balance helps policymakers evaluate the stability and risks of India-Russia energy cooperation.
Connectivity: Continental and Maritime Eurasian Bridges
The connectivity corridors, such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Northern Sea Route, demonstrate India and Russia’s roles in shaping regional influence, empowering diplomats to foster stability, and emphasising their strategic importance in Eurasia.
INSTC, anchored in Iran and the Caspian Sea, naturally intersects with the interests of KSA, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. Iran benefits from serving as a land bridge between India and Russia, supporting the India–Iran Chabahar project and strengthening Tehran’s influence amid U.S. pressure.
Turkey, positioning itself as a Eurasian hub, will observe how INSTC interacts with its own Middle Corridor vision connecting Europe to Central Asia; a strong India–Russia–Iran axis via INSTC could challenge Ankara’s transit dominance.
Pakistan, excluded from this network and heavily reliant on the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is pushed further into China’s strategic sphere, limiting its options with both Moscow and New Delhi.
The Northern Sea Route
The Northern Sea Route and Far East cooperation extend the reach into the Arctic, where Russia remains the main coastal power, and India seeks observer-led influence.
For Japan and South Korea, India’s involvement in the Russian Far East, Arctic shipping, and resource projects provides an additional regional partner that expands their exposure beyond China and Western shipping routes.
For China, however, a more active India–Russia cooperation in the Arctic slightly complicates Beijing’s longer-term goals in the “Polar Silk Road”.
Defence And Technology: From Buyer–Seller to Co‑Producer
Defence and military-technical cooperation remain a key pillar. The language has shifted decisively from pure import to co-development and co-production, which should inspire confidence in India’s technological resilience and strategic independence.
The Joint Statement explicitly mentions joint manufacturing of spares and components for Russian-origin systems in India, including for export to “mutually friendly” third countries, which has significant implications for regional power balances and India’s strategic autonomy.
– To the U.S. and its allies, it demonstrates that India will not abruptly dismantle its Russian equipment ecosystem, even while acquiring U.S., French, and other Western platforms.
– To China and Pakistan, it reaffirms the technological strength of the India–Russia defence partnership, particularly in areas such as air defence, aviation, armoured systems, and nuclear submarines, where cooperation remains strong.
– To West Asian partners (KSA, UAE, Iran), it emphasises India’s potential as a manufacturing hub for affordable, combat-ready systems with Russian origins, providing them with an alternative supply channel outside Western OEMs and Chinese systems.
The space and nuclear sectors expand this military-technical ecosystem into strategic and dual-use domains. Collaboration between ISRO and Roscosmos on human spaceflight, rocket engines, and navigation further connects India to Russia’s advanced technology network, particularly given Moscow’s restricted access to Western technology. Japan and South Korea—U.S. treaty allies but technologically competitive—see this as evidence that India is not relying solely on Western partners for advanced technology but is instead balancing multiple suppliers.
RELOS and Operational Reach
An essential backdrop to the summit is the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support (RELOS) agreement, ratified by Russia just before Putin’s visit and now effectively operational. RELOS enables the armed forces of both countries to access each other’s bases, ports, and airfields for refuelling, repairs, supplies, and maintenance, significantly broadening India’s reach from the Indian Ocean into the Russian Far East and Arctic, while ensuring Russian assets have reliable logistics across the wider Indo‑Pacific arc.
For India, RELOS is more than just a convenience; it serves as a force multiplier, linking with the INSTC, the Chennai–Vladivostok corridor, and the Northern Sea Route to create a seamless logistics network from peninsular India to the Arctic rim. It also strengthens practical defence cooperation—maintaining Su‑30MKI fleets, naval units, and air defence systems in remote regions—and reflects a level of trust with Moscow comparable to India’s logistics agreements with the U.S., France, Australia, and others, thereby balancing continental and maritime partnerships.
India’s Defence Wishlist and Post-Ukraine Upgrades
Beneath the formal communiqués lies a challenging military-technical agenda shaped directly by Russian battlefield experience in Ukraine and India’s need to future-proof its mostly Russian‑origin inventory. Open discussion around the summit has highlighted New Delhi’s tentative “wish list,” which includes exploratory interest in the next-generation S‑500 air defence system, closer cooperation on Su‑57 fifth-generation fighters, upgrades of the Su‑30MKI fleet, advanced drones and loitering munitions, and further development of BRAHMOS variants, such as extended range and improved anti-ship and land-attack capabilities.
These discussions are at different stages, from exploratory to advanced. Still, they collectively demonstrate India’s aim to maximise technological value from its Russia channel while demanding clearer delivery schedules, better lifecycle support, and higher levels of joint production.
At the same time, the Indian armed forces are undertaking extensive upgrades of legacy Russian platforms, such as tanks, air defence systems, and rotary- and fixed-wing assets, to incorporate lessons learned from Ukraine on precision fires, counter-UAV defences, electronic warfare resilience, dispersed logistics, and hardened command-and-control. The goal is clear: India intends to re-engineer its Russian-origin systems, including BRAHMOS, Su-30MKI, T-90/T-72 fleets, and integrated air defence networks, for a future battlefield dominated by drones, long-range precision, dense ISR, and cyber-electronic warfare, with a significant portion of the upgrade, manufacturing, and software development conducted within India through co-development frameworks.
RT India and The Information Domain
The launch of RT India from New Delhi during Putin’s visit enhances the information landscape within the framework of hard and soft power described earlier. RT India operates as an English-language network with a sizable editorial team, serving not just as an India-specific channel but as a global platform that presents “alternative narratives” on Ukraine, sanctions, multipolarity, and the Global South. It leverages Indian voices and contexts to increase its credibility.
This operation aligns with the broader strategic messaging of the summit: while RELOS, defence co-development, and energy corridors increase military and economic interdependence, RT India functions as a soft-power amplifier for Russian and, occasionally, convergent Indian perspectives in Western and international information spaces. Incorporating this “megaphone” into the Delhi media ecosystem enables Moscow to partly direct its messaging to Western audiences through content framed in and from a major democracy, complicating Western efforts to see it as just Kremlin propaganda and strengthening the India–Russia partnership in cognitive and narrative domains.
Multilateralism: Establishing a Common Doctrine
Multilaterally, the Joint Statement is notably dense. It emphasises several key platforms: the UN, the G20, the BRICS, the SCO, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), and export control regimes. Three elements serve as geopolitical markers.
First, Russia’s reaffirmed support for India’s permanent UNSC membership strengthens Moscow’s position on India’s long-term institutional goals, unlike China’s hesitation. This enhances Russia’s political influence in New Delhi, especially as India advocates for “reformed multilateralism” and greater representation of the Global South in international forums.
Second, the emphasis on BRICS expansion and Russia’s commitment to support India’s 2026 BRICS Chair gives New Delhi a crucial platform to influence discussions on economic, financial, and climate governance, including reducing dependence on Western-controlled institutions. For the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, this indicates that India will continue investing political capital in non-Western alliances even while pursuing QUAD-like initiatives.
Third, the SCO references—civilisational dialogue, counter-terrorism centres in Tashkent and Dushanbe, and a broader emphasis on a “representative, democratic, fair multipolar world order”—convey a normative rejection of Western interventionism and double standards.
For China, SCO remains a co-chaired forum with Russia, and India’s active participation allows New Delhi to influence, or at least moderate, continental security narratives that might otherwise favour a China–Russia conception of Eurasian order.
Counter-Terrorism and Regional Fashpoints
On terrorism, the Joint Statement is strongly worded, condemning specific attacks in Pahalgam and Moscow and addressing cross-border movement, safe havens, and UN-listed groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. For Pakistan, this marks a diplomatic setback. Although not explicitly named, the language on cross-border terrorism and safe havens aligns with India’s long-standing narrative, and Russia’s complete agreement narrows Islamabad’s scope to portray itself solely as a victim.
Coordinated positions on Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Gaza further demonstrate a shared preference for negotiated solutions, humanitarian access, and rejection of maximalist military options.
Here, Iran and Turkey emerge as key players: both align with India’s and Russia’s interests in Syria, Iraq, the Gulf, and the broader West Asian region. Russia’s extensive presence in Syria and Iran’s regional networks overlap with India’s energy, diaspora, and trade interests, making coordinated de-escalation in West Asia vital to New Delhi’s stability considerations.
For the U.S. and its allies, India–Russia coordination on these flashpoints indicates that Western crisis management will face a counter‑narrative centred on sovereignty, non‑intervention, and negotiated settlements, especially when sanctions or military interventions are considered.
Climate, Critical Minerals and Technology Governance
The statement places significant emphasis on climate change, low‑carbon development, critical minerals, and digital technologies, including information protection and critical infrastructure security. This is essential; it directly relates to the economic and technological competition among the major powers.
Russia’s resource base, including critical minerals and Arctic reserves, along with India’s market and manufacturing capabilities, creates an alternative node in the global supply chains for EVs, batteries, and green technologies. This affects China, which currently dominates many critical mineral and processing chains, and U.S.–Japan–Korea partnerships working to develop “China‑plus‑one” or “China‑minus” supply systems.
The digital and cyber references—such as information protection, critical infrastructure security, and law-enforcement cooperation—also indicate a growing consensus on norms and architectures for cyberspace. This consensus may lean more toward Russia’s state-centric vision than toward the open-internet models favoured in some parts of the West. For authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes like Iran and, to some extent, Turkey, this normative development offers a governance framework that balances connectivity with increased state control.
Implications For Major Players
The visit and Joint Statement reshape perceptions across all the mentioned actors: –
United States. Washington views New Delhi as a partner in Indo‑Pacific balancing, but the summit reaffirmed that India will not be co‑opted into an anti‑Russia bloc. The development of rupee–rouble and other non‑dollar payment mechanisms, along with deep energy ties, sit uneasily with U.S. sanctions strategy and tariff pressure.
China. Beijing benefits from Russia’s strategic shift away from the West, but a more active India–Russia relationship hedges against over‑dependence on China within the context of Moscow’s Asia pivot. India’s involvement in the Russian Far East, Arctic, and energy sectors reduces China’s exclusivity as Russia’s Asian partner.
Japan and South Korea. Both welcome India’s role in supply‑chain diversification, Arctic governance, and regional stability, but must consider India’s ongoing defence and energy ties with Russia. This requires Tokyo and Seoul to accept that New Delhi’s strategic autonomy involves strong engagement with Moscow, even as India participates in Indo‑Pacific coalitions.
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan
Iran benefits from INSTC and energy-connectivity projects that bring it closer to India and Russia, providing it with economic resilience against Western sanctions and Gulf competition.
Saudi Arabia interprets India’s Russia equation through the energy lens; a stable India–Russia oil and fertiliser corridor aligns with Riyadh’s interest in predictable demand and collaborative OPEC+ management, while also competing with some Gulf exports.
Turkey perceives both opportunity and competition: cooperation through the SCO, BRICS-plus, and climate/energy forums, but rivalry over becoming Eurasia’s primary transit and energy hub.
Pakistan finds itself strategically marginalised: India’s strengthening partnership with Russia on defence, counter-terrorism, and connectivity diminishes Islamabad’s ability to play Moscow against the West, pushing it further into a China-centric orbit.
India’s Strategic Takeaways
For India, the main result of Putin’s 2025 visit is the establishment of a multi‑vector balance in a growingly binary global conversation. The relationship with Russia continues to be essential for:
– Energy and resource security on a large scale and at competitive prices.
– Maintaining and indigenizing a large installed base of Russian-origin military hardware while gradually shifting towards co-development and export.
– Shaping Eurasian and Arctic governance from the inside, rather than from the outskirts.
– Maintaining a credible, time-tested continental partner as India expands its maritime and Indo-Pacific footprint with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and others.
The Joint Statement, rich with sectoral initiatives, defence‑industrial opportunities, information‑domain actions like RT India, and multilateral efforts, is less about nostalgia and more about developing a sanctions‑resilient, technology‑integrated, multi‑theater partnership that can function in the shadow of U.S.–China rivalry. In a world where no single power can control outcomes, the Putin–Modi summit emphasises that India and Russia aim to remain influential shapers, not passive entities, of the emerging multipolar order, from Europe’s eastern border to the Indo‑Pacific, the Arctic, and the broader information domain.