The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), since its inception, has been more than a regional grouping; it is a political barometer of Eurasia. With its members spanning South Asia, Central Asia, Russia, and China, it reflects the converging and diverging interests of major continental powers. The recently concluded SCO Summit in Tianjin, along with its joint statement, the Tianjin Declaration, offers a telling snapshot of how the grouping navigates the deep fault lines between India and China, engages with the Middle East crises, and frames the global economy in ways that echo the protectionist spiral of the 1930s Great Depression.
The declaration is noteworthy not only for what it explicitly states but also for the silences, omissions, and careful balancing acts it embodies. It reaffirms the SCO’s pivotal role as a stabilising platform, a beacon of hope in the midst of geopolitical turbulence, and underscores the contradictions within.
Historical Anchoring: Lessons from the 1930s
The declaration deliberately situates itself in a historical continuum. By invoking the 80th anniversary of World War II victory and the founding of the United Nations, it draws a symbolic connection to the global anti-fascist struggle. This framing, particularly resonant with China’s commemorations of the “War of Resistance Against Japan,” re-legitimises Beijing’s narrative of continuity between its wartime sacrifices and its current call for “peace, justice, and UN authority.”
Equally telling is the implicit reference to the Great Depression era. While the term itself is absent, the text laments “serious disruption to the global economy, particularly trade and financial markets,” warns against “unilateral coercive measures,” and champions “open, transparent, inclusive, and non-discriminatory multilateral trading systems.” This is a direct rebuke of contemporary protectionist trends, whether U.S. sanctions, Western trade barriers, or technology restrictions.
The SCO is signalling that the economic fragmentation of the 1930s, which bred nationalism, political extremism, and ultimately global conflict, remains a cautionary tale for today’s fractured order. By extension, the Tianjin Declaration posits multilateralism as the antidote to confrontation.
Counter-Terrorism: Balancing Indian and Pakistani Concerns
Perhaps the most sensitive section of the Tianjin Declaration deals with terrorism. The SCO condemns three specific attacks: –
- 22 April 2025 – Pahalgam (India). A strike in Jammu & Kashmir’s tourism hub, targeting both religious pilgrims and the fragile perception of peace.
- 11 March – Jaffar Express (Pakistan). An attack on a symbolic passenger railway, representing Pakistan’s domestic vulnerability.
- 21 May – Khuzdar (Pakistan’s Balochistan). A reminder of insurgency in Pakistan’s periphery.
By naming incidents in both India and Pakistan, the SCO seeks to Project itself as impartial. It neither privileges Indian claims of cross-border terrorism nor dismisses Pakistani grievances. This balancing act reflects the SCO’s robust effort to prevent India-Pakistan disputes from paralysing its counter-terrorism agenda, a testament to its diplomatic prowess.
Yet, beneath the symmetry lies asymmetry. For India, Pahalgam represents a symbol of its sovereignty and stability in Kashmir. For Pakistan, Jaffar Express and Khuzdar highlight internal vulnerabilities that Islamabad often externalises. By grouping them, the SCO avoids choosing sides but also dilutes the possibility of a decisive anti-terror agenda.
India’s Position: The BRI Divide
Another notable detail is that all SCO members, except India, endorsed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This persistent divide illustrates the frozen state of India-China ties. New Delhi continues to reject the BRI on grounds of sovereignty (the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) and strategic autonomy.
The Tianjin Declaration highlights this divergence by omission: while others reaffirm their support, India’s silence is recorded in the subtext. This not only underscores bilateral mistrust with China but also signals the difficulty of building consensus within the SCO on connectivity. For Beijing, the absence of Indian endorsement is a constant reminder that its flagship initiative is not universally accepted, even within supposedly friendly blocs.
Middle East Flashpoints: Naming the U.S. and Israel
Where the Tianjin Declaration turns unusually forceful is in its commentary on the Middle East. The text: –
- Condemns Israeli and American military actions against Iran.
- Affirms the binding nature of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which underpins the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA).
- Calls for the security of nuclear facilities and urges diplomatic solutions.
The direct naming of the U.S. and Israel is significant. Multilateral declarations typically employ indirect language; however, the SCO states its position clearly here. It reinforces the perception that SCO is tilting towards the Iran-Russia-China axis, particularly at a time when Western powers seek to isolate Tehran.
This assertiveness also reflects the SCO’s influential role as a counter-narrative to Western hegemony; by calling out unilateral actions, it signals that the ‘Eurasian bloc’ will resist what it sees as destabilising interference, empowering its member states with a strong collective voice.
Palestine: Condemnation without the Two-State Solution
On Palestine, the SCO calls for: –
- An immediate ceasefire.
- The establishment of humanitarian corridors.
- A “comprehensive and just resolution” of the Palestinian question.
Notably, however, the declaration does not reference the two-state solution, which has long been considered the international consensus. The omission may be deliberate; while some SCO states, like Russia and China, endorse two-state rhetoric, others may prefer ambiguity to preserve ties with Israel or avoid alienating Arab partners.
This cautious language reflects the SCO’s broader pattern: condemn violence firmly, but avoid binding itself to a prescriptive formula.
Afghanistan: Stability through Inclusion
- The Tianjin Declaration reiterates that Afghanistan’s stability remains central to regional security. Its key points: –
- An inclusive government in Kabul is the top priority.
- Central Asia remains the core region for security spillover.
- SCO support will continue for humanitarian aid, counter-narcotics efforts, and regional infrastructure development.
Here, SCO is caught between realpolitik and principle. Most members, including Russia, China, and Central Asian states, pragmatically engage with the Taliban. Yet, the declaration couches this in the language of inclusivity, implicitly acknowledging that the Taliban’s monopolisation of power alienates minorities and risks further instability.
For India, which remains cautious about engaging directly with the Taliban, this wording provides space to push for broader representation without isolating itself within the SCO.
India-China Dynamics within SCO
The Tianjin Declaration is also a mirror of India-China tensions. While the SCO remains one of the few multilateral forums where leaders of both nations sit at the same table, the declaration exposes: –
- India’s non-alignment with BRI.
- The careful balance on terrorism, which avoids validating India’s specific accusations against Pakistan.
- Ambiguity on border tensions, with the SCO avoiding direct reference to disputes.
Thus, the SCO provides a stage for interaction without resolution. It prevents bilateral conflict from spilling into multilateral paralysis, but it also does not offer breakthroughs. In effect, the SCO serves as a holding ground—valuable for crisis management but limited in its ability to deliver trust.
SCO’s Identity: Between Multilateralism and Bloc Politics
The Tianjin Declaration reveals an SCO in dual transition: –
- As a defender of multilateralism, it seeks to present itself as a stabiliser in turbulent times by invoking UN authority, opposing protectionism, and condemning terrorism broadly.
- As a geopolitical counterweight, by naming the U.S. and Israel, defending Iran, and omitting references that are uncomfortable to members (such as the two-state solution and CPEC disputes), it reveals a tilt towards bloc politics.
This dual identity reflects the contradictions of its members: while united in opposing Western dominance, they remain internally divided on issues such as the BRI, terrorism, and border disputes.
Conclusion: The Tianjin Signal
The Tianjin Declaration is more a signal than a roadmap, a symbolic alignment against unilateralism, protectionism, and Western military interventions. It draws from the memory of the 1930s to caution against repeating cycles of division and conflict.
For India, it is a mixed bag; its terrorism concerns are acknowledged, but diluted; its refusal to endorse BRI keeps it isolated; yet its presence ensures that China and Pakistan cannot monopolise the narrative.
For the Middle East, the declaration reflects a bolder SCO willing to directly challenge U.S. and Israeli actions, aligning itself closer with Iran.
For the world at large, the Tianjin Declaration serves as a reminder that Eurasia is not passive; it is actively shaping counter-narratives, invoking history, and seeking to redefine the terms of the global order.
The challenge, however, lies in whether SCO can move beyond declaratory balancing acts to actionable cooperation. Without this leap, its declarations will remain symbolic, unable to transform the very crises they so carefully navigate.