The Shahed series of kamikaze drones, referred to as “Geran” in Russian service, have undergone considerable improvement in technology since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, particularly in their warhead designs. These drones, which were first purchased from Iran with conventional explosive payloads, have gradually been modified by Russia to include increasingly complex features that reflect both military needs and industrial adaptation under sanctions. According to recent claims from Russian and Ukrainian sources, a new fragmentation-high explosive payload with an airburst capability has been integrated, marking an important leap in warhead technology.
The latest development is a warhead with a cylindrical body that is around 375 mm long and 300 mm in diameter. The shell now has batch marks, the name of the manufacturing facility, and a characteristic yellow line on the outside. These characteristics help with identification and may even help with quality control tracking in Russian manufacturing facilities. Preformed fragmentation elements designed to maximize lethal radius are housed in the upper portion of the casing. A bottom-mounted inertia fuze of the 493M type is secured by six threaded bolts and three filling openings in the lower part. For timed or altitude-based explosion, this fuze can be used in conjunction with sensors in addition to impact.
According to current Russian energetic formulations, the explosive element inside the warhead is identified as a plastisol-type charge, most likely OLA or LP-30T. The explosive mass is estimated to be around 50 kilos, though precise measurements have not been verified. A LiDAR sensor integrated within the construction is the main addition. By enabling detonation at a precisely determined height and measuring altitude above the target, this sensor creates the effect of an airburst. Because the blast extends horizontally and downward without being immediately absorbed by the earth, this feature greatly expands the area of effect for fragmentation weapons.
A purposeful tactical change is shown by the addition of a Shahed warhead with airburst capability. The new Geran drone configuration improves efficiency against open-area targets and personnel, and it is better able to overcome counter-drone defenses like overhead protective netting. Previous iterations of Geran drones relied solely on contact detonation, which was perfect for destroying buildings or breaking through roofs. This design idea is similar to well-established theories in aerial bombing and artillery, which state that airburst weapons are better suited for anti-personnel tasks and for increasing the likelihood of hitting exposed or lightly armored targets.
Since the start of the conflict, there have been several reported modifications to the Shahed warhead design. According to reports, the Russian industry has installed several variations based on the target type and mission description. High explosive BSF-50 units and thermobaric BST-52 warheads weighing 52 kg have been delivered by drones from the “K” and “KB” series. Because thermobaric loads produce extreme overpressure, they are especially deadly in enclosed areas, bunkers, and urban interiors. OFZBCH-50 fragmentation-high explosive warheads and TBBCh-50 thermobaric versions, both in the 50-kilogram class, have been used to record the “Ы” (Y) series drones. Drones have occasionally been equipped with hefty 90-kilogram multi-effect payloads that combine cumulative, incendiary, and fragmentation charges with explosive compositions like TGF-35P2 or warheads made in Iran. These bigger units are probably designed to destroy as much structural damage as possible from highly fortified targets or vital infrastructure.
One significant modification since the beginning of Russia’s employment of Shahed drones in Ukraine has been the manufacture of warheads domestically. Although the airframe and basic design still have Iranian roots, Russian companies are increasingly substituting locally made payloads for imported explosive designs that are suited to certain military requirements. In addition to allowing the Russian defense sector to test new energetic materials, casing forms, fragmentation geometries, and fuze technologies, this change tackles the logistical difficulties of getting Iranian supplies under geopolitical restraints.
In terms of functionality, Shahed warhead development reflects battle lessons. The effectiveness of basic impact detonation has been allegedly reduced by Ukrainian defense adaptations, such as the extensive use of makeshift overhead netting, movable shelter shelters, and the fortified rebirth of Cold War-era fortifications. In response, by sprinkling fragmentation and blast over a larger target area, airburst weapons provide a means of getting over these defenses and causing damage from above. Additionally, by accounting for variations in drone altitude brought on by wind or topography, the new LiDAR sensor probably increases accuracy across a variety of urban or rural terrain.
Strategically, this shift also shows that Russia intends to use the Shahed for more than just economical precision strikes against stationary targets. These drones can affect defensive fortification planning, the deployment of Ukrainian manpower, and even the psychological impact of drone threats by enhancing lethality against scattered or shielded targets and the likelihood of hitting several objects in a single strike. Another layer of the changing drone warfare dynamic is created by Ukraine’s consequent need to modify countermeasures, which may include increased overhead defensive density or new electronic interference with drone sensors.
The evolutionary trajectory of Shahed’s warheads, when viewed in a larger historical context, illustrates a quick cycle of innovation during times of war. The majority of loitering munition designs in arsenals around the world prior to this battle were either anti-armor or precision demolition of stationary structures. The Russian defense-industrial complex is trying to combine several weapon ideologies into a single expendable platform, as demonstrated by the dual-use capability now integrated into the Geran’s most recent warhead, which can effectively suppress an area and destroy contact. Because the same drone model may have drastically varied results depending on its loaded payload, this not only expedites production but also makes it more difficult for the enemy to forecast the impacts of strikes.
The combination of LiDAR-controlled fuze logic, manufactured fragmentation arrays, and high explosives based on plastics indicates that the Russian supply chain for these warhead units is now entirely domestic. If Russian factories can maintain consistent output of the new airburst-capable payloads under wartime conditions, then the Shahed platform will retain its relevance even as Ukrainian forces enhance physical defenses. On the other hand, if production bottlenecks occur in explosives or sensor components, deployment rates may revert to simpler impact-based warheads. As both sides continue to modify their strategies in a technological weapons race that is essentially being waged in the skies at low altitude, over trenches, cities, and infrastructure alike, this dynamic will probably become more apparent over the conflict’s subsequent phases.