As the Indian Armoured Corps commemorates its Raising Day — a moment to honor the steel sinews of our nation’s conventional deterrence — it is also an opportune time for introspection. This isn’t merely a celebration of tanks, tactics, and triumphs in battle.
It is about the strategic role of combat arms and services in ensuring the security of the nation—a role that is increasingly being taken for granted, marginalized, or, worse, misunderstood.
From the deserts of Rajasthan to the ridgelines of Ladakh, from counter-insurgency in Kashmir to joint training exercises in foreign lands, the Indian soldier, across arms and services, stands committed, competent, and ever-ready. Their unwavering dedication and skill should make us all proud. Yet, their voice remains conspicuously absent from the nation’s highest security forums.
Decisions are made far from the battlefield, often in closed rooms where experience in conflict is replaced by administrative proximity and political expedience. In such an arrangement, the soldier becomes the executor of directives shaped by those with neither the vision nor the accountability for consequences.
“A soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him.” — G.K. Chesterton.
From Combat Arms to Combat Silos
Armoured Corps, Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, and Signals — each arm of the Indian Army forms the backbone of combat capability. The Air Force and Navy, with their respective operational doctrines, similarly stand prepared to safeguard India’s sovereignty across domains. Yet, there is a growing dissonance between operational capability and strategic direction.
The Kargil conflict, fought valiantly by India’s armed forces, ended in military success but revealed a gaping void in national security planning. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recognized this and called for a revamp of national security structures, including military integration in higher decision-making.
Over two decades later, the same siloed systems continue, with the same “business as usual” mentality. However, there is hope in the form of the KRC’s recommendations, which, if implemented, could lead to significant strategic reforms. It’s time to turn this hope into reality.
“Insanity is doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting different results.” — Albert Einstein.
A Grease Pole to the Top
It is worth examining why successive Chiefs and Army Commanders have been unable to force a course correction. Some may argue that it lacked political will, while others may point to bureaucratic resistance.
But part of the blame also lies within a system where leadership ascension can feel like climbing a “grease pole,” where each rung is contested, and success is often met with envy rather than encouragement.
This ‘grease pole’ leadership refers to the competitive and often hostile environment in which military leaders operate, where personal ambition and rivalry can overshadow the collective goal of national security.
In such an environment, speaking truth to power, mainly when that power lies outside the uniform, becomes increasingly rare. As a result, institutional courage gives way to personal caution. Over time, the institution loses its strategic voice and is reduced to offering tactical advice when the nation needs military-strategic integration at the top.
Crisis Management is Not Strategy
India has evolved a dangerous tradition of managing national security crises by crisis. Uri, Pulwama, Galwan, and Poonch—the list grows, but the pattern remains. There is reactive deployment, tactical retaliation, and political messaging. But no long-term security architecture ever emerges from the ashes of these events. This approach needs to change, and it needs to change now.
A senior veteran recounts a telling episode from the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Late that night, he received a panicked call from a close relative in Mumbai. Their daughters had narrowly escaped the terrorist assault on the Oberoi Hotel, having left their belongings behind and gone off the grid. Desperate for help, they sought the senior veteran’s assistance to locate them, assuming the Army would have been involved by then. When a staff officer to the Army Commander at the Formation Headquarters was approached, the officer responded sleepily, unaware of the unfolding situation. The Army Commander was oblivious to the attack — a damning indictment of the disconnect between national crises and military readiness. The state government had not even considered alerting the Army in the initial hours. This disconnect can lead to significant delays in response and potentially catastrophic outcomes.
The senior veteran aptly concluded: “So much so for civil-military linkage and including the Armed Forces in immediate dealing with emergencies… until it’s too late, and then asking them to ‘jo uchit samajhte ho kijiye.'”
Another senior veteran adds another critical layer. As senior operations officer of a military formation, he was involved in a seminar post-26/11 hosted by a Formation headquarters under their command, a senior division commander, tasked with reviewing lessons from the Mumbai attack. The General Officer strongly advocated for the National Security Guard (NSG) to be headed by an Army officer — a logical suggestion given the force’s operational character and the Army’s expertise in urban combat. Though supported across the board, the idea did not sit well with the establishment.
The then Army Chief reprimanded them after allegedly receiving a letter from the National Security Advisor, who had taken offense based on a report filed by local Intelligence Bureau officers. The episode illustrates how bureaucratic sensitivities and political insecurities override professional military logic. The beauty is that the Intelligence Bureau could source information from a classified environment within.
How Other Nations Acted When Hit by Terror Attacks
Contrast this with the United States post-9/11. The Bush administration swiftly created the Department of Homeland Security, passed the PATRIOT Act, and restructured intelligence and counterterrorism coordination.
Post the 2015 Paris attacks, France declared a state of emergency and overhauled its domestic security protocols.
Israel integrates operational lessons into doctrine almost in real time with every strike, backed by direct political-military synergy. We must learn from these strategies and adapt them to our context.
India, by contrast, fires a few artillery rounds across the LOC, suspends talks, or invokes economic instruments like Most Favoured Nation withdrawal — before quietly returning to the status quo.
India has evolved a dangerous tradition of managing national security crises by crisis. Uri, Pulwama, Galwan, and Poonch—the list grows, but the pattern remains. There is reactive deployment, tactical retaliation, and political messaging. But no long-term security architecture ever emerges from the ashes of these events.
Weak Political Leadership: The Cost of Inaction
This crisis is not rooted in military inadequacy. It is a crisis of political leadership. The same political class that rose to power promising muscular nationalism now appears paralyzed when faced with hard choices. When calls for retaliation are met with silence, and decisive action is delayed for fear of electoral consequences or international optics, it reflects a strategic vacuum.
Let us not forget: “Leadership is not about being in charge. It is about caring for those in your charge.” — Simon Sinek.
If the political leadership cannot visit a Military Operations Room during a crisis, if it avoids being briefed firsthand by commanders, what message does that send to the forces?
What kind of superpower do we aspire to become when the soldiers defending the nation are excluded from shaping its defense policy?
The idea of civilian control has been slowly but surely twisted into bureaucratic control, which is neither democratic nor efficient.
Nationalism vs. Business Interests: A Contradiction?
Recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) highlights significant disparities in military spending among major nations. In 2024, China’s military expenditure reached $314 billion, surpassing the combined defense budgets of India ($86.1 billion), Japan ($55.3 billion), South Korea ($47.6 billion), and Australia ($33.8 billion), totaling approximately $222.8 billion. This reflects China’s sustained focus on expanding its military reach and regional dominance.
In comparison, India’s defense budget remains nearly nine times that of Pakistan’s $10.2 billion. Yet the outcomes often do not reflect this advantage, mainly due to India’s lack of a unified national security strategy and systemic civil-military disconnect.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to lead globally with an annual defense budget approaching $997 billion. The U.S. retains substantial interests in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in counterbalancing China’s assertiveness and maintaining freedom of navigation through key maritime routes. India is a strategic partner in this calculus, with deepening ties under frameworks like QUAD and military exercises such as Yudh Abhyas and Malabar.
Under its “Indo-Pacific Tilt,” the United Kingdom has also reasserted its strategic presence east of Suez. As a key pillar of AUKUS and a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), the UK has expanded its engagements through naval deployments and strategic dialogues, including with India. Both legacy connections and current geopolitical competition with authoritarian regimes drive its interest.
While the U.S. and the UK articulate support for a “rules-based international order,” their actions often reflect selective engagement, primarily aligned with their national interests.
India must, therefore, be wary of overreliance on global powers and instead build robust self-reliance in its strategic planning and military readiness.
This duality—the state’s performative nationalism at home and realpolitik abroad—must be recognized and addressed. Strategic clarity, Indigenous defense capability, and integrated civil-military planning are no longer optional but essential.
The government is often seen waving the flag of nationalism at public rallies, invoking patriotism to consolidate vote banks. Yet, it treads lightly when significant corporate interests are involved—even if those interests compromise national security.
Strategic decisions such as banning Chinese apps or raising import tariffs are symbolic. India trades USD 100 billion worth of imports and hardly exports USD 10-12 billion. However, concerning defence procurement, the files remain stagnant in the Ministry of Defence. The glaring example is the status of the Indian Air Force and its operational responsibilities.
This duality is not lost on the citizen. A tree cannot seek nourishment from its roots while cutting them down.
What We Must Do: From Rhetoric to Reform
Let us be brutally honest — our Defence Services are not currently geared for a significant kinetic action. The reasons are not far to seek. We are short of workforce, critically low on equipment, and recent government support has been tepid. In recent years, the image of the Services has eroded significantly. The relentless dismantling of our customs, traditions, and military heritage — to appease political masters — may well have come at the cost of operational readiness and morale.
An all-party audit of defence procurements is critical to ensuring we get more bang for our buck.
Now, when the time has come to teach our adversaries a lesson, political leaders step back, offering no coherent politico-military objective, but conveniently tell the Services: do what you think is appropriate. If we deliver, the credit goes to them. If, God forbid, we fail, the blame lies squarely on the uniformed leadership. It is a profoundly uncomfortable situation for the three Service Chiefs to be placed in — expected to act without strategic guidance, and yet fully accountable for outcomes.
We must recall that activating the Line of Control or the International Border might be a tactical necessity, but nothing significant should be attempted without full operational preparedness. Much like in 1971, the military hierarchy should insist on time to prepare. In the interim, low-cost diplomatic and economic options must be vigorously pursued.
If the conflict escalates into the nuclear realm, who will take responsibility? There’s silence on that front. Our current military leadership is often considered more committed to ideological posturing and outdated political treatises like Hindutva and ‘Chanakya Niti’ than to modern strategic realities. However, slogans are not a strategy in a world that responds only to hard power.
Let’s not forget the self-destructive argument that lasted over three decades—that future wars wouldn’t last more than ten days. This notion was so deeply internalized that our War Wastage Reserves (WWR) were scaled down without formal approval. Senior officers laughed off concerns.
“We will fight as is, where is,” became an accepted slogan. Then came the introduction of the Agniveer scheme — the final blow to long-term force cohesion and professionalism.
Meanwhile, political leaders quickly ask, “Kuch karte kyon nahi?” But should the generals act contrary to their expectations, they turn around and exclaim, “General Sahab, yeh kya kar diya?” This is not leadership; this is abdication of responsibility.
The caliber of our officer cadre and men has seen a steady decline. Today, able-bodied youth apply everywhere else before considering the Armed Forces. The best and brightest on both sides of our borders are opting in. Here, we risk becoming more and more subservient—an institution burdened by populism, under-resourced by design, and demoralized by neglect.
We cannot wish all this away. We have reached an inflection point.
Senior military leadership and strategic experts have consistently ignored repeated advisories and reviews. Over the years, the Defence Services have gradually diminished, while the Ministry of Home Affairs has diligently improved the capacity and status of Central Armed Police Forces. This deliberate marginalization has led to an alarming erosion in operational readiness, institutional morale, and force credibility.
Today, the Armed Forces are often relegated to ceremonial showcases — visible on Republic and Independence Days, or through orchestrated fighter jet sorties and fleet reviews, all for optics. There is a glaring absence of serious review or reflection from the political leadership, and the consequences are evident in the state we find ourselves in.
The following corrective steps are not just essential — they are urgent:
- Institutionalize Military Advice. Establish a statutory framework integrating military leadership into the Cabinet Committee on Security and the National Security Council. The photos in the media show the absence of the military leadership when the CCS meeting was on. On the other hand, the defense secretary was missing. This reflects a clear sense of importance being given to our national security. To top it off, in such important meetings, the entire video was released with the sound muted. Do the camera operators have such high security clearances to be present and listen in on deliberations of National Security?
- Empower the CDS. The CDS must be given full operational authority over joint commands and warfighting strategy, not merely coordination and logistics. Given the CDS appointment, is there a need for the defense secretary? Likewise, the secretary of defense production should be a man from the services who can liaise with the industry to deliver what the defense forces need.
- Operationalize Theatre Commands. Expedite the establishment of integrated theater commands based on functional and geographical alignment with our adversaries. It has been a work in progress over the past several years.
- Publish a National Security Strategy. Clearly define threats, outline military and non-military approaches, and allocate budgets accordingly. Let the nation know where it is headed.
- Strengthen Strategic Communication. Build a military-strategic information narrative so the nation is not caught off guard by foreign propaganda or misinformation during crises.
- Audit Strategic Procurement. Ensure all defense procurements serve national security objectives first. Project delays or cancellations for “commercial reasons” must be subjected to parliamentary and expert scrutiny.
- Create a National Defence University (NDU) to educate future civilian and military leaders. This would be a shared space for strategic culture, doctrine formulation, and wargaming. The Rashtriya Raksha University has been established, and the NDU, which has been promulgated, is waiting for its formal execution on the ground.
- Promote Jointmanship Across Services. Establish cross-service career pathways and training from the mid-career stage to ensure future generals and admirals think beyond their arm or service.
- Revive the Spirit of Soldier-Statesmanship. Encourage senior officers to participate in open national discourse, within bounds of service propriety, to shape policy from a position of experience.
- Teach Citizens to be Aggressive. In the terror attack at Pahalgam, only one Pony owner engaged in a physical fight to snatch the weapon. Is there a need for a policy review of allowing citizens to bear arms in places affected by terror? Israel and the US have a policy; we must face real threats and let citizens defend themselves.
Steel in the Spine, Not Just in the Tank
As we celebrate Armoured Corps Day, we must remember that steel is not just in the tank but in the spine of the nation’s resolve. The Indian soldier does not seek glory; he only seeks clarity of mission and backing from the country he serves.
This is not a call to arms. It calls for awareness to end the marginalization of those who bleed first when strategy fails.
History will not forgive us for being caught napping. And neither will the future.