On April 8, 2025, the Supreme Court of India delivered a groundbreaking judgment that sparked the most recent controversy. This judgment established stringent deadlines for the President and Governors to rule on bills passed by state legislatures. This decision has sparked substantial constitutional and political discourse, garnering both endorsements and condemnations from various perspectives.
From Absolute Discretion to Accountability
The Supreme Court mandated in its judgment that the President must decide within three months on legislation that Governors have reserved for Presidential assent under Article 201 of the Constitution. Before this, there was no established timeframe for making such decisions. The case that precipitated this judgment involved the Tamil Nadu Governor, R. N. Ravi, who had refused to grant assent to ten bills that had been passed by the Tamil Nadu Assembly. The Court declared the Governor’s decision to be illegal and ordered that the bills be presumed assented to, thereby bypassing the Governor and President’s delays.
The Court emphasized that the President does not have the power to withhold assent indefinitely, which is known as a “pocket veto.” The Court determined that valid justifications must accompany any delay exceeding three months and communicate them to the relevant state government. Additionally, the Court held that the President’s functions under Article 201 are subject to judicial review, which enables states to approach the judiciary if the assent is withheld without valid justification. The ruling also mandated that Governors act on legislation within one month, thereby affirming the existence of explicit timelines for the legislative process at the state level.
The Supreme Court’s usage of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to approve the ten Tamil Nadu legislations without the signatures of either the Governor or the President was one of the most extraordinary aspects of the judgment. This historic first in Indian legal history underscored the Court’s intention to avoid legislative impasse.
Further Rubber Stamping of the President?
Nevertheless, the decision has sparked a significant amount of debate. The judgment is perceived by some as a substantial restriction on executive authority, as it reduces the President’s “absolute veto” power under Article 201, which previously permitted the indeterminate withholding of assent. According to reports, the Central government is contemplating the submission of a review petition that would contest the imposition of deadlines and the reduction of the President’s veto powers. The government argues that the President was not allowed to be heard during the proceedings and that the Home Ministry’s perspective was not adequately represented.
Criticism Follows
The judgment was harshly criticized by Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar, who characterized the judiciary’s use of Article 142 as a “nuclear missile against democratic forces.” He argued that the actions of the President should not be directed by courts, cautioning against the potential for judicial overreach and its effect on the separation of powers. Additionally, certain governors of states have expressed apprehension that the timelines established by the Court unduly limit their constitutional sway.
A Welcome Change
The Supreme Court’s decision represents a substantial change in the balance of power between the executive and the judiciary, particularly about the assent process for state legislation. Although the judgment is intended to prevent legislative delays and ensure timely decisions, it has incited a significant debate regarding executive discretion versus judicial activism. The controversy is expected to persist, particularly if the government pursues a review petition that aims to reevaluate the Court’s decision.
Can the President be ordered by the Supreme Court?
Even though the Constitution does not explicitly state that the Supreme Court is empowered to “order” the President, it has the authority to ensure that the President of India fulfills constitutional obligations. This authority is derived from the Court’s status as the protector of the Constitution, as outlined in Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies) and Article 142 (Enforcement of Supreme Court Decrees). Although the President is granted immunity from legal proceedings under Article 361, this does not imply that the President is immune to constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has the authority to investigate and declare the president’s failure to fulfill a mandatory constitutional obligation as unconstitutional.
This judicial supervision is predicated on several significant judgments. In 1994, the Supreme Court of India ruled in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India that the President’s actions, including the imposition of the President’s Rule under Article 356, are subject to judicial review. The Court also ruled in Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989) that the President’s pardon power (Article 72) must be exercised within constitutional limits and can be reviewed if it is misused. These rulings emphasize the principle that the President’s discretionary powers must be consistent with constitutional mandates.
The Supreme Court can’t command the President like it can other officials. However, it has the power to invalidate unconstitutional inaction. For example, the court may intervene if the president unreasonably withdraws his or her assent to a measure without adhering to constitutional protocol. This guarantees that the president, despite his or her status as a ceremonial chief, does not act at random. The Court’s authority in these matters is derived from its broader power of judicial review, which is a fundamental feature of India’s constitutional framework.
A check, not a rubber stamp
The Supreme Court’s ruling reduces executive obstructionism by mandating strict timelines for presidential and gubernatorial action on state bills. However, its long-term impact is contingent upon two critical factors: whether the government’s potential review petition is successful in challenging these constraints, and whether future courts consistently apply similar deadlines to central legislation. The judiciary’s proactive role in defining clear boundaries for what was previously a vague constitutional process is exemplified by this ruling, which transforms indefinite executive discretion into a time-bound, justiciable obligation while preserving the delicate balance of India’s federal structure. It is far from acting as a rubber stamp.