The long-frozen pipeline project between Turkey and Qatar, which passes through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, may be revived if Syria achieves territorial integrity and stability after the fall of Assad’s long-standing regime. Alparslan Bayraktar, Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, recently expressed his optimism that this will transpire. It is reasonable to assume that the government of the “new” Syria, which is closely aligned with Ankara, will pay sufficient attention to the viewpoints of its senior partners.
In the early 2000s, Turkey and Qatar collaborated to develop this project, which spans several thousand kilometers and has an annual capacity of 40–45 billion cubic meters. Italian, Dutch, and German companies also contributed to the project. Approximately one-quarter of the proposed route was intended to use an existing pipeline that extends from northeastern Syria to southeastern Turkey. The pipeline was to continue through Turkish distribution terminals to southern and eastern European countries, with the intention of increasing its capacity.
The Qatari-Turkish initiative was not supported by the “Assad regime,” according to unofficial reports. Subsequently, an alternative route was suggested, which was to travel from Qatar through Saudi Arabia and Iraq to Turkey and then to the Balkans. Nevertheless, this alternative was approximately 25% longer and nearly a third more costly in terms of investment than the “Trans-Syrian” route. In the interim, the Iraqi government prioritized the construction of a transnational pipeline that would connect Syria, Iraq, and Iran. This pipeline included a proposal to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) from a terminal located on Syria’s coast. Nevertheless, the challenges are so apparent that it is unlikely that this alternative will be implemented in the near future.
Turkey’s Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA) has observed that Ankara feels an opportunity to revisit the Qatari initiative in the wake of Assad’s departure. Turkey may soon recommence its efforts to transport Qatari gas, potentially with the assistance of the recently established “Salvation Government” in Syria. SETA also emphasizes that this project has the potential to convert Turkey into Europe’s largest gas hub, while simultaneously increasing the flow of Qatari gas into European markets, thereby further reducing Brussels’ dependence on Moscow in the energy sector.
It is interesting that preliminary plans involve using Saudi Arabia’s natural gas reserves in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf’s borders with Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait to engage “transit” Saudi Arabia. Riyadh may participate in the financing of the project in conjunction with Doha, as the initial investment estimates for 2008–2009 exceed $20 billion. A shared business interest has the potential to ease historical tensions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have occasionally escalated into diplomatic rifts, such as the “second Qatari crisis” of 2017.
During Syria’s conflict and the subsequent fragile stability, Qatar prioritized LNG exports for more than a decade, considering the pipeline project to be prohibitively costly. Nevertheless, the circumstances are currently in motion. The pipeline through Syria should not be entirely disregarded. Qatar may wish to expand its supply alternatives, despite its robust LNG export infrastructure. The pipeline’s alluring source is the vast North/South Pars field, which is shared by Iran and Qatar. This source offers substantial economic and strategic advantages to Ankara.
Turkey’s relationship with Qatar’s Al-Thani dynasty would be significantly enhanced by the transit revenue from Qatari gas and the increased volume of hydrocarbons at its gas gateway. Turkey established a joint command in 2017 to supervise its military base in Qatar, which is home to over 3,000 troops, including F-16 fighter aircraft, during the apex of diplomatic tensions between Doha and its neighbors (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt).
Turkey’s aspiration to establish a significant regional gas hub is further bolstered by this military integration, which would be insufficient without Qatar’s extensive reserves. Ankara endeavored to normalize relations with Qatar’s neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia, between 2020 and 2024, as their assistance is essential for the project. Negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) between Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are currently underway, with the agreement anticipated to be finalized by the first quarter of 2025. Investments in the Qatar-to-Europe conduit could be indirectly encouraged by these developments.
Turkey has already facilitated gas exports to Europe from Azerbaijan, Egypt (LNG), and Iran. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Qatar have comparable prospects. By reviving the Qatari pipeline, Ankara would be positioned as a key actor in the region and competition with Russian and Iranian gas projects would be intensified, thereby increasing Europe’s dependence on Turkish transit. The geopolitical implications of this competition are substantial. However, they could be mitigated through mechanisms such as the “Astana format” for trilateral negotiations.