At the 12th World Government Summit (WGS-2025) in Dubai (UAE) in mid-February, Elon Musk said that the new US administration had “no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries” during his video address. He said there were instances in which the United States exhibited an obsessive behavior on the global stage. He expressed his conviction that the United States should, in general, refrain from interfering with other nations and instead concentrate on its own affairs. That is preferable to the global implementation of regime reforms.
The UAE, the host nation, and other Gulf monarchies—particularly Saudi Arabia—were among the main audiences. Notably, on February 18, Russian and American delegations convened in Saudi Arabia to deliberate on critical matters concerning normalizing bilateral relations. According to another interpretation, Musk’s statement could be an attempt to push for a change from normal trade and economic ties between the US and the Gulf countries to a de facto extortion model, where the UAE and other Arab sheiks would have to pay the US for “protection” from problems and crises that the US causes.
US-UAE Tensions and the Gulf’s Pivot Toward China and Russia
Washington’s apprehension regarding the deterioration of US-UAE relations dates back to the summer of 2024. The main trigger was the refusal of two successive US administrations—Trump’s first term and Biden’s—to sell F-35 fighter aircraft to Abu Dhabi. The covert US-Iran negotiations and Washington’s slow and weak response to Yemeni drone attacks were also a source of outrage for the UAE and other Gulf monarchies.
Concurrently, the UAE intensified its partnerships with China and Russia, not only in trade but also in military affairs. Western media began to highlight reports that China was building a military facility at a port in the Emirates. Alarms were raised by US intelligence, which suggested that Beijing could potentially exploit the facility to facilitate the deployment of its military forces and private security contractors globally, including in the Middle East and Africa.
Global news agencies sensationally reported in the early summer of 2023 that a naval alliance of major regional powers was forming in the Persian Gulf under China’s guidance.
The UAE, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Oman were rumored to be establishing a joint naval force to patrol and secure energy routes in the Gulf, according to Iranian media. China was the coordinator of this initiative, as per Iranian journalists. The UAE had demonstratively announced its withdrawal from the US-led International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) two months prior. The IMSC predominantly relies on the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain.
In this context, the Chinese destroyer Nanning participated in an international naval security exhibition in the capital of the United Arab Emirates. According to reports, military representatives from numerous Middle Eastern nations, including Saudi Arabia, expressed considerable enthusiasm for embarking on the Chinese warship. Additionally, there was an increasing amount of media speculation regarding the possibility of an agreement between Saudi Arabia and China to acquire Type 052 destroyers. The Saudi kingdom was reportedly contemplating the acquisition of 12 such ships, as well as the requisite technologies for domestic production, according to reports that were initially published in US media and subsequently extensively disseminated on Chinese social networks.
The Economic Shift and the Strengthening of UAE-Russian Relations
The UAE’s increasing alliances with Russia, particularly in Africa, have been another significant source of concern for Washington. The cooperation in supporting the Libyan National Army of General Haftar in Cyrenaica, as well as the Russian-UAE engagements in Sudan, where gold is being transported to the Emirates, are included. Western media outlets have expressed concern regarding the fact that, since the start of Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine, the UAE has experienced a more than sevenfold increase in equipment exports to Russia, which have bypassed sanctions. Additionally, microprocessor supplies have increased by fifteenfold. Some drones used on the Ukrainian front are also reportedly being shipped to Russia via the UAE.
Simultaneously, Russians have been making substantial investments in UAE real estate. In the Russian market, a specialized trust management strategy has even emerged, with a concentration on real estate investments in the UAE and other Middle Eastern countries. Since the inception of the SMO, this market has experienced substantial growth as a result of Russian investors. In 2022, Dubai registered more than 86,000 real estate transactions, exceeding the previous record of 80,000 set in 2009. The total transaction volume was approximately $56.6 billion, which is nearly 80% higher than the previous year. Among the most significant purchasers were Russians.
In addition to real estate, more than 1,000 Russian companies have established themselves in the UAE in the year since the SMO began. The excellent education and language skills of Russian-speaking professionals are highly sought after by these new companies.
Independent Financial and Energy Strategy of the United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi has been pursuing an independent financial and energy policy for several years, independent of Washington’s influence. Indian refineries began paying for the majority of their Russian oil cargoes, which were procured through Dubai-based traders, in UAE dirhams instead of US dollars two years ago. At the same time, Iraq, the second-largest producer in OPEC, expressed its readiness to participate in resource transactions in national currencies in conjunction with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. After US pressure resulted in a dollar shortage in Iraq as a result of money transfers into Iran, this decision was made.
For years, the United States has threatened UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan with sanctions and investigations in response to these actions. Washington has suggested that the relationship between the United States and the United Arab Emirates may experience a decline that extends beyond mere rhetoric. Nevertheless, Arab culture is profoundly rooted in the practice of bargaining. The UAE can profit from leveraging potential ties with China and Russia to pressure Washington into compromises, but a confrontation with the US is superfluous. This strategy has been successful thus far.
A Business-Style Standoff Between the United States and Gulf Monarchies
The Gulf monarchies, particularly the UAE, and Donald Trump’s team are currently engaged in a conflicting business strategy in the Middle East. Both parties strategically maneuver, escalating stakes, and bluster. The United States suggests that its present strategic partnership with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf monarchies should be supplanted with a model in which these countries compensate the United States for their protection.
In the interim, the United Arab Emirates has been indicating for some time that it is contemplating the transition to Chinese munitions instead of American ones. It has also suggested that the presence of US soldiers in the country could be the next item on the agenda, which would significantly undermine American military logistics and further erode the US position in the region in the face of China’s increasing influence.
Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia has been transitioning to a more autonomous policy. Riyadh abruptly raised its crude prices in early February, despite a personal request from Donald Trump. The Saudi government has disregarded the United States’ requests to increase production to reduce global crude prices. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has followed its interests and has even decided to increase prices for its European and Asian consumers. The price of Arab Light, the primary petroleum grade exported to Asia, will increase by $2.40 per barrel beginning in March. This is the most significant increase since August 2022, when Brent crude traded at approximately $100 per barrel. Consequently, Arab Light will be $3.90 per barrel more costly than the Oman/Dubai crude basket.
These developments pose a significant threat to US influence in the Middle East, as the UAE and other Gulf monarchies could potentially adopt this pricing strategy at any moment. Additionally, they could compel the new US administration to declare its intention to “focus on itself” and “let other countries be.” Nevertheless, it is exceedingly uncertain whether Washington will implement these promises.