What the U.S. Must Learn from Ukraine — Before It’s Too Late

RAND's latest analyses of the Russia-Ukraine war highlight its transformative impact on global military strategy, alliance dynamics, and future conflict preparedness. The reports underscore the strategic setbacks for Russia, the lessons for U.S. deterrence, and the evolving role of drones and industrial mobilization in modern warfare.

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New reports concerning the Russian “Special Military Operation” (SVO) in Ukraine have been released by the American corporation RAND. These reports are noteworthy for their reflection on RAND’s evaluation of the armed conflict, its potential outcomes, and its future intentions regarding Russia. This article summarizes the findings of significant RAND studies and contextualizes them within a broader framework, drawing on insights from external sources.

“The Changing Nature of Conflict and the Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War”

The main geostrategic impact of the conflict has been the deterioration of relations between Europe and Russia, and to a lesser extent, between Europe and China. On the other hand, the United States has bolstered its relationships with its European allies. Russia and China’s objective of establishing a multipolar world and diminishing Western influence will be postponed if these trends continue. This delay, in addition to the material and bloodshed costs, constitutes a substantial strategic setback for the Kremlin.

Russia and China are now more motivated to undermine the transatlantic alliance. Although Russia appears to be open to resuming prewar commerce with Europe, it will be challenging to reverse the EU’s efforts to identify long-term alternatives to Russian energy and the imposition of broad sanctions. In the meantime, China is becoming increasingly interested in diplomatic and informational initiatives aimed at undermining the transatlantic alliance.

The United States and its allies must adjust to prepare for future large-scale, protracted operations. Competitors have noticed the United States’ challenges in maintaining its support for Ukraine and may be likely to doubt the country’s capacity and willingness to engage in a protracted conflict. U.S. extended deterrence may be compromised if competitors consider that their industrial and political systems are more suitable for prolonged conflict and that their interests can be achieved at a reasonable cost.

The implications of the conflict for future contingencies beyond the Indo-Pacific, such as in Europe, may be disregarded by the U.S. defense community. Although the United States is applying the lessons of Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific with greater vigor than its rivals, it has not made comparable efforts in other theaters. It is imperative to identify cost-effective, asymmetrically advantageous methods of deterring aggression across all theaters, given the anticipated strain on U.S. military and economic resources as a result of global commitments.

External Context and Analysis:

The RAND’s observations align with broader Western analyses indicating that the conflict has fundamentally altered the European security architecture and accelerated the West’s decoupling from Russia, especially in the energy sector. EU policy documents have mirrored the U.S. emphasis on the resilience of industrial bases and alliance cohesion. The recurring theme in defense circles is the concern about the United States’ ability to maintain its influence in protracted conflicts, particularly as the 2024 U.S. presidential election approaches and the debate over support for Ukraine intensifies.

RAND Report: “Dispersed, Camouflaged, and Degradable: Lessons from Ukraine”

  • The Russia-Ukraine war presents a critical opportunity for the United States to gain insight into the use and interaction of various forces and means in high-intensity conflict in a manner that was previously unattainable.
  • The U.S. is unable to directly replicate Ukraine’s experience, as Russia and China are inherently dissimilar adversaries, according to the report. Russia may employ tactics that differ from those employed in Ukraine, even in the event of a NATO-Russia conflict. The United States is preparing for the possibility of conflicts with both Russia and China, which could involve its allies in the Pacific.
  • The line between drones (UAVs) and cruise missiles will probably become increasingly blurred. Although cruise missiles presently possess advantages in terms of speed, payload, and resistance to jamming, technological advancements will enable the development of faster unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which will enable the combination of these weapons for specific purposes.
  • A significant shift in the balance between offense and defense could result in future conflicts that are not attrition-based, as was the case in Ukraine. Advancements in surveillance and long-range ordnance may render both attackers and defenders equally detectable.
  • The significance of mass-producing affordable armaments has been underscored by the conflict. Rebuilding their defense industries, sourcing supplies from abroad, and revising operational concepts based on the remaining munitions and systems are all necessary adaptations that both factions in Ukraine have had to make. Competence—consistent strategy, operational planning, and tactical skill—is equally critical as technology, if not more so.

External Perspectives:

Western military analysts concur that the Ukraine conflict has served as a testing ground for modern warfare, particularly in the areas of drone use, electronic warfare, and the transformation of industrial bases to facilitate the rapid production of armaments. NATO after-action evaluations have consistently brought attention to “soft power” factors, including adaptability, morale, and leadership.

“Russia’s Military After Ukraine”

Possible Futures for Russian Military Reform:

  • Shoigu Plan: The concepts for a ceasefire and stabilization that former Defense Minister Shoigu proposed are reflected in this document.
  • Return to Traditional Models: A return to the Russian armed forces that existed prior to the “New Look,” with a focus on domestic production, nuclear deterrence, mass mobilization, and conscription.
  • New Look: Forces that are smaller in size but of superior quality.
  • New Operational Model: Significant institutional reforms to facilitate modernization.

Historical Context and Results:

  • The report examines the military development of Russia since the collapse of the USSR, covering the Chechen wars, the reforms implemented by Sergei Ivanov, and the 2008 war with Georgia, which catalyzed genuine reforms.
  • The outcome of the Ukraine conflict will determine Russia’s rebuilding of its forces.
  • The recovery process of Russia will be significantly impacted by its relationships with critical partners, including China, Iran, Belarus, and North Korea.
  • Russia’s transition to a wartime economy has resulted in defense industrial base dependencies that will be challenging to reverse. However, the article’s author disputes the severity of this assertion, noting that Russia’s economy continues to operate, albeit under the influence of sanctions.
  • The Western focus is on the pace of Russia’s military recovery rather than its character. The U.S. and Western interests in Europe will continue to be significantly threatened by the partially restored Russian military.

External Context:

It has been confirmed by recent Western intelligence assessments that Russia is preparing its military and economy for a protracted conflict by increasing its dependence on partners such as Iran and North Korea for munitions and technology. The outcome of the conflict and the longevity of Western sanctions will determine the future configuration of the Russian military.

RAND’s Policy Suggestions for the United States

  • Enhance collaboration and strategic planning with European allies to confront global challenges.
  • Increase the focus and resources of the interagency to safeguard the political systems of the United States and its allies from adversarial information operations.
  • Continue to refine the instruments of economic coercion.
  • Prioritize Ukraine and donor support to invest in the defense industrial base to meet long-term requirements.
  • Revise the deterrence strategies of the United States and NATO in light of the lessons learned from Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on the Indo-Pacific and drones.
  • Investigate the influence of drone dependence on the perceptions of the United States’ dedication to NATO defense held by adversaries.
  • Investigate infrastructure enhancements in Europe to facilitate distributed aviation operations.
  • Develop novel strategies and protocols in conjunction with the Ukrainian and NATO air forces.

External Validation:

These recommendations are consistent with recent policy changes in the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO, which prioritize alliance cohesion, industrial resilience, and the implementation of new technologies such as drones and electronic warfare. A recurring theme in Western strategic planning is the emphasis on acquiring knowledge from Ukraine in anticipation of potential future conflicts with China.

In conclusion,

The RAND reports demonstrate a clear Western intention to maintain support for Ukraine as a proxy against Russia and to leverage the conflict’s lessons to improve military capabilities for potential future conflicts, particularly with China. The reports also underscore the persistent perception of Russia as a substantial threat, irrespective of the war’s outcome, and the necessity for both parties to adjust their military and economic strategies accordingly.

RAND’s analysis emphasizes the significance of alliance unity, industrial mobilization, and technological adaptation in modern warfare. The war in Ukraine is perceived not only as a regional conflict but also as a catalyst for global strategic realignment, with future implications for the military planning of the United States, NATO, and Russia. 

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