A brief Russian report published in the press in recent days contains a seemingly simple statement: Russia—”may dispatch production to India in a version with foreign components”—which has now generated considerable interest within aviation circles and has been reported by multiple outlets. The same diplomatically phrased meetings and memoranda also reference another regional aircraft: the turboprop Il-114-300, which Indian officials and industry representatives have reportedly identified as a potential candidate for collaborative development or local manufacturing. Together, these points suggest that both Russia and India might be changing their plans for civil aviation: Russia is looking for new ways to deal with supply chain issues and sanctions, while India wants to speed up its own aircraft production and improve regional air transport. The following account consolidates the public disclosures, elucidates the technical and geopolitical context, and delineates the practical challenges and probable consequences.
What the Russian report actually says (and who said it)
The “Business Online” report indicates that United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) is considering the possibility of manufacturing the Sukhoi Superjet-100 in India while maintaining foreign onboard systems, suggesting that the decision has not yet been finalized. The wording is cautious: “can send”—indicating a potential or possible action rather than a definitive commitment—and emphasizes that the current plan is for the SJ-100s manufactured at the Russian factory in Komsomolsk-na-Amure (KnaAZ) to initially serve the domestic market. In summary: sources indicate that the proposal is under consideration, rather than having been finalized.
That subtle distinction is significant. Over the past three years, the Superjet program has faced major challenges due to geopolitical developments. The SJ-100 initially started as a partially international project: its airframe and systems were of Russian origin, while key components such as engines and avionics were sourced from European and other global suppliers. Following 2022, Western sanctions and disruptions to supply chains rendered the import-dependent Superjet vulnerable. Russia initiated an “import-substitution” initiative—comprising replacements, domestically manufactured avionics, and an alternative engine—but these substitutions have proven to be technically and commercially challenging, resulting in extended timelines. The current approach—manufacturing or assembling in India with foreign components—appears to be an effort to maintain the original, internationally sourced configuration by relocating production outside the jurisdiction where sanctions directly impede supply.
Why move (or license) Superjet production to India?
There are three parallel reasons suggesting that UAC may favor engaging India in the production of Superjets.
first from a commercial perspective: maintaining the original foreign systems in the Superjet ensures the retention of proven, certified equipment and prevents the teething challenges associated with rushed or incomplete domestic substitutions. An aircraft assembled outside Russia using the original supplier network may achieve faster certification for international clients and may be perceived as more reliable than an abruptly “Russified” variant. This factor is relevant for markets beyond Russia and for operators who prioritize globally standardized avionics, engines, and maintenance networks.
Second, a sanctions circumvention strategy: building or assembling the aircraft in a country not subject to the same export restrictions—or at least using components that can be lawfully supplied there—offers a technical, albeit politically sensitive, approach to preserving production lines. Designating a completed jet as “free from sanctions” is not merely rhetorical: when the aircraft and its components are produced and possessed outside the jurisdiction enforcing restrictions, certain legal obstacles are alleviated. However, this does not render sanctions irrelevant, as legal, banking, and insurance frameworks will significantly influence any substantive export strategy.
Third, India’s strategic approach: New Delhi has clearly articulated its desire to expand its aerospace industrial base and enhance its capacity to produce a greater proportion of its own civilian and military aircraft. The opportunity to assemble a passenger aircraft in India is appealing for technology transfer, skill enhancement, and job creation. Indian state enterprise Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has already been associated in reports regarding discussions and memoranda with UAC concerning the SJ-100, and both parties have publicly acknowledged collaboration on regional aircraft. For India, a licensed Superjet program could serve as a foundational step toward improved design and manufacturing capabilities, as well as a means to establish a regional network featuring a domestically produced 80–110 seat aircraft.
The Il-114-300: why India has also been named
Alongside the discussion of the SJ-100, Russian officials and media have stated that India has shown interest in the Ilyushin Il-114-300—a modernized turboprop regional aircraft that Russia promotes as a wholly domestically produced design, suitable for operation in remote and challenging airfields. The Il-114-300 was specifically engineered to be self-reliant: equipped with Russian engines, avionics, and systems, and featuring a structure tailored for regional connectivity and challenging environments. This makes it easier to sell the aircraft to partner countries that are cautious about Western sanctions, since it doesn’t rely on the same Western parts as the earlier Superjet.
Several recent reports and statements—including remarks by senior Russian industry officials—indicate that Russia and India started discussions regarding the joint production or assembly of the Il-114-300 and have signed memoranda of intent. The case for India is clear: a turboprop such as the Il-114-300 is ideally adapted for short regional routes, airports with limited infrastructure, and feeder connections from smaller cities to primary hubs. For a nation with India’s geographical characteristics and a political agenda to establish new regional corridors, such an aircraft represents a viable candidate for “Make in India” collaboration. For Russia, the Il-114 provides a configuration that is less susceptible to supply chain disruptions associated with Western components.
Technical, regulatory, and commercial challenges
Discussions and even written memoranda do not assure successful delivery. Any genuine program involving the transfer of components, assembly lines, certification activities, and after-sales support across nations encounters significant practical challenges.
Certification represents the initial and most immediate challenge. Civil aircraft are required to comply with rigorous standards set by aviation safety authorities. Masks and labels notwithstanding, relocating an aircraft assembly line to India—or establishing a joint venture—will necessitate coordination with India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and, likely, engagement with other international regulatory authorities if exports beyond Russia or India are envisaged. Certification of aircraft with complex supply chains can be onerous due to the necessity for clear traceability of components, maintenance protocols, and design authority.
Supply chain dynamics and supplier willingness represent the second significant challenge. If the proposed Superjet in India is to include Western or other international components, suppliers must be prepared to supply to a production line dedicated to assembling aircraft that are closely aligned with Russian design standards. Banks and insurers must also ascertain the ultimate ownership and end-use; if reputational or regulatory risk is deemed significant, suppliers may withhold cooperation or require the implementation of rigorous legal protections. This reality helps to clarify why the Il-114-300—marketed as locally produced—is frequently proposed as a more straightforward alternative.
A third obstacle pertains to economic factors. Manufacturing a relatively low-volume regional jet involves substantial expenditures in capital, and profit margins have traditionally been narrow; success relies on securing stable orders, maintaining competitive operating costs, and sustaining an extensive spare-parts and maintenance network. India’s interest is strategic; however, for commercial viability, the program must attract consumers beyond the initial government support. Lacking a well-defined international customer base, the process of assembling aircraft in India may require more time to achieve profitability than policymakers anticipate.
Probable scenarios over the next 12 to 24 months
Multiple intermediate outcomes are conceivable and, in order of decreasing immediacy, are as follows:
A viable short-term approach is the issuance of a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that enables HAL and UAC to develop a framework for assembly, joint manufacturing of components, and technology transfer. Several recent developments already suggest memoranda and discussions; the subsequent step would be to formalize this into a project-oriented joint venture. This result aligns with India’s long-term industrial objectives and Russia’s aim to maintain its production capabilities.
A second option involves initiating production with the Il-114-300, which can be delivered more promptly: as it is fully designed to comply with Russian standards, it may facilitate simpler establishment of joint assembly or licensed manufacturing without reliance on sensitive Western suppliers. If New Delhi seeks to quickly enhance capacity for turboprops serving regional routes, the Il-114 provides an immediately operational solution.
A third, less optimistic scenario involves deep legal, insurance, supplier, or political constraints slowing both initiatives, resulting in efforts that remain primarily high-level and symbolic for several months. Political symbolism holds significance—aviation collaboration serves as a compelling diplomatic gesture—but converting that into certified, revenue-producing aircraft remains a more challenging endeavor.
Geopolitical Dynamics, Financial Markets, and Their Implications
If India and Russia succeed in establishing a new production corridor for regional aircraft, the implications would extend beyond merely two factories and a transfer agreement. For India, this would represent an important leap in civil aerospace capabilities: manufacturing a 70–110 seat regional jet or a turboprop such as the Il-114 at scale would necessitate expertise and suppliers across various domains, including avionics, composite manufacturing, systems integration, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services. It would also improve India’s negotiating leverage within international aviation supply channels. For Russia, the arrangement would constitute a pragmatic hedging strategy aimed at maintaining legacy programs and safeguarding employment and manufacturing capacity at facilities that would otherwise lack access to export markets.
Nevertheless, such an arrangement also warrants careful examination. Western exporters and regulators will monitor to ensure that no transferred technology or components breach export control regulations. Insurance markets will assess the end-use risk prior to underwriting aircraft. And prospective clients—airlines and leasing firms—will consider operational, training, and reliability hazards in comparison to cost savings or political advantages.
In summary
Russian industry sources indicate that UAC might consider moving Superjet production to India with the use of foreign components—but this remains a proposal under consideration and has not yet been finalized. At the same time, the Il-114-300 is considered a more politically and theoretically straightforward candidate for collaborative development, as it was designed with a domestic supply chain in mind. Both initiatives indicate a strong commitment from both parties to enhance civil-aviation collaboration, yet the transition from memorandum to widespread production remains extensive and fraught with certification, supplier, insurance, and commercial challenges. The pace at which either program advances will be contingent upon the legal clarity regarding component supply, the willingness of international suppliers to engage, and whether the Indian government and HAL prioritize rapid development and scale or opt for a cautious, phased approach.