Network modernization has enabled US Army units to operate in a more dispersed manner and at lower classification levels.
A key principle of future combat will be the need to move quickly and disperse on the battlefield to avoid becoming a target. Lessons from the war in Ukraine have shown that conflicts will be much faster, and large, stationary command posts—used by the US military during recent counterinsurgency operations—will not be suitable. US forces must be more agile to avoid detection and attack by adversaries.
The Army’s network team has worked for years on modernizing tactical communications, making units lighter, faster, smaller, and more capable of sharing large amounts of information. These efforts have often been ahead of their time, employing rapid feedback loops that align with the so-called “transformation in contact” concept. One official stated that they are “very comfortable” with the close feedback process.
Instead of concentrating all of them in a single, potentially vulnerable command center, command, control, and communication capabilities have enabled units to operate from much smaller command posts and even to divide staff sections by function.
This was evident with the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry Regiment, during a recent rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Johnson, Louisiana. The latter unit, known as “Geronimo,” serves as a formidable opponent for units rotating through these centers.
Colonel Matthew Hardman, the task force commander of JRTC, which manages opposing forces, described it as an application-based opportunity and a really common operational picture since it allows for easy movement across applications. During a visit in early September 2024, he observed the rotation of the 2nd Brigade, a key unit in the Army’s transformation concept. This approach necessitates the use of deployments and rotations to test new equipment—primarily off-the-shelf commercial gear—that allows units to respond more quickly on changing battlefields.
Hardman noted that Geronimo’s command post occupies very little space, as it uses an integrated tactical network for capabilities and applications.
Over the years of the Army’s network modernization, upgraded equipment has drastically reduced the size of command posts. Smaller, more mobile command posts create more difficult targeting challenges for adversaries.
The Army’s use of “antenna farms” is one innovation contributing to this reduction—a few trucks instead of large, scattered, and often static outposts—and reduced electronic emissions. In recent exercises at Fort Johnson, these so-called farms provided all the communication for the brigade’s command post, which was physically separated from the main post, a contrast from previous setups where they were located side by side.
While the farm had a signature, communication capabilities like directional radios and dispersed low-Earth orbit satellites made it difficult for the enemy to detect it, unlike other systems such as Wi-Fi or high-frequency setups.
During the exercises, the opposing force couldn’t distinguish whether it was the brigade’s command post or a lower echelon, thanks to the small size and reduced electromagnetic signature. Now, the enemy has to be more cautious about deciding what to target, not wanting to waste artillery or reveal their position by attacking a smaller echelon. They are looking for bigger targets, like a brigade or division command post.
Compared to previous communication setups, the antenna farm allows for much faster setup and takedown times. JRTC officials noted that it used to take 30 to 45 minutes to establish the network without troubleshooting issues. It now takes roughly 10 minutes, a significant increase that allows the brigade command post to connect or leave more rapidly.
Officials also explained that command, control, and communication capabilities have allowed brigade staff sections to disperse even further. Traditionally, a large command post housed personnel handling current operations, intelligence, fire control, and many other functions, which contributed to its size.
Now, these staff sections can be separated, resulting in smaller command posts that could resemble something like a company or battalion.
Cross-functionality at the Command Post “was very people-centric, using our various combat function capabilities and integrating them,” said Major General Brett Sylvia, commander of the 101st Airborne Division. Instead of having a large number of personnel and computers, it’s a much simpler setup and system, but it’s still as powerful as before because the force has integrated many of its network systems, he noted.
While the technology allows this decentralization, network leaders explained it creates human challenges, as commanders now must get used to communicating with all their staff, dispersed across the battlefield, rather than simply walking over to them at a command post.
In the JRTC rotation, the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division launched a 500-mile air assault from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to Fort Johnson, Louisiana, to start the exercise.
This effort included upgrading the integrated tactical network’s communication equipment, which included installing HMS portable radios—used by dismounted soldiers—on helicopters to enable beyond-line-of-sight satellite communication. Previously, these planes merely had chat capabilities and could broadcast location data.
These features enabled the unit to maintain continuous and dependable contact throughout the 500-mile travel to JRTC.
JRTC saw the first instance of voice and data communication between air platforms and ground formations. “It was powerful. No more picking up the phone and saying, ‘Here’s where I am,'” remarked Lieutenant General John Morrison, Deputy Chief of Staff G6, at a Pentagon news event on September 4, 2024. Everyone had situational awareness, whether they were in the air or on the ground, he explained.
With commercial tools becoming more intuitive, it now takes less time to deliver equipment to units for familiarization and training, according to network officials. Previously, the program office had to introduce new capabilities or upgrades to the unit ahead of exercises to allow them to familiarize themselves with the technology. That timeline is becoming shorter.
Another notable difference in this exercise rotation was that a major amount of the data used was unclassified. To increase speed, the Army has been declassifying communications and battlefield data. Classification often hinders sharing with international partners and slows operations. However, the development of secure-but-unclassified encrypted capabilities, or SBU-E, reduces network complexity by downgrading perishable data.
The Army is making dual efforts to provide enhanced capabilities for soldiers to be “ready to fight tonight” in the near term while also looking at long-term solutions. These projects are known as C2 Fix and C2 Next, respectively.
One of the core principles of both C2 Fix and C2 Next is the use of commercial encryption to offer secure yet unclassified communications. Morrison predicted that, once completely deployed, it would be a game changer for coalition interoperability, particularly on the periphery. “The days of sending a radiotelephone operator to an allied partner’s command post to use your radio to talk to you will be a thing of the past. We’re actively rolling this out as part of C2 Fix,” said Morrison.