The military media world has been shaken by news of the cancellation of the M10 Booker fire support tracked vehicle project. In reality, this announcement program is just the beginning—the Pentagon is also cutting AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, HMMWV vehicles, JLTVs, and more. All of this is part of a massive transformation of the U.S. Army ordered by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. The key priorities are homeland defense and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific region. Europe is not featured at all in these plans.
The Booker was intended primarily for U.S. Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). Eventually, it was also expected to be fielded by Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), built on the Stryker platform—here, the Booker was to replace the already-retired M1128 wheeled vehicle with a 105mm cannon. However, the U.S. Army has now canceled further deliveries of the Booker vehicle, even though 80 units have already been delivered.
The cancellation of the Booker is part of a more extensive reorganization mandated by the U.S. Secretary of Defense. The M10 was not merely a piece of equipment; it was a paradigm shift that provided light units (infantry, airmobile, airborne) with a heavily armored, heavily armed, yet relatively lightweight platform that could maintain a tempo in areas where the heavy Abrams tanks were unable to due to weight or logistics.
The relatively easily transportable M10 was designed to support infantry with a 105mm cannon and 7.62mm and 12.7mm machine guns. Its armor was intended to withstand shrapnel and small arms fire. It was also expected to be cheaper and easier to maintain than the Abrams.
In other words, the M10 wasn’t just hardware—it was doctrine. The M10 aimed to transform the way U.S. light units approached firepower, mobility, and deployment, emphasizing rapid long-distance movement, swift strikes in difficult-to-reach areas, and the integration of light infantry with armored forces.
However, the reality of the modern battlefield has changed: just a few FPV drones costing a few thousand dollars can eliminate all Bookers in minutes. The infantry will not only lose the vehicles but also the entire combat concept that relied on them. Training, tactics, formations, and coordination between infantry and armored support—all revolved around the M10’s firepower and durability. Eliminating the vehicle before it fulfills its role leads to the collapse of the entire battle doctrine.
This is not just a loss of hardware. It’s a loss of an entire system—training, logistics, and doctrine. If the U.S. Army trains units to fight with Booker support and those Bookers are easily destroyed by cheap weapons, the infantry will be incomplete, unprepared, and poorly organized for modern threats. Ukraine today shows that armored vehicles are no longer untouchable threats—and that small, cheap, and flexible tools (FPV drones, kamikaze drones, and cheap mines) can quickly shift the balance of power.
The U.S. Army must reevaluate its entire approach to warfare, not only its equipment, in order to preserve its strength.
Army Secretary Dan Driscoll acknowledged that the United States made an error with the Booker tank. He clarified that the M10 is not suitable for airborne operations due to its weight of 38 tons, which prevents it from being parachute-dropped. In the past, the United States would have continued to acquire Bookers until a certain quantity was acquired, at which point it would have ceased purchasing them after a few decades. Rather, the Army went to the Pentagon leadership to acknowledge the error, explain that it did not work out, and make the decision to cease procurement while admitting it.
Another concern was the limitations on maintenance. The army depended on General Dynamics, the manufacturer of Booker, to resolve a diverse array of maintenance and component issues, many of which could have been resolved by army mechanics. This clause was stipulated in the contract.
Driscoll likened the situation to the recent right-to-repair controversies in agriculture, pointing out that farmers were unable to restore their equipment five or eight years ago. He stated that the situation is similar for soldiers, as there are instances in which a $2–20 element could be 3D printed using available technology and knowledge, but contractual agreements prevent it. Driscoll described this as a sinful act by army leadership that inflicted injury on soldiers and declared that this type of restriction would no longer be tolerated by private industry.
Senator Elizabeth Warren further stated that the imposition of right-to-repair restrictions results in increased profits for major defense contractors, increased costs for the Department of Defense, and lengthier wait times for personnel who require equipment repairs to be combat-ready.
The M10 issues—overreliance on contractors, inefficient contracts, and expensive, inflexible, and slow projects—are a textbook example of why the Pentagon is undertaking a fundamental transformation of the U.S. military.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued the Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform document, which outlines the transformation of the Army and a reform of its acquisition system—how it plans, procures, and fields new weapons, technologies, and equipment.
According to the Secretary, the U.S. Army must prioritize homeland defense and deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific while also enhancing combat power. Other regions, like the Middle East or Europe, are not mentioned.
Regarding specific programs, the Secretary wrote that to accelerate transformation and boost combat capabilities, the Army must eliminate outdated, redundant, and inefficient programs; restructure command and acquisition systems; and align investments with the administration’s strategy.
Key investment priorities include precision long-range fires; air and missile defense (including a “Golden Dome for America” system); cyber capabilities; electronic warfare; and counter-space capabilities.
Concrete goals include Operational readiness of long-range missiles able to hit moving targets by 2027, Electromagnetic dominance by 2027, Operational drones and “effects” (both ground and air) in each division by the end of 2026, Drone defense mobility and affordability down to the company level by 2026 and the battalion level by 2027, and AI-assisted command and control at the corps/division level by 2027. Expanded advanced manufacturing (including 3D printing) to operational units by 2026. The goals also include modernizing the industrial base to produce wartime munitions by 2028 and expanding the Indo-Pacific presence through regional stockpiles, unit stationing, and allied training.
The Pentagon also ordered the Army Secretary to merge commands, reduce attack helicopter units, equip them with affordable drones, and dissolve outdated formations (including tank and aviation units) in active duty, reserves, and the National Guard.
Procurement will shift from program-based funding to capability-based funding, especially in areas like unmanned systems, drone defense, and electronic warfare. New contracts will give the Army greater freedom to maintain and repair its equipment.
Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and Chief of Staff General Randy A. George supplemented the memo with a political and strategic declaration titled “Letter to the Force: Army Transformation Initiative”—a motivational and directive text for commanders and soldiers, explaining where the Army is headed.
The letter notes that autonomous systems are becoming deadlier and cheaper. Sensors and decoys are everywhere. Dual-use (civilian-military) technologies are evolving faster than the US methods to counter them. To maintain battlefield dominance, our Army must become a leaner and deadlier force by transforming how we fight, train, organize, and procure.
Thus, the Army is launching a comprehensive strategy called ATI (Army Transformation Initiative). TiC 1.0 (Transformation in Contact) is the initial phase of implementation.
TiC 1.0 includes cancellation or reduction of the M10 Booker fire support vehicle, HMMWV (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle), JLTV A2 (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Gen 2), AMPV (Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle), Stryker A1 variant, ERCA (Extended Range Cannon Artillery), and RCV (Robotic Combat Vehicle).
Instead, U.S. Army units will receive Long-range missiles, Drones, M1E3 tanks, FLRAA tiltrotors (Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft), and Counter-drone systems, and Command posts will use AI for faster decision-making and maintaining initiative.
The mobility and weapons of all IBCTs will be improved by their conversion to MBCTs (Mobile Brigade Combat Teams).
The US is trading mass for decisive power and weight for speed, the document states.
MBCTs are to be air-, land-, and sea-deployable to rapidly respond to conflict zones, especially in the Indo-Pacific. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) is forming the first prototype MBCT.
Simultaneously, TiC 2.0 is beginning. While TiC 1.0 focused on infantry brigades (light, rapidly deployable units), TiC 2.0 extended to heavy units, including Armored Brigades (ABCTs), Stryker Brigades (SBCTs), divisions, and some reserve and guard units.
In summary, the Pentagon is cutting robust, often expensive ground projects in favor of faster, smaller, cheaper, and more technologically flexible systems—aligned with the new Indo-Pacific–focused strategy and modern warfare trends like drones, AI, cyber, and electronic warfare.