China’s latest military parade, held in the heart of Beijing, has drawn global attention. This strategic location serves as a powerful platform for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to showcase its strength to both domestic and international audiences. These carefully choreographed events are more than just theatre and national pride; they are a means for China to signal its strategic intent and hint at future capabilities.
New but Not Tested
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the parade was the contrast between the hardware displayed and its lack of actual combat validation. Unlike in the United States, Russia, or other Western militaries, PLA systems have not been proven in the crucible of modern war. Most Western equipment has been tested or at least stress-tested through decades of combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Syria, and most recently, Ukraine. The operational lessons derived from those campaigns have profoundly shaped Western doctrine and system design.
In the recent skirmish between India and Pakistan, Chinese systems were used but proved ineffective, as many were found intact within Indian territory.
China’s new weaponry, while visually state-of-the-art, remains unbloodied. The real test for modern combat systems is not whether they look advanced on parade grounds but whether they operate effectively in complex, contested environments with logistical stress, attrition, and enemy adaptation.
Nevertheless, the overall impression was clear: across the spectrum of land, sea, and air power, the platforms rolling through Tiananmen Square looked more modern than many Western equivalents. Whether infantry fighting vehicles, naval systems, or air defence assets, Beijing has managed to close not just capability gaps, but exceedances in certain areas at least on paper.
Indigenous Military Innovation: A Pivotal Display
The most newsworthy aspect of the parade was the unveiling of several new systems that underscore the PLA’s growing research and development ecosystem. Among them were:
Large Underwater Unmanned Vessels (LUUVs). Their inclusion signals a serious investment in undersea autonomous warfare. Such systems could be used not only for surveillance but also for anti-submarine or anti-access operations.
Rotary-Wing UAVs. A development that suggests China aims to fill gaps in battlefield reconnaissance, logistics, and potentially armed strike functions.
Missiles such as the HHQ-16C, DF-61, and DF-31BJ demonstrate continuing advancements in both precision conventional strike and strategic deterrence. While the DF-41 drew global attention at previous parades, this year’s missile set indicated a broadening of strike options rather than just raw intercontinental range.
Directed-Energy and Laser Defence Systems. Still at an experimental stage globally, their presence in the parade suggests either genuine progress or deliberate signalling.
China’s ability to produce these systems indigenously is the real story here. The era when China relied heavily on Russian imports for nearly all its advanced military systems is over. Beijing has built a domestic military–industrial complex that not only produces at scale but appears to innovate across domains. This has long-term implications for sustainability and self-sufficiency in war.
If supply chains remain resilient, this capacity makes Chinese forces less vulnerable to external disruption, at least compared to powers reliant on external suppliers. For regional actors, it is a worrying indicator that China can continue advancing capabilities even under sanctions or external pressure. Moreover, China’s ability to produce these systems indigenously could potentially disrupt the global arms market, challenge the dominance of traditional suppliers and reshape the geopolitical landscape.
The Limits of Parade Power
One of the central lessons in observing PLA parades is remembering what they do not tell us. Military parades are polished spectacles, designed for impact and symbolism rather than operational demonstration. Watching precision marching units or glistening missile launchers roll by does little to inform us about how these same systems would actually function under fire.
The Chinese military has spent the last decade undergoing major reforms, consolidating into joint theatre commands, strengthening strategic support forces in domains like space and cyber, and conducting larger-scale joint exercises. These are the areas that will dictate actual warfighting effectiveness.
Instead of focusing solely on parades, analysts should pay closer attention to exercises such as Joint Swords or Strait Thunder exercises, which are major Chinese military drills designed to demonstrate and improve the People’s Liberation Army’s capacity for operations surrounding Taiwan.
Joint Sword Exercises
Joint Sword refers to a series of coordinated cross-service Chinese military drills near Taiwan. These exercises usually involve land, sea, air, and rocket forces. Their main objectives are rapid deployment of units, simulations of blockading Taiwan, and practicing large-scale strikes on key targets and infrastructure. Joint Sword drills have become the PLA’s way of demonstrating military resolve, especially during times of increased cross-strait tensions and political friction with Taiwan’s leadership.
Strait Thunder Exercises
Strait Thunder, specifically the “Strait Thunder-2025A” exercise held in April 2025, is an extension and intensification of joint Sword activities. It emphasized enforcing maritime blockades around the Taiwan Strait, conducting precision strikes against simulated targets such as energy facilities and ports, and deploying Coast Guard vessels to practice maritime control, including inspections and detentions of ships. Strait Thunder marked a shift toward simulating real-world maritime law enforcement and blockade scenarios, which are key factors in any campaign to isolate Taiwan. There was also a notable psychological and propaganda aspect, including messaging aimed at Taiwan’s leaders.
Strategic Role and Phases
These drills reflect the PLA’s phased campaign planning for a Taiwan conflict.
– Phase One involves assembly and combat readiness patrols.
– Phase Two shifts to blockade operations, encirclement, and precision strikes, as seen during the Joint Sword and Strait Thunder drills.
– Phase Three simulates maritime traffic control, interception, and containment of ships, practiced by the Coast Guard.
Both exercises demonstrate China’s willingness to expand its military and law enforcement presence in the Taiwan Strait, underscoring its strategy of applying graduated pressure by combining real military manoeuvres with political messaging to deter Taiwanese independence and prevent outside intervention.
Military strength is not just hardware; it includes personnel training, doctrine integration, command and control cohesion, and the willingness and ability to sustain operations. These remain largely untested aspects of modern Chinese military power.
Regional and Strategic Signalling
If parades do not represent direct operational power, they do serve as strategic signals. Beijing organizes these events in ways that appeal to both local and regional audiences. The message is clear; China is modern, strong, united, and willing to show its strength right outside the foreign embassies in Beijing.
For regional governments, however, messaging effects vary
Those favouring accommodation with China will see their options strengthened. Observing the size and confidence of the PLA emphasises the risks of resistance and the attractiveness of strategic hedging.
For governments already inclined toward balancing or resistance, the parade confirms the PLA threat. Expect leaders in Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, and New Delhi to see the parade not as intimidation but as a reason to strengthen alliances, increase defense spending, and enhance bilateral security agreements.
A more subtle audience is Russia. While China and Russia have never been closer politically, their military relationship remains complicated by history. Moscow likely understood the implicit message of a parade where Beijing showcased long-range strike systems, strategic nuclear options, and new technologies that place Chinese industry well ahead of war-weary Russian production. This display of military strength could potentially challenge the China-Russia relationship, as it highlights China’s growing military capabilities and its potential to overshadow Russia in the global arms race.
For President Putin and his generals, already stretched in Ukraine and compelled to redeploy units from their Far Eastern districts, the rise of PLA capabilities may cause deep, albeit private, unease. History haunts this relationship: the two powers have clashed before, and Moscow has long understood the risks of over-reliance on Chinese goodwill.
Xi Jinping’s Continuing Narrative
The final and possibly most significant theme is not technological but political. President Xi’s speech reinforced his long-standing narrative about the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” In doing so, he highlighted military strength as not just an end but a vital part of China’s rise as a global leader. If this narrative continues, it could greatly influence China’s foreign policy, shaping its approach to international relations, security alliances, and regional conflicts.
Xi’s messaging revolved around the duality of peace and war, dialogue and confrontation, win-win versus zero-sum. This rhetorical structure plays two roles simultaneously.
Domestic. It links the PLA’s existence directly to the legitimacy of the CCP and Xi’s leadership. The message to the officer corps is that apparent loyalty is crucial, and strength reflects Party leadership.
International. It makes global observers confront a paradox: China claims to desire peace, but only on terms shaped by its military revival and political will. The juxtaposition aims to normalise China’s rise while maintaining space for both reassurance and deterrence.
This dual-level communication is a key strength of Beijing. The speeches and parades are more than patriotic displays; they offer an ideological foundation for China’s military development that combines history, destiny, and strategic patience.
Beyond the Parade: What Comes Next?
Ultimately, the 2025 PLA parade focused more on messaging than hardware. The systems showed considerable R&D progress, but key questions remain. How will they perform in actual combat situations? Can the PLA coordinate across theatres, services, and domains against advanced opponents? And how will regional and global players adapt their strategies in response?
The biggest unanswered question is whether China views these displays of strength as tools for deterrence and influence or as preludes to more assertive actions in its neighbourhood.
For some, the sight of China’s growing arsenal will reinforce a sense of inevitability about Beijing’s rise. For others, it will be a trigger for deeper strategic resistance. But for all, the parade was yet another reminder of the speed and scale of China’s military transformation.
Conclusion
The PLA parade in Beijing followed the familiar choreography of military pageantry, but beneath the surface of glittering uniforms and gleaming weapons lay five deeper themes. China’s systems look more modern than Western equivalents but remain untested; its indigenous innovation ecosystem is producing increasingly advanced weapons; the parade itself tells us less about combat effectiveness than exercises and reforms do; the messaging is aimed as much at regional governments as domestic audiences; and Xi’s narrative about China’s unstoppable rise continues without deviation.
The fundamental insights, however, are not in the parade itself but in how observers of regional governments, Russia, and the global security community choose to interpret it. China has signalled confidence, technological prowess, and ideological continuity. But whether this projection of strength translates into effective warfighting remains an open, and critical, question for the years ahead.