In the event of a conflict, the United States, its allies, and partners have to adapt their air forces to counter China’s substantial missile capabilities, which have the potential to disable airbases throughout the Indo-Pacific region for up to 12 days, according to a recent report by the Stimson Center.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can achieve air superiority without defeating America’s arsenal of sophisticated fighters and bombers by denying the United States access to runways and taxiways in the region, according to the think tank’s report, which was published on December 12, 2024. The issue is unlikely to be resolved by any combination of US countermeasures, such as improved runway repair capabilities, increased dispersal of aircraft, and more robust missile defenses. It further stated that there is a genuine and increasing risk that Beijing may conclude that it can neutralize US airpower for an extended period of time in order to quickly accomplish a fait accompli.
US vulnerabilities to runway attacks in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau are the primary focus of the analysis. To mitigate the Chinese threat, the Stimson Center simulated the efficacy of missile defense systems, expedited runway maintenance, and the dispersion of US aircraft throughout the theater.
According to the report, the initial strikes by China on adjacent airbases could have a 12-day paralyzing effect on US and allied forces, particularly at bases in Japan. Nevertheless, the absence of facilities for aerial refueling tankers could potentially disrupt operations for a period exceeding one month.
US fighter aircraft with relatively short ranges would be unable to position the majority of their weapons within reach, let alone conduct combat air patrols over Taiwan or the South China Sea, in the absence of refueling.
The report contends that confronting this formidable obstacle is “likely the most significant and challenging issue that the United States Air Force is currently confronted with.” It cautions that the Air Force may be substantially less effective than previously anticipated, if not entirely grounded, during the initial phase of a conflict, when Joint Forces would anticipate that it would conduct combat air patrols immediately or sink Chinese ships in the Taiwan Strait. Additionally, Chinese military planners may calculate that they have a window of over 30 days to establish a fait accompli, during which time U.S. airpower would be largely disregarded.
This could significantly complicate the process of deterring Beijing in the event that the situation escalates.
The authors argue that the United States and its allies cannot resolve the issue by purchasing additional fighters and bombers or missile defense systems. Rather, they should allocate resources to a substantial number of long-range drones and missiles of all types to guarantee that they can contest the skies and thwart Chinese attacks during the initial phases of a conflict without relying significantly on US fighters and bombers.
The authors note that in October 2024, two US Navy ships launched approximately twelve SM-3 interceptors at Iranian ballistic missiles en route to Israel, in a single day, in order to demonstrate the lack of American missile defenses, despite their impressive performance in limited conflicts. These actions depleted a year’s supply. According to the Stimson Center’s research, the United States would likely exhaust its Patriot and THAAD interceptors within the initial 24 hours of a military conflict. Within days, the 1,200 Patriot missiles in the stockpile would be exhausted. Consequently, the deployment of THAAD and Patriot batteries around US and allied bases would not provide adequate protection for an extended period.
Additionally, the authors suggest that allies and partners assume a greater proportion of the responsibility for air control during the initial phases of a conflict.
For example, the authors suggest that allies should prioritize defense spending and drone warfare training rather than purchasing “prestige weapon systems” such as upgraded Japanese F-16s or Tokyo’s plans to jointly develop a sixth-generation fighter with the UK and Italy, which they believe will have “limited utility in the early stages of a war.”
The report concludes with a sobering reminder of the risks that are at stake. It asserts that the United States must not be deceived. In the event of a conflict, there will be no sanctuary or respite from the extensive range of Chinese missiles for US airbases. American decision-makers must confront difficult questions: Is it in the national interest of the United States to incur such a significant cost in terms of resources and human lives, and if so, when?