In military and security circles, endurance is often equated with capability. The longer a drone or aircraft can stay airborne, the more “valuable” it is perceived to be. But endurance is a double-edged sword. The obsession with loiter time ignores a critical question: how long does it take to get eyes on target? In a border security or maritime surveillance context, a delayed picture is often as good as no picture at all.
India’s unique and pressing security environment — two hostile land borders, a vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Indian Ocean, and increasingly active grey-zone threats—demands an urgent and fresh look at this problem. The issue is not merely about how long we can watch a target, but how quickly we can get there, observe, make a decision, and act.
India’s Surveillance Mandate: Scale of the Challenge
Land Borders
India must monitor over 15,000 km of land borders, including:
Pakistan, which has a lengthy history of infiltration and cross-border terrorism, poses the primary challenge in the western sector. These activities have maintained the region’s volatility, necessitating that Indian security forces maintain a high level of vigilance and implement rapid response capabilities.
Since the 2020 Galwan conflict, the northern sector, which is situated along the Line of Actual Control with China, has become exceedingly sensitive. The deployment of advanced ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) assets is critical in the near-live front that has been transformed by tensions. ISR is an essential tool for both deterrence and preparedness in modern warfare in this region, as it requires real-time intelligence about enemy movements, infrastructure buildup, and overall capabilities.
The north-eastern front presents a distinct set of obstacles. The porous borders with Myanmar and Bangladesh facilitate the smuggling of narcotics and munitions, as well as cross-border insurgent movements. These concerns generate a multifaceted security environment in which intelligence, military, and paramilitary agencies must collaborate to impede the proliferation of illicit networks that undermine the region.
Maritime Frontier
India is obligated to protect a maritime domain that is both expansive and susceptible to threats beyond its land borders. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep, which are located on some of the world’s busiest marine lanes, are among the strategic island territories that make up its Exclusive Economic Zone, which spans nearly 2.3 million square kilometers. This maritime frontier is confronted with a variety of hazards that transcend conventional naval warfare. A long-term strategic challenge has been introduced by the increasing Chinese PLAN incursions into the Indian Ocean Region, while immediate operational risks remain associated with piracy, smuggling, and trafficking in the Arabian Sea. In recent years, maritime security has been further complicated by grey-zone tactics, including drone incursions into sensitive waters and intelligence collection by ostensibly civilian research vessels.
India is unable to rely solely on platforms that prioritize endurance due to the vastness of its topography, which encompasses both land and sea. At present, security threats are time-sensitive, adaptive, and mobile. To effectively safeguard national interests across diverse and challenging frontiers, a layered approach is necessary, which includes sophisticated ISR systems, rapid deployment capabilities, and persistent monitoring.
The Endurance Paradox: Time to Target as the Real Metric
A notional drone cruising at 50 knots with 20 hours of endurance sounds impressive until we factor in the transit time. If the incident is 250 nautical miles away, five hours are lost in transit before the first frame of imagery is captured.
Often the concept of a “3-hour loiter mission” is extended to a 13-hour sortie, with nearly 77% of the endurance being consumed in transit. This extended delay is not only an operational hazard with severe consequences, but also an inefficiency.
Target displacement is a significant issue. A fast-moving boat or an infiltrating column could easily surpass the surveillance footprint in the five hours it takes to reach the area of interest, thereby rendering the mission ineffective. Decision latency, which necessitates commanders to depend on obsolete data, is equally perilous. This undermines the utility of surveillance in active operations by transforming it from a real-time prevention tool to a post-mortem exercise. Lastly, there is the matter of resource inefficiency. Platforms, personnel, and logistics are all put under duress as a result of the excessive consumption of fuel and operational hours, which results in minimal actionable intelligence being gathered.
India must reevaluate the method by which endurance is assessed in surveillance and reconnaissance missions for these reasons. It should no longer be defined as “time airborne” but rather as “time relevant”—the duration of time during which the mission provides context-specific, actionable, and timely intelligence that meets operational requirements in real-time.
Case Studies: Lessons from Global Conflicts
2004 Tsunami: A one-hour early warning could have saved thousands of lives. Speed of detection and communication mattered more than endurance.
Ukraine War: Small, fast ISR drones with short endurance but near-real-time feeds have been more decisive than lumbering high-endurance assets.
Red Sea Interdictions (2024): Naval forces successfully intercepted Houthi drone boats only when surveillance assets were close enough to detect, track, and vector shooters within minutes.
For India, these lessons underline that proximity, responsiveness, and networked decision-making are as crucial as raw endurance.
Border ISR: Problems and Fixes
Current Gaps
The operational efficacy of India’s current surveillance posture is compromised by a number of critical limitations. One of the most significant concerns is the excessive dependence on slow-flying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that, despite their extended endurance, do not possess an adequate sprinting speed. This renders them unsuitable for promptly responding to time-sensitive threats or monitoring fast-moving targets, resulting in coverage voids during critical moments.
The issue is further exacerbated by the fact that a significant portion of the surveillance infrastructure is still located in areas that are remote from forward areas. This geographic disadvantage invariably results in delayed response times, as assets are compelled to travel considerable distances before they can commence meaningful observation or interdiction. Evolutionary threats may have already migrated far beyond the immediate sensor picture by the time surveillance data is collected and relayed.
The constraints of ISR assets in high-altitude sectors, where night-capable and all-weather systems are uncommon, further exacerbate these vulnerabilities. In these strategically sensitive regions, the absence of robust, 24/7 coverage creates blind areas that adversaries can exploit, particularly during periods of poor visibility or adverse weather. Collectively, these deficiencies underscore the pressing necessity for a forward-deployed, diversified, and agile ISR framework that is capable of operating efficiently in a variety of terrains and conditions.
Way Forward
Forward Basing & Mobility: –
The setting up of smaller, semi-permanent drone operating bases that are located closer to the Line of Actual Control and the Line of Control is an effective solution to address the current surveillance limitations. These bases, which are equipped with modular shelters and rapid fuel supply systems, would substantially reduce the transit times of UAVs and increase their operational availability. Drone missions could transition from being endurance-intensive to being more time-relevant by decreasing the distance between launch points and target areas. This would offer commanders more recent intelligence and more rapid response options.
Concurrently, the use of truck-mounted Ground Control Stations provides a mobile and adaptable substitute for fixed infrastructure. These mobile units can be swiftly relocated to accommodate changing threat scenarios, thereby guaranteeing that UAV operations remain responsive and dynamic. Not only does mobility in control architecture mitigate vulnerability to adversary targeting, but it also enables India to continuously realign its surveillance network in accordance with the changing operational requirements along contested borders.
Speed-Optimised Platforms: –
The introduction of Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) and High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with transit speeds that are substantially higher, ideally in the range of 150 to 200 knots, is a critical step in improving the effectiveness of India’s ISR. These platforms would mitigate the operational lag that is presently induced by slow transit by nearly halving the time-to-target. In addition to enhancing the timeliness of intelligence collection, drones that operate at a faster pace also enhance the flexibility of missions, enabling them to cover dynamic and rapidly evolving threats.
The direct integration of small, expendable loitering munitions and micro-drones with forward-deployed personnel is equally critical. These compact systems can fill the voids left by larger ISR platforms, providing immediate situational awareness and even offensive strike capabilities at the tactical edge. Their presence guarantees that surveillance and response are not restricted to centralized assets, but rather extended to the unit level, thereby establishing a resilient and layered ISR network that is adaptable to conflict of all sizes.
Sensor Fusion & AI
Real-time cueing from satellite or aerostat sensors can be instrumental in optimizing the efficacy of UAV operations. Commanders can eliminate unnecessary loitering and ensure that finite airborne endurance is allocated to surveillance or strike over areas of genuine interest by vectoring UAVs directly onto suspected targets. This layered sensor integration enables the acquisition of targets at a faster pace and substantially improves the responsiveness of missions in both maritime and land environments.
Furthermore, the implementation of AI-based motion detection systems has the potential to revolutionize the processing of surveillance data. Artificial intelligence has the ability to automatically flag suspicious activity, monitor anomalies, and prioritize alerts, rather than requiring analysts to manually sift through vast streams of imagery. This not only reduces the workload on operators but also minimizes human error, thereby facilitating more accurate and rapid responses. The combination of real-time cueing and AI-enabled data processing serves as a force multiplier, guaranteeing that UAV missions are both operationally pertinent and efficient.
Maritime Surveillance: A Layered Approach
The Indian Ocean Challenge
China’s increasing presence from survey vessels to nuclear submarines means India cannot rely solely on long-range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) like the P-8I. These have excellent endurance but are expensive to operate and limited in number.
Proposed Solution
Distributed UAV Operations: Deploy ship-launched and island-based drones with moderate endurance but high dash speeds.
Persistent Sensors: Invest in undersea hydrophone networks, passive radar, and HF surface-wave radars to provide early detection cues.
Forward Operating Nodes: Upgrade A&N Command and Lakshadweep outposts to serve as drone and helicopter hubs, significantly reducing response times.
This layered model ensures that India maintains surveillance not just “longer,” but sooner — a decisive advantage in maritime interdiction.
Logistics & Infrastructure: Doing More with Less
A common counterargument is that forward basing and speed-optimised platforms will raise costs. But a clever design can minimise this burden:
Runway Reduction. Platforms under a certain MTOW can use 200-m semi-prepared strips, avoiding costly airfield construction.
Lean Maintenance. Emphasise modular, line-replaceable units that need fewer skilled technicians.
Autonomous Refuelling and Turnaround. Robotic fuel bowsers and predictive maintenance minimise ground time, ensuring high sortie rates.
This model can transform even remote posts into fully operational ISR nodes with a minimal footprint, demonstrating India’s potential to lead in innovative surveillance and security solutions.
Command, Control, and Decision Superiority
Faster ISR is pointless without equally fast decision loops. India must emphasise the importance of integrated decision-making and collaboration:
Joint ISR Picture: Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Intelligence agencies must share a single near-real-time surveillance feed.
Decentralised Decision Authority. Forward commanders should have delegated authority to act on time-critical intelligence without waiting for Delhi.
Kill-Chain Automation. Sensor-to-shooter links must be hardened and accelerated to compress detection-to-interdiction timelines.
The Cost of Delay: Strategic Implications
Each hour of delay carries strategic risk: –
Border Intrusions. The PLA could alter the ground status without resistance.
Terror Infiltration. Cross-border launch pads might be vacated before approval for punitive strikes at sea.
Threats. Enemy submarines could enter Indian choke points undetected. India’s ability to deter and punish threats depends not only on being aware of events but also on receiving information quickly enough to respond.
Recommendations
Reframe Endurance. Define it as “mission relevance time” instead of just hours airborne.
Invest in Speed. Balance endurance platforms with faster ISR assets to minimise time-to-target.
Forward Presence. Build lightweight forward bases and island nodes to bring surveillance nearer to the threat.
Integrate Networks. Establish a unified, tri-service ISR command structure to facilitate seamless information sharing and flow.
Leverage Emerging Technologies: Utilise AI, edge computing, and autonomous swarms to minimise human reaction times.
Conclusion: Time as the Decisive Weapon
For India, time is the most non-recoverable resource in national security. A 10-hour-endurance drone that sees the target too late has failed its mission. The real challenge is not just watching longer, but seeing sooner.
In an era of rapid, high-tempo threats, from PLA manoeuvres in Ladakh to drone swarms in the Arabian Sea, surveillance must be fast, forward-deployed, and fully networked. India’s surveillance doctrine must therefore move beyond endurance fetishism to embrace a triad of speed, relevance, and integration. Only then can India convert information into action, and action into deterrence.