The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ attack on the Kursk region comes at a time when numerous experts and advisors within NATO are proposing accelerated preparations for war with Russia.
Boris Pistorius, German Defense Minister, warned that ‘Germany must be ready for war by 2029’ because ‘we should not believe that Putin will stop at Ukraine’s border.’ Norway’s Defense Minister, Eirik Kristoffersen, suggested that NATO has only two to three years to prepare for a Russian attack on the alliance.
According to Western logic, the current war of attrition in Ukraine will likely lead to some sort of truce. This will free a resentful Russia to leave some forces on the border with Ukraine and direct most of its military might toward attacking NATO countries in the West. It has a large army and a burgeoning military economy. Moscow’s politics and planning may now inherently incorporate the logic of war.
Russian Sanctions Ineffective
Despite the collective, comprehensive sanctions imposed by Western countries, Russia has not collapsed. Russia’s economy is expected to grow by 3.2 percent in 2024, compared to 1 percent in the EU. In 2024, Russia’s planned military spending will be 29 percent higher in real terms than in 2023, totaling 7.1 percent of GDP and 35 percent of all government spending. These levels are comparable to Soviet times.
The country’s defense spending is even more impressive when adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). This is a more accurate method of assessing actual military resources, given Russia’s lower labor and other resource costs compared to the West. Suppose one calculates the military spending estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and adjusts them for lower costs. In that case, it shows that the Russian military spending in 2023 (in PPP dollars) reached nearly $400 billion, accounting for more than half of the $719 billion spent by European NATO members and Canada, unlike the usual assumption of a quarter or less in standard GDP calculations. This helps explain Russia’s ability to stay in the fight despite enormous losses.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s 2023 report, the defense industry produced 1,500 tanks, 2,200 combat armored vehicles, 1,400 missile and artillery systems, and 22,000 drones.”
Russia has suffered significant personnel and equipment losses in the war in Ukraine. Despite this, today, the Russian army is 15 percent larger than when it invaded Ukraine in 2022—Russian armed forces now number 1.3 million personnel. In Ukraine, Russia has 470,000 battle-hardened soldiers—more than the entire active US Army.
According to the Hudson Institute, ‘the Russian army has approximately 5,750 main battle tanks, 9,000–10,000 other armored vehicles, more than 10,000 pieces of artillery and mortars, and more than 3,000 rocket launchers.’ Its combat formations may include up to 7,500 units of towed artillery.
Economic and military potential of Europe
Collectively, EU countries significantly outnumber Russia in population (449 million vs. 143 million), total GDP ($18.4 trillion vs. $2 trillion in 2024), and GDP per capita ($40,824 vs. $13,817). Adding the United Kingdom to this comparison only increases the gap. However, these European advantages do not translate into a combat-ready military superiority.
During the Cold War, the average military spending by European NATO countries was 3% or more of GDP. By 2014, this figure had dropped to 1.5% but then rose to 2% this year.
Since 2000, defense spending in Russia and China has increased by 227% and 556%, respectively. Over the same period, the corresponding figures for European NATO countries and Canada were only 22%. After decades of underinvestment, this growth is insufficient.
European allies’ air, naval, and cyber capabilities may surpass those of Russia, but they are unlikely to determine the outcome of a war. The decisive battle will be on land, and the Europeans are clearly not strong enough in this area.
On paper, the armed forces of EU member states are quite impressive—1.9 million. However, few European countries can field a fully equipped and trained brigade (about 5,000 people) capable of conducting high-intensity combat operations for several weeks. Some military analysts call them ‘Potemkin forces’ (analogous to ‘Potemkin villages’) because of their low readiness and unproven ability to field a combined combat force without US support. In contrast, the Russian military has traditionally relied on mass manpower and is prepared to incur significant losses to achieve its goals.
The number of combat battalions (up to 1,000 personnel) in some of NATO’s largest armies has barely increased from 2015 to 2023, even in the face of growing military threats from Russia.
According to The Economist, France and Germany each added only one battalion, and even Poland added only two. The UK lost five.
A recent European Council on Foreign Relations report warns that many European armies have become ‘bonsai armies’ (bonsai is the Japanese art of growing small trees that look like large plants in miniature) with extremely limited force volumes, offering only samples of core capabilities rather than large and reliable combat-ready forces. They are, in essence, sophisticated but miniature versions of the modern force model offered by the US Army. For more than two decades, most European defense plans have ignored the issue of mass.
The UK is Europe’s largest sponsor. A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report states that the British armed forces have seen a trend of trading quantity for sophistication over the past thirty-five years, reducing overall firepower. The United Kingdom can do some things well, but not on an impressive scale, especially when the adversary is a state with significant military power of its own.’ According to a Wall Street Journal, the British military is in the process of downsizing. In 2020, Parliament approved the most significant increase in defense spending since the Cold War.
Nevertheless, the actual troop strength will continue to decline to 72,500. The British Army plans to replace its 227 tanks with 148 more modern models, but they won’t be ready until 2027. Of the existing tank arsenal, only 150 can be deployed with thirty days’ notice, and only forty are fully operational at any given time.
Germany has the largest economy and population in Europe. Nevertheless, its army maintains a force of only 180,000 people. During the Cold War, West Germany could boast a force of 500,000 with 7,000 tanks, while East Germany could field 300,000 people. According to local media, only 30 percent of the German army’s self-propelled howitzers are operational. Tank readiness is not much better. According to Spiegel, Germany’s leading magazine, the Bundeswehr has about 300 Leopard 2 main battle tanks, but only 130 of them are operational. In one exercise with eighteen Puma infantry fighting vehicles, all of them broke down.”
Similarly, according to another Hudson Institute study, military simulations show that the British army would deplete its arsenals in about a week. Germany would run out of ammunition within days or, depending on the scale of the battle, even within hours.
Unproven Reliance on Mobilized NATO Forces
European NATO members rely on the New NATO Force Model (NFM), approved at the Madrid summit in 2022. When fully implemented, NFM aims to provide more than 100,000 troops within ten days, 200,000 within thirty days, and 500,000 within 180 days. A 2023 IISS study found that European NATO ground forces may not be sufficiently prepared to meet NFM tasks. It stated they would require ambitious improvements in collective training, equipment availability, and logistics stocks.
Dependence on US Support
European allies consider the 100,000 American soldiers on the continent to be a combat-ready core force for any initial military actions. In the event of a conflict, they also anticipate the deployment of additional troops from the United States. They believe that Article 5 of the NATO Charter on mutual assistance obligates America to enter a war to protect them. And while many in America agree, there are other perspectives. Experts note that countries that signed the NATO Charter committed through Article 5 to assist each other by taking such action as they deem necessary, including using armed force. However, they also agreed to the requirement of Article 3 that they ‘maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.’ Countries failing to meet their spending obligations under Article 3 should not expect the mutual defense benefits of Article 5.
President Trump publicly and convincingly expressed a widely held belief in the United States that many European countries are ‘freeloaders.’ He was not the first American president to do so. President Dwight Eisenhower cautioned NATO members against underfunding their own defense. Barack Obama said in a 2016 interview that ‘freeloaders annoy me.’ His defense secretary, Robert Gates, warned that America’s ‘appetite and patience’ for supporting countries that do not invest in their own defense would diminish.
Will America Be Able to Help?
The 2024 National Defense Strategy Commission report highlights the increasingly close relations between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as the “very” real threat of simultaneous conflict in more than one theater of war. Russia could attack Europe, while China could attack Taiwan, North Korea, or South Korea. Similarly, Iran could initiate attacks in the Middle East. Under the current ‘one major war’ standard for conventional forces, such a scenario would seriously strain US military resources.
People often argue that US naval and air forces would primarily fight in Asia, while ground forces would primarily engage in European battles. This is only partially true and overly reassuring. Air defense will be in high demand in both theaters of war, as will logistical assets for strategic air and sea transport. More importantly, from a practical standpoint, it is extremely difficult and burdensome both politically and economically to fight one great power war, let alone two simultaneously. To put it another way, if the United States is involved in a conflict with China over Taiwan, it is less likely to defend Europe if Russia simultaneously invades a NATO country.
Action Plan for European NATO Countries
European NATO countries must develop plans urgently to have the personnel, weapons, supplies, and transportation for self-defense with limited US support. Significant work must begin immediately to be ready within three years.
During the Cold War against the Soviets, European countries consistently spent more than 3% of their GDP on defense. Once again, we are in a new Cold War, and a hot war is raging in Europe. Poland, a frontline state, currently has 4 percent and plans to increase to 5 percent next year.
Reuters reported in July 2024, citing a military source, that European NATO countries discussed creating between thirty-five and fifty additional brigades, roughly 175,000 to 250,000 troops, to meet the new defense requirements agreed upon by the alliance.
Forming a cohesive fighting force requires increasing the frequency and scale of exercises for the thirty-two European NATO members.
Integrated European Defense Industrial Base
According to a European Parliament briefing, the European defense industry is too fragmented. Only 18 percent of investments and procurements are joint. Defense companies are national, and demand comes from national governments. This creates numerous problems in terms of economies of scale and operational compatibility. For example, Europe produces 17 types of main battle tanks, while the United States produces only the M1 Abrams.
Logistics and support are crucial for war success, especially when moving forces and equipment over long distances. European logistical capabilities urgently need improvement. Despite starting their efforts in 2017 and expanding them in 2022, the EU and NATO faced underfunding.
US Pushes Europe
For decades, US leaders have asked their European counterparts to do more for their own defense. This has not yielded results because European governments realized there would be no consequences if they ignored US requests. This needs to change.
Former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien recently articulated Trump’s ‘peace through strength’ foreign policy. In this context, he argued that Washington must ensure that its European allies understand that the continued American defense of Europe depends on Europe doing its part.
In a Wall Street Journal article, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo proposed the idea of a 20 percent cap on US contributions to the Ukraine aid fund. Theoretically, this cap aligns with the approximately 16 percent US share in the overall financing scheme that the thirty-two NATO member countries have agreed upon.
By agreeing that the number of US brigades in Europe should not exceed 16 percent of the total number of allied combat-ready brigades, one should extend this ‘proportionality concept’ to the deployment of US forces in Europe. Therefore, if the United States wants to maintain its existing five brigades in Europe, Europeans should form at least twenty-six of their own combat-ready brigades within three years, for a total of thirty-one allied brigades.