After tensions rose and concerns mounted that “Hezbollah” may seize the chance to engage in combat in the south and launch an offensive in the north, the Israeli army decided to postpone the ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, according to a story that was published in the “Jerusalem Post.”
According to the article that was published in the newspaper on Thursday, it was made abundantly apparent that the Israeli army’s assault on Gaza will start either on Friday or Saturday. The Israeli army had given Palestinians living in northern Gaza strict deadlines by which they were required to evacuate their homes; these deadlines were scheduled to expire at lunchtime on Friday.
The article noted that several circumstances caused the ground invasion delay. According to sources cited by the “Jerusalem Post,” one of the contributing factors was the rising concern that “Hezbollah” was waiting for the majority of the Israeli ground forces to be involved in battle in Gaza before opening an entire front with the Israeli army in the north.
The report revealed that by this version of events, “Hezbollah” did not take part in the initial fighting on the morning of Saturday, October 7; this was stated in the narrative. Its attacks on Israel remained at a relatively low threshold, which does not indicate deterrence but rather is part of a cunning feint to trap the Israeli army into a false sense of security, much to what “Hamas” accomplished in the south of the country.
After losing control of Hamas in the south, the sources for the publication noted that “Israeli intelligence and the political level need to be more humble in interpreting the objectives of the enemy.”
The source went on to say that this would not prevent the Israeli army from invading the Gaza Strip, but it could cause a delay in better interpreting the signals regarding Hezbollah’s intentions and boosting the northern forces in case the worst should happen.
According to the article, there is also widespread recognition within the Israeli army and at the political level that the army has not done anything like this for decades and that rushing into intervention without preparation to satisfy the population’s thirst for revenge quickly could be a significant mistake. This is acknowledged on a deep level both within the army and at the political level.
The report recalled the events that took place in the war in Lebanon in 2006 and the wars in Gaza in 2008 and 2014. It stated, “From this perspective, the ground invasion in the Second Lebanon War in 2006 was complete chaos, where the air force was the successful part, and the Gaza invasion in 2008-2009 and 2014 was more symbolic.”
According to the continuation of the report, given several rounds of conflict, the Israeli Defence Forces should not be overconfident in their ability to launch large-scale land invasions.
The newspaper provided an overview of the Israeli strategy against Hamas, noting that even though it is theoretically impossible to achieve a strategic “surprise” because Hamas initiated this war, the Israeli army also seeks to achieve at least a tactical surprise against the Palestinian movement, which requires significant planning on their part. The newspaper went on to say that this strategy requires significant planning.
The report identified numerous other factors that contributed to the delay of the ground invasion, including pressure from the United States to reduce the number of civilian casualties, internal concerns about Israeli detainees in Gaza, and providing more time for Palestinian people to flee.
Israel today feels tremendous backing from the international community and has more time to work with and deal with “Hamas” due to the response from the United States and the rest of the world. This is another factor. At this juncture, one question is whether or not the senior Israeli military and civilian leaders have misjudged the event’s timing.
Statistics gathered in Gaza suggest that thousands of Palestinians have already lost their lives, and many more have been injured. Despite the efforts of the Israeli army to reduce the number of civilian casualties, at least half of the 2,000 Palestinians who were murdered in 2014 were members of the civilian population.
The publication stressed that when these numbers rise for a second time, likely when the invasion begins in earnest, the United States and the rest of the world will exert significant pressure to halt the invasion. This was a major argument presented in the piece.
Based on the statements of various sources, the publication was also able to ascertain that no one has decided what would occur in Gaza when “Hamas” is removed from power by the Israeli army. As a result of all the other causes listed above, senior Israeli officials are anxious to discover new favoured arrangements for what they will do with “Hamas,” even though they have, in essence, done relatively few new things in the past approximately one week.
