The Middle East’s emerging order will not be decided only by armies, missiles, or defence pacts. It will also be shaped by economic networks, technological partnerships, diplomatic normalisation and the ability of states to cooperate without surrendering strategic autonomy. I2U2—comprising India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States—is one such framework. It is not a military alliance, but its growing institutional depth gives it strategic relevance in a region where security and economics increasingly overlap.
The central issue is whether I2U2 can become more than a collection of bilateral relationships. Its potential lies in connecting India’s technological and industrial capacity, Israel’s innovation and defence expertise, the UAE’s capital and regional access, and American strategic and financial weight. Its limitation is equally clear: it has no collective-defence commitment and cannot by itself provide regional security.
I2U2: Cooperation, Not Alliance
I2U2 was formally launched at a leaders’ summit in July 2022. Its declared agenda focuses on joint investment and cooperation in water, energy, transport, space, health, food security, and technology. It is a quadrilateral partnership, not a treaty-bound military bloc.
This distinction matters. I2U2 can facilitate cooperation on infrastructure, clean energy, food security, digital technology, and supply chains, but it does not obligate India to defend Israel or the UAE, nor does it require the UAE to join an anti-Iran military coalition. Its flexibility is precisely why it has survived regional political sensitivities.
Calling I2U2 an “Israel-UAE-led hegemonic alliance” is inaccurate. India is not a subordinate partner, the United States is a full member, and the grouping’s declared agenda is cooperative rather than hegemonic. Its security relevance is indirect: stronger economic ties and technological cooperation can create stakes in stability, even without a mutual-defence treaty.
The Three Bilateral Pillars
I2U2’s strength lies in its three functional bilateral channels.
| Bilateral channel | Principal strategic value |
| India-Israel | Defence technology, intelligence, innovation and defence-industrial cooperation |
| India-UAE | Trade, energy, diaspora links, maritime access and investment |
| Israel-UAE | Normalisation, technology, cyber, intelligence and selective security cooperation |
| India-U.S. | Strategic convergence, technology, maritime awareness and broader Indo-Pacific linkage |
India-Israel cooperation is the most visible defence dimension. Israel supplies advanced military technology, surveillance systems, missiles, drones and other capabilities that strengthen India’s defence preparedness. India, in turn, offers Israel a large market, industrial capacity, and a strategic partner outside the Western alliance system.
India-UAE cooperation is broader than security. The UAE is a major trade, investment, energy, and diaspora partner for India. It also provides India with access to the Arabian Sea, the Gulf, and increasingly important connectivity routes between Asia, Africa, and Europe.
Israel-UAE cooperation is politically sensitive but strategically significant. The Abraham Accords opened space for cooperation in technology, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and intelligence. Yet the UAE must manage this relationship carefully, given Arab and Islamic sensitivities over Palestine and the broader regional political environment.
Shared Threats, Flexible Responses
I2U2’s security relevance arises from shared threats rather than a shared treaty. Terrorism and terror financing, Iranian missile and drone activity, maritime disruption, cyber attacks and supply-chain vulnerability affect all four members, though not always in identical ways.
The Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden are particularly important. They carry energy flows, commercial shipping, and digital infrastructure. Disruption in these waters affects India’s trade, the UAE’s economy, Israel’s security environment, and global energy markets. This makes maritime domain awareness, port security, anti-piracy cooperation and protection against drone and missile threats natural areas for practical cooperation.
Cybersecurity is another area where cooperation can deepen without requiring a formal alliance. Israel’s technological strength, India’s digital capacity, the UAE’s financial and infrastructure networks, and American expertise create a basis for joint resilience. But such cooperation must be carefully managed to avoid creating the perception of an anti-Iran or anti-Arab bloc.
India’s Strategic Autonomy
India’s interest lies in preserving strategic autonomy while deepening functional cooperation. It benefits from defence technology and intelligence ties with Israel, trade and energy links with the Gulf, maritime cooperation with the UAE, and a relationship with the United States that does not require formal alliance membership.
India should avoid joining an anti-Iran bloc or treating the Middle East as a sectarian chessboard. Its interest is in secure sea lanes, stable energy supplies, diaspora protection, technology partnerships, and a region that does not become wholly dominated by either Iran or a narrow Sunni-Israeli alignment.
The I2U2 framework is useful precisely because it is not a military alliance. It allows India to cooperate on food security, clean energy, infrastructure, technology and connectivity while retaining flexibility. Its security relevance is indirect: stronger economic ties and technological cooperation can create stakes in stability, even without a mutual-defence treaty.
Israel’s Neighbourhood Policy Under Eisenkot
Israel’s political transition adds another variable. Gadi Eisenkot has been tasked with forming the next government, and his stated conditions for coalition partners include support for Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organisation, and military or national service. He has presented himself as seeking a more stable and internationally acceptable course after years of turbulence, while still rejecting Palestinian statehood and maintaining a hard line on Iranian and Hezbollah threats.
For the region, this creates a paradox. An Eisenkot-led government may be less confrontational in style than its predecessor, but it is unlikely to fundamentally alter Israel’s core security doctrine. Israel will continue to regard Iran’s missile, drone and proxy network as an existential strategic challenge. It will also continue to seek security cooperation with Gulf states, particularly the UAE, while pursuing any possible opening with Saudi Arabia.
The key question is whether an Eisenkot government can convert Israeli military superiority into diplomatic restraint. A more disciplined Israeli approach could make Saudi-Israeli security cooperation more politically feasible. Conversely, continued escalation in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon or against Iranian targets would make it harder for Riyadh to move toward public normalisation, regardless of shared concerns about Iran.
Israel’s security policy will therefore shape the broader architecture. If Israel pursues deterrence alongside diplomatic caution, it may reinforce a loose convergence with Gulf states. If it pursues escalation, it may push Arab states back into defensive ambiguity and strengthen Iran’s narrative that normalisation with Israel is incompatible with regional stability.
Can China Replace the United States?
China’s growing presence in the Middle East is real, but it should not be mistaken for a replacement for American security leadership. Beijing has deep economic interests in Gulf energy, infrastructure, technology, and trade. It has also positioned itself as a diplomatic actor, calling for dialogue among Saudi Arabia, Iran and other regional states and supporting a political settlement in Yemen.
Yet China remains more an “engaged observer than a decisive broker.” It has not offered Gulf states the kind of security guarantee that the United States provides: forward-deployed forces, intelligence integration, air and missile defence, maritime protection, logistics, and a credible deterrent against major-state aggression.
China’s preference is for commercial influence without strategic entanglement. It wants stable energy flows and access to markets, but it is reluctant to assume responsibility for regional wars, alliance obligations, or military intervention. That makes it a useful economic partner and a potential diplomatic mediator, but not yet a security guarantor.
The United States, therefore, is unlikely to simply vacate the region. Its bases, naval presence, intelligence relationships, arms sales, and defence partnerships remain strategically valuable. The more likely trajectory is not American withdrawal but American conditional engagement: Washington will remain present, but regional states will increasingly hedge by diversifying partners, building indigenous capabilities, and creating regional arrangements of their own.
Energy Security Beyond Oil Dependence
The argument that the United States remains dependent on Gulf oil because it cannot refine light crude is too narrow. The more important point is that the United States has an enduring interest in the stability of global energy markets, maritime chokepoints, and allied economies.
Even if American oil imports decline, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, or the Gulf of Aden can raise global prices, damage supply chains and create inflationary pressure. Energy security is no longer only about barrels of oil; it is about shipping routes, undersea cables, port infrastructure, cyber systems, insurance markets, and the resilience of refineries and pipelines.
China has an even more direct interest in these corridors. Much of its imported energy passes through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Hormuz. This gives Beijing a reason to support regional stability, but it also gives it leverage. If China becomes the principal economic partner of Gulf states while the United States remains the principal security partner, the region could become dependent on two external powers with different interests.
That division of labour may be unstable. Economic dependence on China does not automatically produce security dependence on China, but it can reduce the political cost of defying American preferences. Conversely, American security protection does not automatically produce economic loyalty if Gulf states see Chinese investment, technology, and market access as more valuable.
A More Realistic Agenda
The Middle East does not need another grand alliance. It needs a practical agenda built around shared economic and security vulnerabilities.
- Maritime Security. Joint patrols, information sharing, protected shipping corridors, and rapid response to drone and missile threats.
- Technology and Cyber Resilience. Protection of energy infrastructure, financial systems, ports, and government networks.
- Supply-Chain Resilience. Diversified sources for critical components, semiconductors, energy equipment, and defence technology.
- Food and Water Security. Joint investment in agriculture, desalination, logistics, and climate resilience.
- Crisis Diplomacy. Standing channels among India, Israel, the UAE, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other regional actors to prevent miscalculation.
These measures would not eliminate rivalry. They would make rivalry more manageable. The goal should not be to erase competition but to prevent competition from becoming catastrophic.
Conclusion: Economics as Strategy
I2U2 will not replace military alliances, but it may become one of the most durable instruments of regional statecraft. Its strength is not collective defence; it is the creation of shared interests in technology, trade, energy, food security and infrastructure.
For India, the framework offers a way to deepen its Middle East presence without abandoning strategic autonomy. For Israel and the UAE, it offers a platform to consolidate normalisation through practical cooperation. For the United States, it offers a way to remain engaged without relying solely on military presence.
The challenge is to prevent I2U2 from becoming merely a diplomatic label. If it can deliver concrete projects, build trusted supply chains, and strengthen maritime and technological resilience, it will become a meaningful pillar of regional stability. If it remains limited to summitry and declarations, it will remain a useful but shallow framework in a region that increasingly demands both economic depth and security credibility.