India has long resisted using proxies as a tool of statecraft, preferring overt diplomacy, moral posturing, and conventional deterrence. However, the strategic environment in South Asia is changing rapidly. India must reconsider its playbook as the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh axis emerges and flexes its muscles. While controversial, the denial of transit facilities to Bangladesh for exports to Nepal and Bhutan via Petrapole signals a long-awaited recalibration of Indian resolve.
The “Petrapole signals” are far more than a logistical choke or diplomatic gesture—they are a carefully calibrated message. Petrapole, Asia’s most significant land customs station, is a trade lifeline and a barometer of India-Bangladesh bilateral sentiment. Whether through port enhancements, delays, or denial of access, every movement through this corridor carries geopolitical undertones. In 2024, the opening of new land infrastructure at Petrapole was read as a gesture of goodwill and commitment to trade valued at $14 billion annually. Conversely, the recent denial of transit rights is a clear signal of assertive recalibration.
Such moves also affect symbolic space. The daily Petrapole-Benapole retreat ceremony, modeled on Wagah, is meant to signal harmony. A disruption here or cooling of its warmth would reverberate through diplomatic and domestic channels alike.
India’s response cannot remain confined to traditional lanes in this complex matrix. This policy assertiveness must now extend into covert, asymmetric, and psychological dimensions.
China’s model of using economic, cyber, diplomatic, and military proxies is well documented. Russia’s use of “little green men” in Crimea redefined hybrid warfare. India, surrounded by multiple fault lines and restive borders, must consider cultivating local and regional allies to develop strategic depth. The Arakan National Army (ANA) and other similar ethno-nationalist movements offer a unique opportunity to simultaneously secure Indian interests and support groups striving for autonomy or justice in their nations.
Key Takeaways
Petrapole as a Signal Post. India’s control over trade and transit at Petrapole serves as both an economic lever and geopolitical barometer in its relationship with Bangladesh.
Strategic Shift. Denial of transit facilities marks a decisive move from passive diplomacy toward calibrated coercion.
Symbolism of Ceremony. The Petrapole-Benapole retreat ceremony metaphorically represents the state of bilateral relations—its tone and conduct send powerful cues.
Expanded Toolkit. To address evolving challenges, India must deploy a mix of traditional and non-traditional tools, including proxies.
India’s security responses must be agile, constantly reviewed, and adaptive to shifts in regional alliances. The need for a dynamic strategy is paramount in the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape of South Asia, emphasizing the urgency and importance of India’s security responses.
The Strategic Case for Proxy Engagement
Understanding the strategic benefits of proxy engagement in South Asia is crucial for India’s regional security. This approach could significantly enhance India’s strategic depth by aligning with forces that share common interests, rather than hiring mercenaries. By leveraging proxies like the ANA, India can effectively extend its influence and counterbalance the growing power of its adversaries in the region.
A strategic proxy is not a mercenary but a force that shares overlapping interests. In the case of the ANA, the alignment is organic. The ANA has effectively pushed both the Myanmar Army and the Bangladesh Army out of the Naf River region. It now controls a 270-kilometer border zone, including territory near the volatile Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). It has demonstrated its ability to conduct independent operations, control territory, and regulate cross-border commerce—seizing cargo vessels and detaining border violators.
For India, whose Northeastern states remain vulnerable to both physical isolation and psychological alienation, leveraging the ANA could serve three objectives:
· Dismantle the BD-China logistical nexus through the disruption of CHT-based infrastructure.
· Deny Bangladesh and China the freedom to Project influence westward toward Tripura and Mizoram.
· Create a parallel lever to counterbalance China’s support to Northeast insurgent groups.
Why the Arakan National Army Matters
The ANA represents the armed wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), which seeks greater autonomy for the Rakhine ethnic population in Myanmar. Unlike the Rohingya insurgent groups, the ANA maintains a distinct identity, and its ideological framing is rooted in ethno-nationalism, not Islamist extremism.
The ANA has been increasingly assertive.
· Controls large tracts of the western Myanmar coastline.
· Maintains its governance mechanisms and taxation systems.
· Has successfully resisted both Tatmadaw offensives and Bangladeshi intrusions.
Its control over the Naf River and its reach toward Teknaf, close to the maritime gateway of Chittagong, give it immense strategic utility. An ANA-led disruption in CHT would significantly dilute Bangladesh’s ability to function as a corridor for Chinese logistics.
From Doctrine to Deployment: Crafting the Indian Strategy
India must take a page from Putin’s Crimea strategy—but with democratic nuance. The following steps could be taken.
· Covert Support Channels. Through backchannels and humanitarian fronts, India can provide the ANA with logistical support, non-lethal aid, communication systems, and tactical training. ANA fighters can be trained in fieldcraft, ambush tactics, and intelligence-gathering using India’s counter-insurgency expertise from the Northeast.
· Secure Intelligence Coordination. The ANA can be an advanced human intelligence network to monitor Chinese movements near CHT, Bangladesh’s port facilities, and key energy and telecommunication corridors.
· Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Deploy disinformation campaigns and digital operations to amplify ANA’s victories, weaken Bangladesh Army morale in the region, and raise the political cost for China in investing further in Bangladesh’s military infrastructure.
· Cyber Deterrence. Support regional hackers to disrupt pro-Bangladesh Chinese telecom grids and defense logistics. Promote independent digital platforms controlled by groups like ANA to tell their version of the narrative.
· Private Military Contractors (PMCs). India could explore discreet partnerships through PMCs to serve as buffers between the Indian state and operational ground realities. These entities can provide the ANA training, logistics, and supply chain facilitation without directly attributing to the Indian government. This avoids overt fingerprints and ensures plausible deniability, limiting international blowback and preserving diplomatic flexibility. Any engagement must be under the strict strategic oversight of the Government of India to avoid rogue operations.
· Leverage of Indigenous Insurgent Groups. India could also consider the calibrated use of groups such as the NSCN(IM) in the Naga Hills and the PLA in Manipur. These groups have operated for decades in the region, possess intimate terrain knowledge, and are well-networked across borders. Other influential groups like ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom), KNF (Kuki National Front), and NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura) could also be considered under similar frameworks. Their alignment with India’s regional goals can be explored under formal peace accords with clear deliverables. As part of any peace arrangement, India can help such groups achieve their political and cultural aspirations in neighboring lands without compromising Indian sovereignty. This would lend strategic cohesion to the larger proxy initiative and ensure India’s security agencies maintain operational control.
Learning from Pakistan: Strategic Depth, Not Strategic Overreach
India must not repeat Pakistan’s mistake of treating proxies as permanent force extensions. The TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) eventually turned against its creators after being used by Pakistan’s deep state. India must ensure that the groups supported are
· Ideologically aligned.
· Limited in mandate.
· Subject to periodic assessment and recalibration.
· Proxy Engagement: Ensuring Strategic Oversight and Control
Proxy Engagement: balancing Aspirations with National Interest
A key caveat in proxy warfare is the risk of blowback. Hence, proxy selection must prioritize groups with defined objectives and shared threat perceptions. The ANA fits this matrix. Additionally, India could explore strategic ties with:
· Chin National Front (CNF). Operating in western Myanmar, with cultural links to Mizoram.
· Karen National Union (KNU). Longstanding opponents of the Tatmadaw with a strong social governance tradition.
· Chakma Rights Movements in Bangladesh and Arunachal Pradesh. These groups face discrimination in both Myanmar and Bangladesh and look to India as a natural ally.
Supporting these groups must come with clear red lines
· No attacks on civilian populations.
· No collaboration with Islamist or narco-terrorist networks.
· Complete strategic alignment with Indian objectives.
Legal and Ethical Plausibility—India need not openly admit to supporting proxies. It can operate through:
· Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) focused on human rights.
· Regional religious and cultural bodies sympathetic to these movements.
· Unofficial third-party governments that serve as intermediaries (e.g., Thailand or Vietnam).
International pushback, particularly in forums like the WTO or UN, can be countered by highlighting Bangladesh’s alliance with China, known for suppression of ethnic minorities. Moreover, the ANA’s opposition to Bangladeshi and Chinese intrusion strengthens India’s position as a counter-balance rather than an aggressor.
Policy Recommendation for Decision-Makers
To ensure that the initiative always remains with the Government of India and avoids unmanageable blowback, the following steps are recommended:
· Establish a National Proxy Engagement Cell under the National Security Council Secretariat to oversee all operations.
· Mandate legal oversight and budgetary scrutiny through the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
· Initiate backchannel engagement with the ANA leadership to evaluate their long-term political vision and reliability.
· Frame a Proxy Engagement Doctrine, defining India’s red lines, escalation thresholds, and disengagement protocols.
· Ensure operational deniability through regulated PMCs, NGOs, and human rights conduits.
· Wargame the proxy strategy regularly under NSCS supervision, recognizing that such initiatives are dynamic and not static. Leadership must remain ahead of the curve, ensuring the target country remains in a decision dilemma.
Towards Strategic Autonomy Through Asymmetric Power
Strategic depth is not always geographic—it can be psychological, informational, and paramilitary. With the Bangladesh-China-Pakistan nexus tightening, India must break out of its moral hesitation and embrace strategic realism. Proxies like the Arakan National Army offer India a silent but potent force multiplier. With calibrated engagement, India can convert fault lines in its neighbors into lines of defense.
This is not about war—it is about positioning. It is not about conquest—it is about containment. India’s road to Eastern security may not be paved with formal treaties but with informal alliances that allow it to stay one step ahead of its encircling adversaries.