Given the rapid expansion of ballistic missile production by Russia, Europe’s missile defense posture appears to be becoming increasingly unsustainable. Despite the significant investments in interceptor missiles made by Europe and the United States, these efforts are not keeping pace with the rapid pace and scope of Russia’s missile output. Consequently, the strategic equilibrium is steadily shifting in Moscow’s favor, which poses a challenge to NATO’s current emphasis on missile defense.
Russian Missile Production: Quantitative and Industrial Supremacy
Since the start of its limited invasion of Ukraine, Russia has drastically boosted its annual production of ballistic missiles. The estimated annual production of ballistic missiles has increased significantly from approximately 250 to 300 missiles a few years ago to between 840 and 1,020. New advanced variants, such as the Oreshnik hypersonic missile, are being produced in increasing quantities for both immediate battlefield use and long-term stockpiling, in addition to traditional missiles. This surge is not limited to specific countries or regions. Substantial investments in industrial expansion, the construction of new production lines, the hiring of thousands of additional workers, and access to foreign technology and critical components, including those from China, have enabled this surge in production, claims the West. The outcome is a missile program that is industrially and quantitatively dominant, which presents a major obstacle for European defense planners.
Europe’s Response: Interceptor Production Still Lags
European and allied efforts have concentrated on the expansion of production of sophisticated interceptor missiles, including the Patriot PAC-3 MSE and the Aster 30B1/B1NT, on the defensive side. As of 2025, the global production of Patriot PAC-3 interceptors is estimated to be between 550 and 580 units per year. The production is expected to more than double to approximately 1,130 units by 2027. Nevertheless, this figure is indicative of global production, which is used by NATO’s European members, as well as the United States, Middle Eastern nations, and many Asian countries. In reality, Europe can only receive approximately 45 to 55 percent of this output, which equates to a maximum of approximately 320 interceptors annually. In 2025, the Aster 30B1/B1NT program, which is the primary indigenous solution in Europe, is expected to produce between 190 and 225 interceptors, with the potential for an increase to 270 units by 2026. A large number of these are indeed designated for European countries, thereby increasing Europe’s proportion of missile defenses. Nevertheless, the effective annual interception capacity for Europe is a mere 235 to 299 Russian missiles when the actual interception calculus is applied, taking into account the fact that two interceptors are frequently necessary to assure the destruction of a single incoming missile. In comparison to Russia’s annual production of up to 1,020 ballistic missiles, this figure is significantly lower, indicating that the disparity is expanding and cannot be resolved in the near future through interceptor expansion efforts.
The Cost-Effectiveness Trap: Economic Reality
Another challenging obstacle for NATO is the financial aspect of missile defense. Western interceptors, including the Patriot and the Aster 30, are exceedingly costly. The cost of a single Patriot PAC-3 interceptor is between $4 and $5.2 million per unit, while Aster 30s are priced at approximately $2 million each. In contrast, the cost of Russia’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is significantly lower, with estimates indicating that the cost is less than $1 million per missile. This discrepancy results in an unfavorable economic exchange for Europe and its allies. Each interception attempt to neutralize a Russian missile incurs a significantly higher cost, which can lead to the rapid depletion of stockpiles in a saturation attack scenario. Furthermore, the relative affordability of Russian munitions enables Russia to more easily maintain and replenish its arsenal during a high-intensity conflict, whereas Western powers are burdened by the financial and industrial costs of replacing expensive interceptor stocks.
Is the NATO Missile Defense Strategy Irrelevant?
NATO’s missile defense is not entirely irrelevant, despite these obstacles. In the event of an attack, missile defense continues to serve as a first line of defense, safeguarding critical military assets, government leadership, and civilian urban populations. Nevertheless, it is impossible to build an absolute shield due to the scope and speed of Russian missile production. Europe’s missile defenses are unable to neutralize the entirety of Russia’s vast and expanding missile armament, despite their aggressive efforts to increase missile interceptor inventories. This reality implies that a significant number of incoming missiles would still be able to penetrate defenses and achieve their intended targets, thereby significantly reducing the strategic value of a defense-only posture. The presence of interceptors continues to have a psychological effect and may deter limited strikes; however, it does not offer a comprehensive solution to the threat that Europe currently confronts.
The Required Shift: From Denial to Punishment
NATO and its European members must acknowledge that missile defense alone is insufficient in the face of a persistent and expanding missile gap. The emphasis must be redirected toward the development and deployment of credible retaliatory capabilities. The credibility of deterrence can only be restored by a robust conventional long-range strike capability that is specifically designed to target Russian military and economic infrastructure while meticulously avoiding civilian targets. This strategy necessitates the development of industrial capacity and political will to employ such systems in the event of a need, in addition to increasing the production of precision-guided munitions and offensive missiles. Although sophisticated air and missile defense programs, including HYDEF and HYDIS², are currently in development, it will require years to reach a state of maturity and be deployed on a large scale. Meanwhile, to match Russia’s strategic leverage, Europe must quickly remediate the obvious deficiency in its counterstrike capabilities.
In conclusion,
NATO’s current investment in anti-missile defense, while necessary for limited protection, is insufficient to mitigate the threat posed by Russia’s rapidly expanding and superior missile production. The overwhelming numerical, industrial, and economic advantages of Russia render it impossible to rely solely on defensive technology. Missile defense is not ineffective; rather, it is most effective when it is a component of a more comprehensive deterrence strategy that emphasizes a credible and sustainable ability to respond. Europe and NATO must supplement defensive systems with an urgent buildup of their own long-range conventional strike arsenals to achieve genuine security and restore strategic stability. These countries will transfer the focus from denial to punishment in their deterrence strategies.