Richard Weitz, Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, published an article in The National Interest on January 3, 2025, stating that the new Trump administration will conduct a comprehensive review of the missile threats facing the United States shortly after taking office. Technological and geopolitical advancements are undermining the long-standing foundations of U.S. missile defense policy. Potential adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are deploying a growing arsenal of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, along with extensive fleets of reconnaissance and strike drones. These nations are consolidating their missile-related assets. Iran and North Korea are both providing Moscow with missiles and drones for use against Ukraine, while Russia is actively supporting these partners in their aerospace programs. In the interim, the boundaries between regional and domestic missile systems are becoming increasingly muddled by technological advancements.
Some beneficial changes have already occurred. By the end of this decade, the Pentagon will implement a next-generation interceptor. This new interceptor will enhance the effectiveness of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which safeguards North America from intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has established a new Transformation Task Force to assess the feasibility of redistributing missions and responsibilities, integrating cross-domain capabilities, modernizing digital technologies, improving internal processes, and fostering collaboration with operational forces and other partners.
The United States can use these technologies to establish a more comprehensive missile defense barrier. Nevertheless, the potential for budget constraints and competing priorities to erode capabilities and elevate risks is a concern.
Particularly, the United States’ defense against hypersonic missiles is inadequate. Chinese and Russian military forces are in the process of developing a variety of hypersonic conventional and nuclear delivery systems that are capable of traveling at speeds that are many times the speed of sound. According to the most recent report by the U.S. Department of Defense on China’s military capabilities, “China possesses the world’s leading arsenal of hypersonic missiles.” Russia has deployed numerous hypersonic missiles, including its new “Oreshnik” medium-range ballistic missile, which it deployed against Ukraine in November 2024.
Chinese and Russian leaders are of the opinion that hypersonic weapons offer their respective nations essential strategic and operational capabilities.
Long-range hypersonic glide vehicles that operate on unpredictable trajectories in the upper atmosphere have the potential to circumvent current U.S. national missile defenses at the strategic level.
Hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles have the capability to swiftly eliminate critical targets, including U.S. command centers, military bases, and forward-deployed forces, at the regional level.
To address these hypersonic threats, the United States requires a well-conceived strategy. The Department of Defense is developing the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor constellation to continuously monitor hypersonic vehicles in flight. The Pentagon is currently evaluating the Long-Range Discrimination Radar for software enhancements to facilitate the identification of hypersonic targets.
However, the detection and tracking of fast, maneuverable gliders in the upper atmosphere are only half of the challenge. The United States must also be able to shoot them down. Congress has established a timetable for the United States to establish its first hypersonic interceptor capability by the end of this decade. Consequently, the Pentagon is in the process of creating the first system that is specifically designed to counter hypersonic gliders. Although this capability is new, the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) utilizes established technologies that the U.S. Navy has used to intercept numerous drones and missiles in the Middle East.
The primary constraint on defensive efforts has been budget, rather than technology, in contrast to the technical setbacks that have plagued U.S. offensive hypersonic missile programs. The Pentagon allocates less annual funding to hypersonic interceptors than it does to a pair of new F-35 fighter aircraft. Funding constraints have compelled the Pentagon to reduce the number of R&D contracts it has awarded to counter hypersonic gliders.
Proposals suggest allocating limited funding to develop a “gap-filler” terminal interceptor with limited capabilities as a temporary defense until the deployment of the GPI. The development of a layered defense could benefit from terminal interceptors that protect a limited number of critical sites, but the financing of any gap-filler should complement the GPI budget, protecting a much larger area, rather than dividing it.
Burden-sharing is also a component of the GPI program. The Japanese government is allocating $368 million to support its development through a cooperative agreement with the United States and other means. In order to facilitate a rigorous GPI development, testing, and deployment program, the President and Congress must capitalize on these matching funds.