NATO nations have experienced an increase in apprehension as a result of the evolution of electronic warfare (EW) over the past decade, particularly as it has been developed by Russia. Recently, Adam Bartosiewicz, Vice President of the WB Group, made widely discussed statements during a webcast. These statements have sparked a debate about Western investments in military systems, which have long ignored the increasingly sophisticated Russian approach to EW. The issue isn’t just about money; it also involves how military operations are carried out, the technology used, and overall strategies, which have been highlighted by real-life situations, especially where unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and drones have entered European airspace
The WB Group’s Warning Bells: The Podcast Brief
Adam Bartosiewicz, during his appearance on the “Biznes klasa” podcast, emphasized a critical but frequently overlooked point: the billions of dollars that the United States and broader NATO spent on programs, many of which were subsequently terminated, did not anticipate the growing importance of electronic warfare as a primary aspect of any conflict with Russia. Bartosiewicz emphasized that Western planners made major investments in GPS-guided munitions, including the M982 Excalibur, but they failed to account for the extent to which Russian EW would disrupt these systems. He clarified that the omission was the consequence of “just doing it stupidly” and a reluctance to acknowledge EW as a key component of modern Russian military doctrine. NATO is currently seeking to catch up, as the statement resonated throughout policy circles.
Due to Russian GPS-jamming operations, commercial shipping is becoming increasingly vulnerable in northern Poland and the Baltic region, as navigation issues are acute. Bartosiewicz based his claim on direct observation, not abstract theory. He stated that he had observed Russian drones equipped with GPS interference countermeasure systems, which date back to 2016 and predate the so-called full-scale invasion. Many NATO members are currently confronting the lost opportunity and time, as the funds allocated have resulted in military architectures that are improperly equipped to address the current threat environment.
What Russian Drones Are We Talking About?
Bartosiewicz did not identify specific drone models during his remarks; however, the broader context of Russian UAV development provides important context for the discussion. In 2016, Russia actively deployed drones equipped with counter-EW technology and specifically designed to operate in GPS-denied environments. The following are among the most frequently cited:
Orlan-10 UAV: The Orlan-10 has been in extensive use in Ukraine and along NATO borders, and it is a trusted mainstay for Russian forces. It is designed to assist with artillery targeting and spying, and it frequently includes tools that can detect electronic warfare assaults and transition to a backup navigation system in the event of a loss of GPS signals. These systems are equipped with robust anti-jamming modules, as evidenced by public technical evaluations from various Russian and Ukrainian military sources.
Drones of the Geranium class are frequently associated with the Iranian Shahed design. However, Russia has begun to employ these drones, which are sometimes referred to as Geran-2, and has begun to equip them with alternative navigation protocols and GPS-jamming countermeasures. According to reports from mid-2025, the modifications include advanced warheads and hardened EW protection features, which complicate interception strategies.
Lancet Loitering Munition: Lancet drones, which are manufactured by ZALA Aero, are equipped with data links that are configured to operate in areas with significant EW interference. In the event of losing external control, these links can transition between communication frequencies and rely on onboard algorithms for guidance. Ukrainian battlefield experience consistently underscores Lancet’s resistance to GPS denial and deception tactics.
Other Tactical UAVs: Russian forces have implemented improved GPS spoofing detection and autonomous return-to-base algorithms in various smaller tactical drones, such as the Granat, Takhion, and Eleron-3SV families, since at least 2016. Technical publications written in Russian describe the ubiquitous deployment of software-defined radios and anti-jamming antennas across multiple platforms.
Russian strategy is multifaceted. In addition to drones being equipped to operate in the event of GPS jamming, Russia has also deployed ground-based EW systems, including Krasukha-4 and Leer-3, which are intended to jam, disrupt, and even seize control of adversary UAVs and communications networks.
The Strategic Context: NATO’s Missed Opportunity
NATO’s foundational air defense concepts, which are concentrated on conventional standoff weapons, missile batteries, and multimillion-dollar jets, have been increasingly mismatched to Russia’s strategy of asymmetric, technologically sophisticated, and cost-effective drone warfare. The scramble of high-cost Western aircraft and the highlighting of a critical cost imbalance were the result of the September 2025 incursions of nearly 20 Russian UAVs into Polish airspace. The expenditure disparity between the cost of a fighter sortie (tens of thousands of dollars) and the cost of the drones intercepted (some estimated at a mere $10,000 each for plywood and foam decoys) is significantly skewed in Russia’s favor.
These challenges have been acknowledged by defense officials in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who have observed that the majority of drones were not detected by conventional radar and air defense sensors. The deployment of Russian drones has served a dual purpose: directly acquiring electronic intelligence regarding radar configurations and EW countermeasures and probing the reaction times and capabilities of NATO air defense. The impact is both procedural and psychological, as it necessitates accelerated expenditures on evolving air defense solutions that cannot be expected to maintain pace with the technological advancements of adversaries. Uncertainty and vulnerability fuel this effect.
The Russian Model of Drone Innovation and Electronic Warfare
Russia’s success is predominantly due to its integrated EW ecosystem. Russian-operated unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are designed to withstand and capitalize on such environments, while ground-based jamming platforms obstruct navigation and guidance for hostile drones or missiles by saturating the electromagnetic spectrum with noise and spoofed signals.
The following principles are indicative of modern Russian electronic warfare (EW) against drones:
Directed Radio Emission: Directed radio emission uses specialized antennas to target GPS bands and controlling frequencies (420 MHz to 6 GHz). This makes it impossible for the operator to control or locate the drone.
Protective Bubbles: Krasukha-4 and other systems establish protective zones that encompass a kilometer in diameter. Within these zones, satellite links are inaccessible to the majority of conventional unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Multi-Channel Disruption: Multi-band drones are rendered vulnerable unless they are equipped with sophisticated countermeasures, as up to 18 frequency bands are simultaneously targeted.
Selective Targeting: EW attacks are focused exclusively on the operational bands of UAVs, thereby reducing collateral interference with sensitive electronics in protected areas, such as airports or industrial zones.
In the event that satellite navigation is lost, Russian drones are configured to transition to inertial guidance or preprogrammed routes, enabling them to continue operations in the face of persistent interference. Algorithms enable these drones to autonomously return home, restore data links upon vacating suppressed zones, and adjust to battlefield conditions in real time, as detailed in Russian technical forums and media.
Analysis: Interpreting the Drone Example and Broader Trends
Given the Orlan-10 family’s extensive Russian military use, EW resilience, and availability of commercial data, it is probable that the example referenced by Bartosiewicz involved the Orlan-10 family, although the podcast does not name specific UAVs. However, the existence of Orlan-10 is not the sole pertinent case, as evidenced by open-source intelligence and documentation of the Ukrainian conflict. Russian defense firms are actively upgrading the Lancet, Shahed/Geranium, and various tactical reconnaissance drones with new counter-jamming technologies to ensure that they are capable of operating in GPS-denied environments.
The original source only interprets the identification and does not definitively confirm it. Other drones, particularly those deployed in 2022-2025, such as modified commercial types, indigenous Russian designs, and loitering munitions, may accommodate the narrative equally well. Continuous upgrades to drone radios and antennae are the focus of Russian-language defense news sites that were published in 2024 and 2025. These upgrades are designed to circumvent NATO’s most recent signal intelligence and EW countermeasures. For instance, reports from May 2024 outline the installation of anti-jamming receivers along the western frontier and introduce new software packages that enable drones to transition from GPS/GLONASS to inertial navigation in the event of an attack.
These issues are further complicated by the increasing prevalence of hybrid tactics, which employ both radio-electronic methods against battlefield assets and cyber operations against NATO-linked infrastructure. NATO is urgently looking at changing what it buys to focus on making affordable counter-drone technologies and stronger signal protection, since it often tends to invest in advanced, high-tech solutions without considering the enemy’s ability to disrupt electronic warfare.
Conclusion: A Reevaluation of Future Investments
Adam Bartosiewicz’s assessment of NATO’s stewardship reinforces a critical lesson: technological sophistication is inadequate in the absence of adversarial innovation and EW. Architectures are currently experiencing difficulty adapting as a result of the billions of dollars that have been spent on systems that assumed uncontested GPS and signal environments. The Russian approach, which integrates tactical adaptation, well-developed EW platforms, and low-cost, resilient drones, persistently exposes weaknesses in NATO’s defense strategies.
The Alliance’s tardiness in adopting electronic warfare as a defining conflict dimension and its subsequent haste to rectify this deficiency are not only operational challenges but also a lesson in defense policy and military innovation. To ensure that future funds are not solely aligned with technical ambition but also with actual threat realities, planners and manufacturers must maintain a balance between high-end solutions and scalable technologies that are capable of absorption, adaptation, and rapid deployment as NATO recalibrates.