The One Rank One Pension (OROP) scheme was introduced to promote fairness and equity in pension payments among India’s armed forces retirees. In principle, it ensures the same pension for personnel retiring at the same rank with the same length of service, regardless of their retirement date. However, the implementation of OROP II has exposed serious flaws that not only breach this principle but also discriminate against long-serving veterans.
These are not just statistical anomalies but personal injustices that have profoundly affected the lives of our veterans. It has emerged that the Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA) and CDA (O) compiled OROP II tables using incomplete and frequently non-representative data. Several service brackets, especially those involving Majors and Selection Grade Lieutenant Colonels with 20 to 28 years of service, had no actual retirees, yet fixed pension figures were assigned arbitrarily.
Historic Service Structures Ignored
A clear example of this unfairness involves a Selection Grade Lt Col with 22.5 years of service, who has been fixed at a pension of INR 82,275. In stark contrast, a Territorial Army officer with 20 years of service receives a pension of INR 89,150 — nearly INR 7,000 more, despite having less service and experience.
Even more revealing is the disparity between ranks and services. An AMC or RVC Lt Col earns INR 1,18,000, including Non-Practising Allowance (NPA). After NPA adjustment, this still creates a significant gap compared to their counterparts in combat arms or regular services.
The result: officers who served under more selective and rigorous career progression systems are now grouped with those promoted under current time-scale norms. A Lt Col promoted at 19 years is now equated with one promoted at 13 years. This grouping not only violates logic but also devalues the contributions of senior officers and creates a flawed sense of parity.
Personnel Below Officers Rank (PBOR)
Most of the Veterans are our PBOR who have also been adversely affected. Their case needs to be examined as well, and justice should be served.
Majors with 25–28 Years of Service: Forgotten by the System
Another silent group affected by OROP II is the Majors who retired with 25 to 28 years of service, during a period when there was no provision for Time Scale promotion to Lt Col. These officers, having served long and honourably, find themselves completely erased from the pension parity structure because the rank progression system has changed. Today, all officers are promoted to Lieutenant Colonel after 13 years of service, leaving no current equivalents of long-serving Majors in the data used for pension calculations.
This structural shift has resulted in a complete lack of pension brackets for Majors with extended service, leaving them voiceless in the current tables. This is not just an oversight; it is a systemic erasure of a whole generation of officers who dedicated decades to the nation.
Selection Grade Lt Cols Who Took PMR: The Most Adversely Affected
Perhaps the most affected group in the implementation of OROP II is Selection Grade Lt Colonels who took Premature Retirement (PMR) before 2006.
Consider the case of an officer who retired in 2005 after completing 26 years of service as a Selection Grade Lt Col. According to the pension regulations then in effect, he was granted a weightage of 7 years, which increased his qualifying service to 33 years, making him eligible for a full pension — 50% of his last drawn pay (calculated as the average of the previous 10 months). This approach was consistent with existing norms and ensured fair treatment based on seniority and rank.
Under OROP II, that table has now been ignored. The officer’s qualifying service is counted as only 26 years, and their pension entitlement has been significantly reduced. The earlier recognition of Selection Grade service and weightage is now eliminated, resulting in pensions lower than even Time Scale Colonels, many of whom never held any selection-grade rank.
To compound the injustice, Selection Grade Lt Col was a senior and hard-earned rank, distinct from its Time Scale equivalents. But in today’s tables, there is no distinction at all — effectively equating or even subordinating Selection Grade Lt Cols to Time Scale Colonels.
A fair and logical policy would have been to recognize Selection Grade Lt Cols as equivalent to Col (TS) for pension purposes, especially for those who took PMR before the introduction of the Time Scale Colonel. However, this tiny group of officers has been overlooked — probably because their numbers are small and the cost of fixing the anomaly would have been negligible in the larger budget context.
Higher Ranks Also Affected
Lieutenant Generals have not been spared. Their pensions have also been affected by indiscriminate grouping, without acknowledging differences in command tenure, operational responsibilities, or seniority within the same rank. As a result, officers at the highest level of military leadership face reduced pensions, contradicting their status, experience, and command responsibilities.
Opaque Methodology and Silence from Authorities
Despite several representations, there has been no response from DESW or CGDA. There has been no clarification regarding the source of the data used, the rationale for grouping dissimilar service profiles, or the basis of these new pension brackets.
CGDA continues to enforce these tables strictly, citing adherence to procedure while neglecting fairness, transparency, and past service conditions.
This is not only administratively arbitrary but also a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice.
A Violation of Justice, Not Just Process
The impact of OROP II is more than just a breach of equality; it also represents a betrayal of policy goals and distorts institutional memory. When pension tables are created without reflecting actual service conditions, it becomes a policy that penalizes loyalty, longevity, and merit, betraying the trust that veterans placed in the system.
OROP was designed to unify veterans across generations. Currently, it has the opposite effect—generating new disparities, penalising those who served under stricter systems, and undermining trust in military pension policy.
Conclusion: Restore Honour, Not Just Pensions
OPOR II, as implemented, is more than a policy failure; it is an ethical and moral failure. A generation of officers, particularly those who retired as Selection Grade Lt Colonels under older, more demanding promotion systems, has been left behind by a framework that refuses to acknowledge their rank, effort, and sacrifice.
It is not enough to publish tables and claim compliance; one must also demonstrate it. Real justice requires historical awareness, proportional fairness, and institutional empathy. It’s time for the system to recognise that honour doesn’t fade with time, and neither should the pensions of those who earned it.