Pakistan is once again in the midst of political drama marked by the midnight heist of the jailed PM from a hospital and his return back to his jail cell without even examination on the pretext that machines in the premier hospital were not working. While the drama was being enacted, Pakistan’s National Assembly quickly passed Defence Forces of Pakistan Act 2026, without a murmur or even a minute of debate, ceding unbridled powers to the FM Asim Munir as Chief of Defence Force. The spectacle as always was marked by televised rallies, contrived court battles, and parliamentary maneuvers. These visible trappings, however, mask a deeper recalibration of political power. Through this one act, the Pakistani political establishment has handed over power to a centralized military hierarchy. This is not merely intensification of military influence; it is a systemic shift. Where once power worked through influence and backchannels, it will now operate through a military-dominated chain of command designed to act in its own interest at the expense of people of Pakistan.
Civilian theatre, uniformed engine
Civilians provide cover; the military sets the agenda.
The arrangement set in motion has practical consequences for both domestic governance and external posture. Political actors may be permitted to campaign, negotiate, and represent the state, but their room for defining national choices or interests will have to be in line with military thinking. The uniformed leadership will retain authority over force posture, internal security priorities, and the selection of instruments for external coercion, with no political oversight or reference to people of Pakistan. Civilian legitimacy may be sought for international optics and internal calm; reality is the operational calculus from counter-insurgency timelines to foreign alignments will be the sole preserve of the central military hierarchy. This relegation of political and diplomatic space narrows the scope for diplomacy and political connection. What Pakistan has witnessed is a soft coup in which the elected government, through the constitutional process, has ceded power to a single person, the “Chief of Defence Force.” In subsequent paragraphs we examine the consequences of this political upheaval.
Implications of Defence Forces of Pakistan Act 2026
The principal elements of the Act are the creation of the Integrated Defence Forces Headquarters led by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), who will exercise command over all elements of the Pakistani Defence Forces, viz., the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Nuclear and Rocket Forces. CDF will be the single point advisor to the Federal Government of Pakistan on all matters related to defence of Pakistan, including command and control of all defence forces. Important functions will include
- Responsible for multi-domain integration, including operational coordination and oversight of all matters relating to joint/tri-service and their strategic implications.
- A very far-reaching power exercised by CDF will be the power to release, reject, or accept resignation and discharge of all serving officers, irrespective of service. This essentially means service officers in the Pakistani military will now serve at the pleasure of the CDF rather than the President of Pakistan. Implications of this are self-evident.
- A national strategic command will be established, which will control all strategic assets of Pakistan. The commander of the NSC will be appointed by the Federal Government, a person approved by the CDF. The National Security Act 2010 will be amended accordingly.
Implications are obvious. CDF has emerged as a nation’s security czar with unbridled military power and little or no constraints. He will be responsible most importantly for overall national security, both internal and external. This will have far-reaching consequences, as discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
Proxies kept, not killed
Some irregular groups will be preserved for leverage.
A key paradox of the new arrangement is the intensification of counter-insurgency operations at home together with the selective retention of deniable instruments abroad. Pakistan is now likely to pursue operations in restive provinces to reassert its writ while preserving calibrated militant capabilities as tools of coercion against India. Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will see higher-tempo operations aimed at denying sanctuary to insurgents, among others, to satisfy Chinese security needs and send a strong message of authority to the general populace. Against India it will preserve or create additional networks that it views as useful. These groups will be managed more tightly and kept at levels sufficient to harass, probe, and complicate India’s security calculations without inviting strong reprisals. Escalation of the cross-border proxy campaign cannot be overlooked.
This dual approach has two effects. Domestically, it allows the state to claim governance victories while retaining asymmetric options. Externally, it institutionalizes a posture in which deniability becomes a core strategic asset—making rapid attribution and international censure harder while undertaking calibrated provocations designed to test red lines.
China stays close but sets limits
Beijing’s support is significant yet strategically constrained.
Pakistan will continue to anchor its external strategy in an enhanced partnership with China. Economic lifelines, infrastructure projects, and military cooperation remain foundational to Islamabad’s plan to stabilize the state and modernize its armed forces. Yet this relationship is transactional and bounded. Beijing’s appetite for providing the most advanced weaponry systems that carry political or reputational risk appears cautious. Pakistan should expect continued Chinese investment and selective defence transfers, but not an unfettered conveyor belt of cutting-edge capabilities, as an example, there are reports that the sale of fifth-generation J-35 fighters has been delayed owing to production delays and concerns about Pakistan’s ability to pay, etc.
Beyond China, Islamabad will hedge. The United States, despite a checkered relationship, remains an important card to be played when Washington’s priorities align with Pakistan’s. Gulf states and Turkey offer political and financial cushions that reduce Islamabad’s strategic vulnerability. This multi-vector military diplomacy is pragmatic: avoid total dependence on any single partner while leveraging geopolitical competition to extract resources. Expect this to continue or even gather pace.
Nuclear fog and faster mistakes
Ambiguous C2 shortens margins and increases the risk of miscalculation.
Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of a centralized, command-driven military posture is the opacity surrounding nuclear command and control. If functions once distributed across collective bodies such as Employment and Development Committees with political oversight, get consolidated under a Chief of Defence Forces, the result is a less accountable, faster decision loop. In a crisis, that opacity can be lethal. Compressed timelines, coupled with a doctrine that contemplates miscalculated crossing of nuclear redlines creating pathways to inadvertent escalation.
The combination of deniable proxies, rapid conventional escalation, and uncertain nuclear signalling reduces the space for measured diplomatic intervention. A misinterpreted strike or a proxied incursion, occurring in the fog of an escalatory dynamic, could trigger reactions whose speed and intensity neither side intended. The nuclear overhang transforms what might otherwise be limited clashes into scenarios with catastrophic potential.
Patrons will be courted, not trusted
Islamabad will seek sponsors while protecting strategic autonomy.
To underwrite its domestic stability and external posture, Pakistan will continue to court patrons. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provide financial buffers; Turkey offers diplomatic cover and technology cooperation; and the United States, when geopolitics permits, remains a potent balancing partner. The intent is clear: to secure political legitimacy, financial resources, and strategic leeway without becoming hostage to any single patron’s demands. A difficult balancing act, which the all-encompassing Pakistani military under CDF feels he can manage.
Sadly these relationships are transactional and limited. External patrons will weigh reputational costs and their own strategic calculations before providing unconditional support. Beijing’s strategic caution and Western sensitivities mean Pakistan cannot assume unlimited external backing for high-risk ventures. Still, even limited patronage provides funds and political space sufficient to sustain a command-driven posture at home and a coercive stance abroad.
Expectations for operational behaviour
The emerging Pakistani model will produce a predictable pattern of activity across several fronts. Internally, CI operations will intensify and expand geographically. Externally, calibrated provocations, increased infiltration attempts, and preemptive proxy attacks could be used to test Indian resolve and operational readiness.
Water politics, notably disputes over the Indus Waters Treaty, offer an attractive lever for symbolic and material coercion; actions tied to these issues can be framed domestically as assertions of sovereignty while serving as a plausible pretext for limited moves against India.
Escalation dynamics: faster, murkier, riskier
Faster operational tempos make miscalculation likelier, not less.
A principal strategic danger is the compression of escalation timelines. New Delhi has historically relied on a mix of measured political and military responses. Against a relatively unconstrained adversary, those windows narrow. Miscalculated or heuristic actions by CDF led to military increases in the risk of miscalculated escalation.
Misattribution and information fog multiply the problem. If Islamabad uses deniable tools, India’s need for quick, incontrovertible evidence grows. Without that, democratic pressures may push for visible retaliation.
Policy prescriptions for India and the region
The world has to realise, legitimising the military power of a nuclear nation in a single military commander with unfettered powers is a serious and hugely destabilising development. Consequences of this are heightened instability and narrowing the nuclear trip wire.
What should New Delhi do to manage the evolving risks? First, accept the operational reality: India faces heightened threat, with a leader who has a record of anti-India bias. His speeches and remarks are self-explanatory. The second scope for diplomacy has been hugely curtailed. To prevent miscalculation or inadvertent escalation, there is a need for direct military-to-military channels and low-profile backchannels to be prioritized and kept functional. Second, invest in fast, decisive attribution mechanisms, technical forensics, ISR assets, and joint fusion centres to deny Pakistan the advantage of plausible deniability.
Third, institutionalize crisis management and confidence-building mechanisms. Practical measures, hotlines, agreed signalling protocols, and pre-notification of major exercises reduce the likelihood of accidental escalation. Fourth, leverage diplomatic pressure on Pakistan’s patrons: Gulf and other friendly states can be engaged to raise the cost of enabling deniable operations.
Finally, calibrate deterrent responses, which are credible, proportionate, and agile. A deterrence that is too slow or too ambiguous invites further testing. Deterrence that is overblown risks unnecessary escalation. The imperative is precision: shape tools that impose costs on coercion without triggering uncontrolled spirals.
A more dangerous normal
Diplomacy will be sidelined while generals act.
Pakistan’s evolving model of command-driven statecraft may not necessarily lead to conflict, but it increases the probability of faster, murkier, and more dangerous crisis escalation. The consolidation of military authority shortens decision cycles, preserves deniable instruments of coercion, and increases the opacity of nuclear C2. For India, the strategic response must be adaptive: strengthen attribution, institutionalize crisis communications, invest in integrated deterrence, and use diplomatic levers to limit patronage. Treating this as a passing phase would be a strategic error; recognizing it as a structural change in Pakistan’s operational logic is the necessary first step in managing risks.